<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/dcache.c, branch v4.4.110</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>dentry name snapshots</title>
<updated>2017-08-07T02:19:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-07T18:51:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=407669f2c9fe9f32aeb39f715d748fe456718aac'/>
<id>407669f2c9fe9f32aeb39f715d748fe456718aac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e upstream.

take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified).  In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.

dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().

Intended use:
	struct name_snapshot s;

	take_dentry_name_snapshot(&amp;s, dentry);
	...
	access s.name
	...
	release_dentry_name_snapshot(&amp;s);

Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e upstream.

take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified).  In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.

dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().

Intended use:
	struct name_snapshot s;

	take_dentry_name_snapshot(&amp;s, dentry);
	...
	access s.name
	...
	release_dentry_name_snapshot(&amp;s);

Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/dcache.c: fix spin lockup issue on nlru-&gt;lock</title>
<updated>2017-07-21T05:44:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sahitya Tummala</name>
<email>stummala@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-10T22:50:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=68b0f5d85b3a25ee452424e18fe06b93da8dd4d2'/>
<id>68b0f5d85b3a25ee452424e18fe06b93da8dd4d2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b17c070fb624cf10162cf92ea5e1ec25cd8ac176 upstream.

__list_lru_walk_one() acquires nlru spin lock (nlru-&gt;lock) for longer
duration if there are more number of items in the lru list.  As per the
current code, it can hold the spin lock for upto maximum UINT_MAX
entries at a time.  So if there are more number of items in the lru
list, then "BUG: spinlock lockup suspected" is observed in the below
path:

  spin_bug+0x90
  do_raw_spin_lock+0xfc
  _raw_spin_lock+0x28
  list_lru_add+0x28
  dput+0x1c8
  path_put+0x20
  terminate_walk+0x3c
  path_lookupat+0x100
  filename_lookup+0x6c
  user_path_at_empty+0x54
  SyS_faccessat+0xd0
  el0_svc_naked+0x24

This nlru-&gt;lock is acquired by another CPU in this path -

  d_lru_shrink_move+0x34
  dentry_lru_isolate_shrink+0x48
  __list_lru_walk_one.isra.10+0x94
  list_lru_walk_node+0x40
  shrink_dcache_sb+0x60
  do_remount_sb+0xbc
  do_emergency_remount+0xb0
  process_one_work+0x228
  worker_thread+0x2e0
  kthread+0xf4
  ret_from_fork+0x10

Fix this lockup by reducing the number of entries to be shrinked from
the lru list to 1024 at once.  Also, add cond_resched() before
processing the lru list again.

Link: http://marc.info/?t=149722864900001&amp;r=1&amp;w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498707575-2472-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala &lt;stummala@codeaurora.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Polakov &lt;apolyakov@beget.ru&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b17c070fb624cf10162cf92ea5e1ec25cd8ac176 upstream.

__list_lru_walk_one() acquires nlru spin lock (nlru-&gt;lock) for longer
duration if there are more number of items in the lru list.  As per the
current code, it can hold the spin lock for upto maximum UINT_MAX
entries at a time.  So if there are more number of items in the lru
list, then "BUG: spinlock lockup suspected" is observed in the below
path:

  spin_bug+0x90
  do_raw_spin_lock+0xfc
  _raw_spin_lock+0x28
  list_lru_add+0x28
  dput+0x1c8
  path_put+0x20
  terminate_walk+0x3c
  path_lookupat+0x100
  filename_lookup+0x6c
  user_path_at_empty+0x54
  SyS_faccessat+0xd0
  el0_svc_naked+0x24

This nlru-&gt;lock is acquired by another CPU in this path -

  d_lru_shrink_move+0x34
  dentry_lru_isolate_shrink+0x48
  __list_lru_walk_one.isra.10+0x94
  list_lru_walk_node+0x40
  shrink_dcache_sb+0x60
  do_remount_sb+0xbc
  do_emergency_remount+0xb0
  process_one_work+0x228
  worker_thread+0x2e0
  kthread+0xf4
  ret_from_fork+0x10

Fix this lockup by reducing the number of entries to be shrinked from
the lru list to 1024 at once.  Also, add cond_resched() before
processing the lru list again.

Link: http://marc.info/?t=149722864900001&amp;r=1&amp;w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498707575-2472-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala &lt;stummala@codeaurora.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Polakov &lt;apolyakov@beget.ru&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Protect the mountpoint hashtable with mount_lock</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-03T01:18:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4a6716f165179679ee418b79445aa4031118ecd1'/>
<id>4a6716f165179679ee418b79445aa4031118ecd1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7 upstream.

Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire.  At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.

Kristen Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt; reported:
&gt; This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
&gt; attempt to free the same mountpoint.  This occurs because some callers
&gt; hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock.  Some
&gt; even hold both.
&gt;
&gt; In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
&gt; put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
&gt; a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.

Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.

I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock.   The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.

d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set.  This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.

Fixes: ce07d891a089 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7 upstream.

Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire.  At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.

Kristen Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt; reported:
&gt; This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
&gt; attempt to free the same mountpoint.  This occurs because some callers
&gt; hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock.  Some
&gt; even hold both.
&gt;
&gt; In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
&gt; put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
&gt; a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.

Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.

I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock.   The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.

d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set.  This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.

Fixes: ce07d891a089 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput()</title>
<updated>2016-08-16T07:30:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Fang</name>
<email>fangwei1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-06T03:32:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=92f71339bceeda3a13b71e9663bf422bf3d3e941'/>
<id>92f71339bceeda3a13b71e9663bf422bf3d3e941</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 47be61845c775643f1aa4d2a54343549f943c94c upstream.

We triggered soft-lockup under stress test which
open/access/write/close one file concurrently on more than
five different CPUs:

WARN: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 11s! [who:30631]
...
[&lt;ffffffc0003986f8&gt;] dput+0x100/0x298
[&lt;ffffffc00038c2dc&gt;] terminate_walk+0x4c/0x60
[&lt;ffffffc00038f56c&gt;] path_lookupat+0x5cc/0x7a8
[&lt;ffffffc00038f780&gt;] filename_lookup+0x38/0xf0
[&lt;ffffffc000391180&gt;] user_path_at_empty+0x78/0xd0
[&lt;ffffffc0003911f4&gt;] user_path_at+0x1c/0x28
[&lt;ffffffc00037d4fc&gt;] SyS_faccessat+0xb4/0x230

-&gt;d_lock trylock may failed many times because of concurrently
operations, and dput() may execute a long time.

Fix this by replacing cpu_relax() with cond_resched().
dput() used to be sleepable, so make it sleepable again
should be safe.

Signed-off-by: Wei Fang &lt;fangwei1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 47be61845c775643f1aa4d2a54343549f943c94c upstream.

We triggered soft-lockup under stress test which
open/access/write/close one file concurrently on more than
five different CPUs:

WARN: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 11s! [who:30631]
...
[&lt;ffffffc0003986f8&gt;] dput+0x100/0x298
[&lt;ffffffc00038c2dc&gt;] terminate_walk+0x4c/0x60
[&lt;ffffffc00038f56c&gt;] path_lookupat+0x5cc/0x7a8
[&lt;ffffffc00038f780&gt;] filename_lookup+0x38/0xf0
[&lt;ffffffc000391180&gt;] user_path_at_empty+0x78/0xd0
[&lt;ffffffc0003911f4&gt;] user_path_at+0x1c/0x28
[&lt;ffffffc00037d4fc&gt;] SyS_faccessat+0xb4/0x230

-&gt;d_lock trylock may failed many times because of concurrently
operations, and dput() may execute a long time.

Fix this by replacing cpu_relax() with cond_resched().
dput() used to be sleepable, so make it sleepable again
should be safe.

Signed-off-by: Wei Fang &lt;fangwei1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix d_walk()/non-delayed __d_free() race</title>
<updated>2016-06-24T17:18:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-08T01:26:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b11d80e1aa70b56c6431e4dc3c686ffc61a73bf'/>
<id>2b11d80e1aa70b56c6431e4dc3c686ffc61a73bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3d56c25e3bb0726a5c5e16fc2d9e38f8ed763085 upstream.

Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child
dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay.  Unfortunately, in
quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as
the result.

Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever
been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it
ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and
covers all cases the old rule used to cover.  Moreover, pipes and
sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in
the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional
in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3d56c25e3bb0726a5c5e16fc2d9e38f8ed763085 upstream.

Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child
dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay.  Unfortunately, in
quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as
the result.

Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever
been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it
ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and
covers all cases the old rule used to cover.  Moreover, pipes and
sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in
the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional
in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add file_dentry()</title>
<updated>2016-04-20T06:42:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>miklos@szeredi.hu</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-26T20:14:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c452dfc33274832a0f23b80ff2829b6fae9dd95d'/>
<id>c452dfc33274832a0f23b80ff2829b6fae9dd95d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d101a125954eae1d397adda94ca6319485a50493 upstream.

This series fixes bugs in nfs and ext4 due to 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs:
Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay").

Regular files opened on overlayfs will result in the file being opened on
the underlying filesystem, while f_path points to the overlayfs
mount/dentry.

This confuses filesystems which get the dentry from struct file and assume
it's theirs.

Add a new helper, file_dentry() [*], to get the filesystem's own dentry
from the file.  This checks file-&gt;f_path.dentry-&gt;d_flags against
DCACHE_OP_REAL, and returns file-&gt;f_path.dentry if DCACHE_OP_REAL is not
set (this is the common, non-overlayfs case).

In the uncommon case it will call into overlayfs's -&gt;d_real() to get the
underlying dentry, matching file_inode(file).

The reason we need to check against the inode is that if the file is copied
up while being open, d_real() would return the upper dentry, while the open
file comes from the lower dentry.

[*] If possible, it's better simply to use file_inode() instead.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues &lt;rgoldwyn@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d101a125954eae1d397adda94ca6319485a50493 upstream.

This series fixes bugs in nfs and ext4 due to 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs:
Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay").

Regular files opened on overlayfs will result in the file being opened on
the underlying filesystem, while f_path points to the overlayfs
mount/dentry.

This confuses filesystems which get the dentry from struct file and assume
it's theirs.

Add a new helper, file_dentry() [*], to get the filesystem's own dentry
from the file.  This checks file-&gt;f_path.dentry-&gt;d_flags against
DCACHE_OP_REAL, and returns file-&gt;f_path.dentry if DCACHE_OP_REAL is not
set (this is the common, non-overlayfs case).

In the uncommon case it will call into overlayfs's -&gt;d_real() to get the
underlying dentry, matching file_inode(file).

The reason we need to check against the inode is that if the file is copied
up while being open, d_real() would return the upper dentry, while the open
file comes from the lower dentry.

[*] If possible, it's better simply to use file_inode() instead.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues &lt;rgoldwyn@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>use -&gt;d_seq to get coherency between -&gt;d_inode and -&gt;d_flags</title>
<updated>2016-03-09T23:34:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-29T17:12:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=53729dbbd20a517c4ecb994cfe994bc832b30523'/>
<id>53729dbbd20a517c4ecb994cfe994bc832b30523</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a528aca7f359f4b0b1d72ae406097e491a5ba9ea upstream.

Games with ordering and barriers are way too brittle.  Just
bump -&gt;d_seq before and after updating -&gt;d_inode and -&gt;d_flags
type bits, so that verifying -&gt;d_seq would guarantee they are
coherent.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a528aca7f359f4b0b1d72ae406097e491a5ba9ea upstream.

Games with ordering and barriers are way too brittle.  Just
bump -&gt;d_seq before and after updating -&gt;d_inode and -&gt;d_flags
type bits, so that verifying -&gt;d_seq would guarantee they are
coherent.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dcache: Reduce the scope of i_lock in d_splice_alias</title>
<updated>2015-08-21T06:34:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-15T18:36:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a03e283bf5c3d4851b4998122196ce9f849e6dfb'/>
<id>a03e283bf5c3d4851b4998122196ce9f849e6dfb</id>
<content type='text'>
i_lock is only needed until __d_find_any_alias calls dget on the alias
dentry.  After that the reference to new ensures that dentry_kill and
d_delete will not remove the inode from the dentry, and remove the
dentry from the inode-&gt;d_entry list.

The inode i_lock came to be held over the the __d_move calls in
d_splice_alias through a series of introduction of locks with
increasing smaller scope.  First it was the dcache_lock, then
it was the dcache_inode_lock, and finally inode-&gt;i_lock.

Furthermore inode-&gt;i_lock is not held over any other calls
to d_move or __d_move so it can not provide any meaningful
rename protection.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
i_lock is only needed until __d_find_any_alias calls dget on the alias
dentry.  After that the reference to new ensures that dentry_kill and
d_delete will not remove the inode from the dentry, and remove the
dentry from the inode-&gt;d_entry list.

The inode i_lock came to be held over the the __d_move calls in
d_splice_alias through a series of introduction of locks with
increasing smaller scope.  First it was the dcache_lock, then
it was the dcache_inode_lock, and finally inode-&gt;i_lock.

Furthermore inode-&gt;i_lock is not held over any other calls
to d_move or __d_move so it can not provide any meaningful
rename protection.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path</title>
<updated>2015-08-21T06:34:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-15T18:36:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65'/>
<id>cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65</id>
<content type='text'>
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root.  For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.

prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.

__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in.  So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.

d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root.  Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1.  So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.

getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.

d_path is the interesting hold out.  d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases.  Which raises
the question what should be printed?

Given that &lt;escaped_path&gt;/&lt;anything&gt; should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths.  As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.

So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root.  For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.

prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.

__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in.  So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.

d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root.  Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1.  So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.

getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.

d_path is the interesting hold out.  d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases.  Which raises
the question what should be printed?

Given that &lt;escaped_path&gt;/&lt;anything&gt; should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths.  As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.

So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs, file table: reinit files_stat.max_files after deferred memory initialisation</title>
<updated>2015-08-07T01:39:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-06T22:46:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4248b0da460839e30eaaad78992b9a1dd3e63e21'/>
<id>4248b0da460839e30eaaad78992b9a1dd3e63e21</id>
<content type='text'>
Dave Hansen reported the following;

	My laptop has been behaving strangely with 4.2-rc2.  Once I log
	in to my X session, I start getting all kinds of strange errors
	from applications and see this in my dmesg:

        	VFS: file-max limit 8192 reached

The problem is that the file-max is calculated before memory is fully
initialised and miscalculates how much memory the kernel is using.  This
patch recalculates file-max after deferred memory initialisation.  Note
that using memory hotplug infrastructure would not have avoided this
problem as the value is not recalculated after memory hot-add.

4.1:             files_stat.max_files = 6582781
4.2-rc2:         files_stat.max_files = 8192
4.2-rc2 patched: files_stat.max_files = 6562467

Small differences with the patch applied and 4.1 but not enough to matter.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Nicolai Stange &lt;nicstange@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Ng &lt;alexng@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Dave Hansen reported the following;

	My laptop has been behaving strangely with 4.2-rc2.  Once I log
	in to my X session, I start getting all kinds of strange errors
	from applications and see this in my dmesg:

        	VFS: file-max limit 8192 reached

The problem is that the file-max is calculated before memory is fully
initialised and miscalculates how much memory the kernel is using.  This
patch recalculates file-max after deferred memory initialisation.  Note
that using memory hotplug infrastructure would not have avoided this
problem as the value is not recalculated after memory hot-add.

4.1:             files_stat.max_files = 6582781
4.2-rc2:         files_stat.max_files = 8192
4.2-rc2 patched: files_stat.max_files = 6562467

Small differences with the patch applied and 4.1 but not enough to matter.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Nicolai Stange &lt;nicstange@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Ng &lt;alexng@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
