linux-toradex.git/fs/binfmt_misc.c, branch v3.10.2

binfmt_misc: reuse string_unescape_inplace()

2013-05-01T00:04:03+00:00

There is string_unescape_inplace() function which decodes strings in generic
way. Let's use it.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules.

2013-03-04T03:36:31+00:00

Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.

A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.

Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.

Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives.  Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.

This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work.  While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases.  The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.

This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.

After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module.  The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions.  In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted.  In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Reported-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

new helper: file_inode(file)

2013-02-23T04:31:31+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack

2012-12-21T01:40:19+00:00

If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.

Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules.  Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted.  They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack.  This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.

After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules.  As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.

This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp.  To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is.  Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.

For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:

   http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: halfdog 
Cc: P J P 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: use -ELOOP for max recursion depth

2012-12-18T01:15:23+00:00

To avoid an explosion of request_module calls on a chain of abusive
scripts, fail maximum recursion with -ELOOP instead of -ENOEXEC. As soon
as maximum recursion depth is hit, the error will fail all the way back
up the chain, aborting immediately.

This also has the side-effect of stopping the user's shell from attempting
to reexecute the top-level file as a shell script. As seen in the
dash source:

        if (cmd != path_bshell && errno == ENOEXEC) {
                *argv-- = cmd;
                *argv = cmd = path_bshell;
                goto repeat;
        }

The above logic was designed for running scripts automatically that lacked
the "#!" header, not to re-try failed recursion. On a legitimate -ENOEXEC,
things continue to behave as the shell expects.

Additionally, when tracking recursion, the binfmt handlers should not be
involved. The recursion being tracked is the depth of calls through
search_binary_handler(), so that function should be exclusively responsible
for tracking the depth.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: halfdog 
Cc: P J P 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

get rid of pt_regs argument of ->load_binary()

2012-11-29T02:53:38+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

get rid of pt_regs argument of search_binary_handler()

2012-11-29T02:53:38+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

vfs: Rename end_writeback() to clear_inode()

2012-05-06T05:43:41+00:00

After we moved inode_sync_wait() from end_writeback() it doesn't make sense
to call the function end_writeback() anymore. Rename it to clear_inode()
which well says what the function really does - set I_CLEAR flag.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu

magic.h: move some FS magic numbers into magic.h

2012-03-23T23:58:31+00:00

- Move open-coded filesystem magic numbers into magic.h

- Rearrange magic.h so that the filesystem-related constants are grouped
  together.

Signed-off-by: Muthukumar R 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

__register_binfmt() made void

2012-03-21T01:29:46+00:00

Just don't pass NULL to it - nobody does, anyway.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro