linux-toradex.git/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c, branch v3.4.83

cifs: extend the buffer length enought for sprintf() using

2013-08-15T05:57:07+00:00

commit 057d6332b24a4497c55a761c83c823eed9e3f23b upstream.

For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length
is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName'
length may be "255 + '\0'".

The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related
buffer enough to hold all things.

It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than
256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'.

Signed-off-by: Chen Gang 
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar 
Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg 
Signed-off-by: Steve French 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Handle big endianness in NTLM (ntlmv2) authentication

2013-07-22T01:19:02+00:00

commit fdf96a907c1fbb93c633e2b7ede3b8df26d6a4c0 upstream.

This is RH bug 970891
Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails
because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars.

Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage.

[To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed
this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated
by sparse -- steve f.]

Reported-by: steve 
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar 
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Steve French 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

CIFS: Rename UCS functions to UTF16

2012-01-19T04:32:33+00:00

to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky 
Acked-by: Jeff Layton 
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar

cifs: sanitize username handling

2012-01-18T04:40:26+00:00

Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL
vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't.

Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that
all the callers check for that.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Steve French

cifs: Assume passwords are encoded according to iocharset (try #2)

2011-10-30T03:06:54+00:00

Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after
rebasing on 3.2.

Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according
to iocharset.  Before this patch passwords would be treated as
raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible
(at least passwords with characters > 0xFF).

The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with
ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1.  Software which
relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also
uses iocharset=iso8859-1.  (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so
it will work as expected.)

Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad 
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar 
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky 
Tested-by: A 
Signed-off-by: Steve French

cifs: consolidate signature generating code

2011-10-13T04:41:41+00:00

We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and
non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste
code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the
vectorized one.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Steve French

cifs: use memcpy for magic string in cifs signature generation BSRSPYL

2011-10-13T04:41:18+00:00

...it's more efficient since we know the length.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Steve French

cifs: Fix broken sec=ntlmv2/i sec option (try #2)

2011-09-20T02:16:58+00:00

Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares.

cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly.
All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2

"Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM,
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName)

as
Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion,
Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)"

is MsvAvNbDomainName.

For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from
type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication.

I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against
Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7.
They all worked.

Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar 
Signed-off-by: Steve French

cifs: don't start signing too early

2011-07-31T21:21:06+00:00

Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed
out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the
signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the
same way.

It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested
against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as
possible here.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton 
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar 
Signed-off-by: Steve French

cifs: Cleanup: check return codes of crypto api calls

2011-07-25T22:12:10+00:00

Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log
an error and return from the calling function with error.

Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar 
Signed-off-by: Steve French