<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/ecryptfs/main.c, branch v2.6.32.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ima: ecryptfs fix imbalance message</title>
<updated>2009-10-08T16:31:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-05T18:25:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=36520be8e32b49bd85a63b7b8b40cd07c3da59a5'/>
<id>36520be8e32b49bd85a63b7b8b40cd07c3da59a5</id>
<content type='text'>
The unencrypted files are being measured.  Update the counters to get
rid of the ecryptfs imbalance message. (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/519737)

Reported-by: Sachin Garg
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: David Safford &lt;safford@watson.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The unencrypted files are being measured.  Update the counters to get
rid of the ecryptfs imbalance message. (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/519737)

Reported-by: Sachin Garg
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: David Safford &lt;safford@watson.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Check for O_RDONLY lower inodes when opening lower files</title>
<updated>2009-09-23T14:10:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-08-12T06:06:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ac22ba23b659e34a5961aec8c945608e471b0d5b'/>
<id>ac22ba23b659e34a5961aec8c945608e471b0d5b</id>
<content type='text'>
If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file
read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged
eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write.  Instead, only try an
unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails.
This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only
mount.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;esandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file
read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged
eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write.  Instead, only try an
unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails.
This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only
mount.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;esandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Convert obvious places to deactivate_locked_super()</title>
<updated>2009-05-09T14:49:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2009-05-06T05:34:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f5bbff9a1b7d6864a495763448a363bbfa96324'/>
<id>6f5bbff9a1b7d6864a495763448a363bbfa96324</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_unlink_sigs warnings</title>
<updated>2009-04-22T09:08:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-04-22T09:08:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e77cc8d243f9f1e1d3f0799e23cc14e837ccc8c6'/>
<id>e77cc8d243f9f1e1d3f0799e23cc14e837ccc8c6</id>
<content type='text'>
A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically
unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon
umount.  This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for
ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically
unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon
umount.  This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for
ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Copy lower inode attrs before dentry instantiation</title>
<updated>2009-04-22T08:54:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-12T05:19:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ae6e84596e7b321d9a08e81679c6a3f799634636'/>
<id>ae6e84596e7b321d9a08e81679c6a3f799634636</id>
<content type='text'>
Copies the lower inode attributes to the upper inode before passing the
upper inode to d_instantiate().  This is important for
security_d_instantiate().

The problem was discovered by a user seeing SELinux denials like so:

type=AVC msg=audit(1236812817.898:47): avc:  denied  { 0x100000 } for
pid=3584 comm="httpd" name="testdir" dev=ecryptfs ino=943872
scontext=root:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=root:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 tclass=file

Notice target class is file while testdir is really a directory,
confusing the permission translation (0x100000) due to the wrong i_mode.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Copies the lower inode attributes to the upper inode before passing the
upper inode to d_instantiate().  This is important for
security_d_instantiate().

The problem was discovered by a user seeing SELinux denials like so:

type=AVC msg=audit(1236812817.898:47): avc:  denied  { 0x100000 } for
pid=3584 comm="httpd" name="testdir" dev=ecryptfs ino=943872
scontext=root:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=root:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 tclass=file

Notice target class is file while testdir is really a directory,
confusing the permission translation (0x100000) due to the wrong i_mode.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename key</title>
<updated>2009-03-14T18:57:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-13T20:51:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=84814d642a4f1f294bd675ab11aae1ca54c6cedb'/>
<id>84814d642a4f1f294bd675ab11aae1ca54c6cedb</id>
<content type='text'>
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK).  The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file.  I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK.  This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.

This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list.  Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK).  The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file.  I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK.  This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.

This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list.  Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option</title>
<updated>2009-01-06T23:59:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-06T22:42:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=87c94c4df0149786ad91d8a03c738a03369ee9c8'/>
<id>87c94c4df0149786ad91d8a03c738a03369ee9c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option.  Note that the ecryptfs-utils
userspace package versions 61 or later support this option.

When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper
will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption
in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user
interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the
mount.  If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will
then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting
by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has
already entered for encrypting the file contents.

When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for
the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option.  This key
must be available in the user's keyring.  The mount helper usually takes
care of this step.  If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount
helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring
with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option.  Note that the ecryptfs-utils
userspace package versions 61 or later support this option.

When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper
will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption
in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user
interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the
mount.  If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will
then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting
by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has
already entered for encrypting the file contents.

When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for
the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option.  This key
must be available in the user's keyring.  The mount helper usually takes
care of this step.  If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount
helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring
with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()</title>
<updated>2008-11-13T23:39:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-11-13T23:39:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227'/>
<id>745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] assorted path_lookup() -&gt; kern_path() conversions</title>
<updated>2008-10-23T09:12:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-02T05:04:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=421748ecde8e69a6364e5ae66eb3bf87e1f995c0'/>
<id>421748ecde8e69a6364e5ae66eb3bf87e1f995c0</id>
<content type='text'>
more nameidata eviction

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
more nameidata eviction

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: remove netlink transport</title>
<updated>2008-10-16T18:21:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-16T05:02:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=624ae5284516870657505103ada531c64dba2a9a'/>
<id>624ae5284516870657505103ada531c64dba2a9a</id>
<content type='text'>
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution.  This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution.  This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
