linux-toradex.git/drivers/xen, branch v6.9-rc4

Merge tag 'for-linus-6.9-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip

2024-03-19T15:48:09+00:00

Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - Xen event channel handling fix for a regression with a rare kernel
   config and some added hardening

 - better support of running Xen dom0 in PVH mode

 - a cleanup for the xen grant-dma-iommu driver

* tag 'for-linus-6.9-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/events: increment refcnt only if event channel is refcounted
  xen/evtchn: avoid WARN() when unbinding an event channel
  x86/xen: attempt to inflate the memory balloon on PVH
  xen/grant-dma-iommu: Convert to platform remove callback returning void

xen/events: increment refcnt only if event channel is refcounted

2024-03-17T17:57:12+00:00

In bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip() don't increment the refcnt of the event
channel blindly. In case the event channel is NOT refcounted, issue a
warning instead.

Add an additional safety net by doing the refcnt increment only if the
caller has specified IRQF_SHARED in the irqflags parameter.

Fixes: 9e90e58c11b7 ("xen: evtchn: Allow shared registration of IRQ handers")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313071409.25913-3-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

xen/evtchn: avoid WARN() when unbinding an event channel

2024-03-17T17:57:11+00:00

When unbinding a user event channel, the related handler might be
called a last time in case the kernel was built with
CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ. This might cause a WARN() in the handler.

Avoid that by adding an "unbinding" flag to struct user_event which
will short circuit the handler.

Fixes: 9e90e58c11b7 ("xen: evtchn: Allow shared registration of IRQ handers")
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour 
Tested-by: Demi Marie Obenour 
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313071409.25913-2-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

x86/xen: attempt to inflate the memory balloon on PVH

2024-03-13T16:48:26+00:00

When running as PVH or HVM Linux will use holes in the memory map as scratch
space to map grants, foreign domain pages and possibly miscellaneous other
stuff.  However the usage of such memory map holes for Xen purposes can be
problematic.  The request of holesby Xen happen quite early in the kernel boot
process (grant table setup already uses scratch map space), and it's possible
that by then not all devices have reclaimed their MMIO space.  It's not
unlikely for chunks of Xen scratch map space to end up using PCI bridge MMIO
window memory, which (as expected) causes quite a lot of issues in the system.

At least for PVH dom0 we have the possibility of using regions marked as
UNUSABLE in the e820 memory map.  Either if the region is UNUSABLE in the
native memory map, or it has been converted into UNUSABLE in order to hide RAM
regions from dom0, the second stage translation page-tables can populate those
areas without issues.

PV already has this kind of logic, where the balloon driver is inflated at
boot.  Re-use the current logic in order to also inflate it when running as
PVH.  onvert UNUSABLE regions up to the ratio specified in EXTRA_MEM_RATIO to
RAM, while reserving them using xen_add_extra_mem() (which is also moved so
it's no longer tied to CONFIG_PV).

[jgross: fixed build for CONFIG_PVH without CONFIG_XEN_PVH]

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240220174341.56131-1-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

xen/grant-dma-iommu: Convert to platform remove callback returning void

2024-03-13T16:09:26+00:00

The .remove() callback for a platform driver returns an int which makes
many driver authors wrongly assume it's possible to do error handling by
returning an error code. However the value returned is ignored (apart
from emitting a warning) and this typically results in resource leaks.

To improve here there is a quest to make the remove callback return
void. In the first step of this quest all drivers are converted to
.remove_new(), which already returns void. Eventually after all drivers
are converted, .remove_new() will be renamed to .remove().

Trivially convert this driver from always returning zero in the remove
callback to the void returning variant.

Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307181135.191192-2-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2024-03-11T23:00:17+00:00

Pull x86 FRED support from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Support for x86 Fast Return and Event Delivery (FRED).

  FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most
  of the technical nightmares which IDT exposes:

   1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved
      in nested exception scenarios.

   2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested
      exceptions as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on
      each entry which requires a massive effort in the low level entry
      of #NMI code to handle this.

   3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user
      which makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs
      to be especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI.

   4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which
      is a problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a
      stack trace.

   5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment

   6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion
      on large systems.

   7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources

  FRED addresses these shortcomings by:

   1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save
      exception cause registers. This ensures that the meta information
      for each exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra
      complexity of preserving it in software.

   2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested
      exception uses the currently interrupt stack.

   3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS
      BASE handling which is required to establish kernel context for
      per CPU variable access is done in hardware.

   4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the
      return from NMI.

   5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP

   6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design
      because it uses a central entry points for kernel and user space
      and the CPUstores the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt,
      syscall) on the entry stack along with the vector number. The
      entry code has to demultiplex this information, but this removes
      the vector space restriction.

      The first hardware implementations will still have the current
      restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires
      further changes to the local APIC.

   7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which
      allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the
      required local APIC changes are in place.

  The series implements the initial FRED support by:

   - Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to
     accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism.

   - Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED
     requires to store context and meta information

   - Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have
     information pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB.

   - Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE

   - Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to
     demultiplex the events

   - Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary
     tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc.

  The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs the existing IDT
  implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths
  like context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the
  impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the
  extended stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and
  therefore have no impact on IDT based systems.

  It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED
  simulation and as of now there are no outstanding problems"

* tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
  x86/fred: Fix init_task thread stack pointer initialization
  MAINTAINERS: Add a maintainer entry for FRED
  x86/fred: Fix a build warning with allmodconfig due to 'inline' failing to inline properly
  x86/fred: Invoke FRED initialization code to enable FRED
  x86/fred: Add FRED initialization functions
  x86/syscall: Split IDT syscall setup code into idt_syscall_init()
  KVM: VMX: Call fred_entry_from_kvm() for IRQ/NMI handling
  x86/entry: Add fred_entry_from_kvm() for VMX to handle IRQ/NMI
  x86/entry/calling: Allow PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS being used beyond actual entry code
  x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user
  x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled
  x86/traps: Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler
  x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code
  x86/fred: Add a machine check entry stub for FRED
  x86/fred: Add a NMI entry stub for FRED
  x86/fred: Add a debug fault entry stub for FRED
  x86/idtentry: Incorporate definitions/declarations of the FRED entries
  x86/fred: Make exc_page_fault() work for FRED
  x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task
  x86/fred: No ESPFIX needed when FRED is enabled
  ...

xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup

2024-02-13T09:12:47+00:00

shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the
irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both
are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order,
however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock.

This opens multiple races:
- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event
  channel:

  CPU0                        CPU1
  shutdown_pirq {
    xen_evtchn_close(e)
                              __startup_pirq {
                                EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq
                                  -> returns just freed evtchn e
                                set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)
                              }
    xen_irq_info_cleanup() {
      set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)
    }
  }

  Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel
  number.
  After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).

- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because
  __startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the
  evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In
  this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can
  be unset in evtchn_to_irq.

The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event
channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's
potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.
This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event
channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.

On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal
[un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe
devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq
is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.
With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during
boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and
startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled
  kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006
  Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work
  RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
  Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
  RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
  RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
   ? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
   ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
   ? die+0x2b/0x50
   ? do_trap+0x90/0x110
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc5/0xf0
   set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
   irq_do_set_affinity+0x1d7/0x1f0
   irq_setup_affinity+0xd6/0x1a0
   irq_startup+0x8a/0xf0
   __setup_irq+0x639/0x6d0
   ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150
   request_threaded_irq+0x10c/0x180
   ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150
   pci_request_irq+0xa8/0xf0
   ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x74/0xa0
   queue_request_irq+0x6f/0x80
   nvme_create_queue+0x1af/0x200
   nvme_create_io_queues+0xbd/0xf0
   nvme_setup_io_queues+0x246/0x320
   ? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30
   nvme_reset_work+0x1c8/0x400
   process_one_work+0x1b0/0x350
   worker_thread+0x49/0x310
   ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350
   kthread+0x11b/0x140
   ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
   ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace a11715de1eee1873 ]---

Fixes: d46a78b05c0e ("xen: implement pirq type event channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-debugged-by: Andrew Panyakin 
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124163130.31324-1-mheyne@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

xen/gntalloc: Replace UAPI 1-element array

2024-02-13T08:06:48+00:00

Without changing the structure size (since it is UAPI), add a proper
flexible array member, and reference it in the kernel so that it will
not be trip the array-bounds sanitizer[1].

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/113 [1]
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Stefano Stabellini 
Cc: Oleksandr Tyshchenko 
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva 
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206170320.work.437-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

xen: balloon: make balloon_subsys const

2024-02-13T08:03:34+00:00

Now that the driver core can properly handle constant struct bus_type,
move the balloon_subsys variable to be a constant structure as well,
placing it into read-only memory which can not be modified at runtime.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Ricardo B. Marliere 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203-bus_cleanup-xen-v1-2-c2f5fe89ed95@marliere.net
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross

xen: pcpu: make xen_pcpu_subsys const

2024-02-13T08:03:31+00:00

Now that the driver core can properly handle constant struct bus_type,
move the xen_pcpu_subsys variable to be a constant structure as well,
placing it into read-only memory which can not be modified at runtime.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Ricardo B. Marliere 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203-bus_cleanup-xen-v1-1-c2f5fe89ed95@marliere.net
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross