linux-toradex.git/fs/dcache.c, branch v4.4.151

root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing

2018-08-15T15:42:05+00:00

commit 90bad5e05bcdb0308cfa3d3a60f5c0b9c8e2efb3 upstream.

Since mountpoint crossing can happen without leaving lazy mode,
root dentries do need the same protection against having their
memory freed without RCU delay as everything else in the tree.

It's partially hidden by RCU delay between detaching from the
mount tree and dropping the vfsmount reference, but the starting
point of pathwalk can be on an already detached mount, in which
case umount-caused RCU delay has already passed by the time the
lazy pathwalk grabs rcu_read_lock().  If the starting point
happens to be at the root of that vfsmount *and* that vfsmount
covers the entire filesystem, we get trouble.

Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

do d_instantiate/unlock_new_inode combinations safely

2018-05-30T05:48:52+00:00

commit 1e2e547a93a00ebc21582c06ca3c6cfea2a309ee upstream.

For anything NFS-exported we do _not_ want to unlock new inode
before it has grown an alias; original set of fixes got the
ordering right, but missed the nasty complication in case of
lockdep being enabled - unlock_new_inode() does
	lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode)
which can only be done before anyone gets a chance to touch
->i_mutex.  Unfortunately, flipping the order and doing
unlock_new_inode() before d_instantiate() opens a window when
mkdir can race with open-by-fhandle on a guessed fhandle, leading
to multiple aliases for a directory inode and all the breakage
that follows from that.

	Correct solution: a new primitive (d_instantiate_new())
combining these two in the right order - lockdep annotate, then
d_instantiate(), then the rest of unlock_new_inode().  All
combinations of d_instantiate() with unlock_new_inode() should
be converted to that.

Cc: stable@kernel.org	# 2.6.29 and later
Tested-by: Mike Marshall 
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lock_parent() needs to recheck if dentry got __dentry_kill'ed under it

2018-03-22T08:23:31+00:00

commit 3b821409632ab778d46e807516b457dfa72736ed upstream.

In case when dentry passed to lock_parent() is protected from freeing only
by the fact that it's on a shrink list and trylock of parent fails, we
could get hit by __dentry_kill() (and subsequent dentry_kill(parent))
between unlocking dentry and locking presumed parent.  We need to recheck
that dentry is alive once we lock both it and parent *and* postpone
rcu_read_unlock() until after that point.  Otherwise we could return
a pointer to struct dentry that already is rcu-scheduled for freeing, with
->d_lock held on it; caller's subsequent attempt to unlock it can end
up with memory corruption.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+, counting backports
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dentry name snapshots

2017-08-07T02:19:42+00:00

commit 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e upstream.

take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified).  In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.

dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().

Intended use:
	struct name_snapshot s;

	take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
	...
	access s.name
	...
	release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);

Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/dcache.c: fix spin lockup issue on nlru->lock

2017-07-21T05:44:56+00:00

commit b17c070fb624cf10162cf92ea5e1ec25cd8ac176 upstream.

__list_lru_walk_one() acquires nlru spin lock (nlru->lock) for longer
duration if there are more number of items in the lru list.  As per the
current code, it can hold the spin lock for upto maximum UINT_MAX
entries at a time.  So if there are more number of items in the lru
list, then "BUG: spinlock lockup suspected" is observed in the below
path:

  spin_bug+0x90
  do_raw_spin_lock+0xfc
  _raw_spin_lock+0x28
  list_lru_add+0x28
  dput+0x1c8
  path_put+0x20
  terminate_walk+0x3c
  path_lookupat+0x100
  filename_lookup+0x6c
  user_path_at_empty+0x54
  SyS_faccessat+0xd0
  el0_svc_naked+0x24

This nlru->lock is acquired by another CPU in this path -

  d_lru_shrink_move+0x34
  dentry_lru_isolate_shrink+0x48
  __list_lru_walk_one.isra.10+0x94
  list_lru_walk_node+0x40
  shrink_dcache_sb+0x60
  do_remount_sb+0xbc
  do_emergency_remount+0xb0
  process_one_work+0x228
  worker_thread+0x2e0
  kthread+0xf4
  ret_from_fork+0x10

Fix this lockup by reducing the number of entries to be shrinked from
the lru list to 1024 at once.  Also, add cond_resched() before
processing the lru list again.

Link: http://marc.info/?t=149722864900001&r=1&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498707575-2472-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala 
Suggested-by: Jan Kara 
Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov 
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov 
Cc: Alexander Polakov 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mnt: Protect the mountpoint hashtable with mount_lock

2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00

commit 3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7 upstream.

Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire.  At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.

Kristen Johansen  reported:
> This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
> attempt to free the same mountpoint.  This occurs because some callers
> hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock.  Some
> even hold both.
>
> In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
> put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
> a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.

Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.

I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock.   The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.

d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set.  This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.

Fixes: ce07d891a089 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen 
Suggested-by: Al Viro 
Acked-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput()

2016-08-16T07:30:50+00:00

commit 47be61845c775643f1aa4d2a54343549f943c94c upstream.

We triggered soft-lockup under stress test which
open/access/write/close one file concurrently on more than
five different CPUs:

WARN: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 11s! [who:30631]
...
[] dput+0x100/0x298
[] terminate_walk+0x4c/0x60
[] path_lookupat+0x5cc/0x7a8
[] filename_lookup+0x38/0xf0
[] user_path_at_empty+0x78/0xd0
[] user_path_at+0x1c/0x28
[] SyS_faccessat+0xb4/0x230

->d_lock trylock may failed many times because of concurrently
operations, and dput() may execute a long time.

Fix this by replacing cpu_relax() with cond_resched().
dput() used to be sleepable, so make it sleepable again
should be safe.

Signed-off-by: Wei Fang 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fix d_walk()/non-delayed __d_free() race

2016-06-24T17:18:21+00:00

commit 3d56c25e3bb0726a5c5e16fc2d9e38f8ed763085 upstream.

Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child
dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay.  Unfortunately, in
quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as
the result.

Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever
been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it
ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and
covers all cases the old rule used to cover.  Moreover, pipes and
sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in
the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional
in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs: add file_dentry()

2016-04-20T06:42:12+00:00

commit d101a125954eae1d397adda94ca6319485a50493 upstream.

This series fixes bugs in nfs and ext4 due to 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs:
Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay").

Regular files opened on overlayfs will result in the file being opened on
the underlying filesystem, while f_path points to the overlayfs
mount/dentry.

This confuses filesystems which get the dentry from struct file and assume
it's theirs.

Add a new helper, file_dentry() [*], to get the filesystem's own dentry
from the file.  This checks file->f_path.dentry->d_flags against
DCACHE_OP_REAL, and returns file->f_path.dentry if DCACHE_OP_REAL is not
set (this is the common, non-overlayfs case).

In the uncommon case it will call into overlayfs's ->d_real() to get the
underlying dentry, matching file_inode(file).

The reason we need to check against the inode is that if the file is copied
up while being open, d_real() would return the upper dentry, while the open
file comes from the lower dentry.

[*] If possible, it's better simply to use file_inode() instead.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Tested-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues 
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Daniel Axtens 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

use ->d_seq to get coherency between ->d_inode and ->d_flags

2016-03-09T23:34:49+00:00

commit a528aca7f359f4b0b1d72ae406097e491a5ba9ea upstream.

Games with ordering and barriers are way too brittle.  Just
bump ->d_seq before and after updating ->d_inode and ->d_flags
type bits, so that verifying ->d_seq would guarantee they are
coherent.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman