linux-toradex.git/fs/ecryptfs, branch colibri Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules eCryptfs: Fix oops when printing debug info in extent crypto functions 2012-02-10T02:20:10+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2012-01-24T16:02:22+00:00 704157b7ceb50c8d5154ccb5d53813235455b692 commit 58ded24f0fcb85bddb665baba75892f6ad0f4b8a upstream. If pages passed to the eCryptfs extent-based crypto functions are not mapped and the module parameter ecryptfs_verbosity=1 was specified at loading time, a NULL pointer dereference will occur. Note that this wouldn't happen on a production system, as you wouldn't pass ecryptfs_verbosity=1 on a production system. It leaks private information to the system logs and is for debugging only. The debugging info printed in these messages is no longer very useful and rather than doing a kmap() in these debugging paths, it will be better to simply remove the debugging paths completely. https://launchpad.net/bugs/913651 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com> Change-Id: Icbb95db933d5fa76938982fcf69cacea85ecbecc Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79652 Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User 
commit 58ded24f0fcb85bddb665baba75892f6ad0f4b8a upstream.

If pages passed to the eCryptfs extent-based crypto functions are not
mapped and the module parameter ecryptfs_verbosity=1 was specified at
loading time, a NULL pointer dereference will occur.

Note that this wouldn't happen on a production system, as you wouldn't
pass ecryptfs_verbosity=1 on a production system. It leaks private
information to the system logs and is for debugging only.

The debugging info printed in these messages is no longer very useful
and rather than doing a kmap() in these debugging paths, it will be
better to simply remove the debugging paths completely.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/913651

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
Change-Id: Icbb95db933d5fa76938982fcf69cacea85ecbecc
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79652
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
eCryptfs: Check inode changes in setattr 2012-02-10T02:20:07+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2012-01-20T02:33:44+00:00 58e263a27fb52705dbf7ba9840b129db801d30e9 commit a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d upstream. Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in ->setattr(), but eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make the call in its ->setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode. This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible inode initialization steps that must happen first. Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when the truncate operation will be growing the lower file. In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com> Change-Id: Idbfa207399bf0f50ce92b4d6fb8ef43896c771d5 Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79651 Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User 
commit a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d upstream.

Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in ->setattr(), but
eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make
the call in its ->setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the
appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode.

This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the
eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call
would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible
inode initialization steps that must happen first.

Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in
functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending
truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being
called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching
maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages
and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's
write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch
introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which
checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when
the truncate operation will be growing the lower file.

In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the
resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem
limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
Change-Id: Idbfa207399bf0f50ce92b4d6fb8ef43896c771d5
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79651
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
eCryptfs: Make truncate path killable 2012-02-10T02:20:03+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2012-01-19T00:30:04+00:00 ab9cf2e9f3ddf639b56cec1edb2ec8d2563106a3 commit 5e6f0d769017cc49207ef56996e42363ec26c1f0 upstream. ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace. This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected, the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size and then -EINTR is returned. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com> Change-Id: I80e83c16c58586c700df081500b6c3e2a4a06270 Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79650 Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User 
commit 5e6f0d769017cc49207ef56996e42363ec26c1f0 upstream.

ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a
page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page
before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to
the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion
of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for
the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace.

This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending
fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to
leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to
break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected,
the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size
and then -EINTR is returned.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
Change-Id: I80e83c16c58586c700df081500b6c3e2a4a06270
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79650
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
ecryptfs: Improve metadata read failure logging 2012-02-10T02:20:00+00:00 Tim Gardner tim.gardner@canonical.com 2012-01-12T15:31:55+00:00 0460bba0e4b2042a2bd5984a8e96e5bda706c4cd commit 30373dc0c87ffef68d5628e77d56ffb1fa22e1ee upstream. Print inode on metadata read failure. The only real way of dealing with metadata read failures is to delete the underlying file system file. Having the inode allows one to 'find . -inum INODE`. [tyhicks@canonical.com: Removed some minor not-for-stable parts] Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com> Change-Id: I0460c59fe4a6490683b1cf6f993945b3f05e8aca Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79649 Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User 
commit 30373dc0c87ffef68d5628e77d56ffb1fa22e1ee upstream.

Print inode on metadata read failure. The only real
way of dealing with metadata read failures is to delete
the underlying file system file. Having the inode
allows one to 'find . -inum INODE`.

[tyhicks@canonical.com: Removed some minor not-for-stable parts]
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
Change-Id: I0460c59fe4a6490683b1cf6f993945b3f05e8aca
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79649
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
eCryptfs: Sanitize write counts of /dev/ecryptfs 2012-02-10T02:19:58+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2012-01-12T10:30:44+00:00 59f421c67d1dd3f5f065bff8f2f83088527f2752 commit db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4 upstream. A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may result in a a very large kernel memory allocation. This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532 bytes. Change-Id: I4fe5831fb58f9de76c81aa4b60efa93cb100dab8 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com> Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79648 Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User 
commit db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4 upstream.

A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may
result in a a very large kernel memory allocation.

This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the
size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count
value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532
bytes.

Change-Id: I4fe5831fb58f9de76c81aa4b60efa93cb100dab8
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/79648
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
eCryptfs: Extend array bounds for all filename chars 2011-12-09T16:54:05+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2011-11-23T17:31:24+00:00 722daca8514aacaf7ed1311f2cc8e518af675049 commit 0f751e641a71157aa584c2a2e22fda52b52b8a56 upstream. From mhalcrow's original commit message: Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters. ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file, can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area, and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character. This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to 0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously being handled. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> 
commit 0f751e641a71157aa584c2a2e22fda52b52b8a56 upstream.

From mhalcrow's original commit message:

    Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of
    filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters.
    ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond
    that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt
    those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file,
    can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past
    the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security
    impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area,
    and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is
    limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character.

This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an
implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of
filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to
0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously
being handled.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close 2011-12-09T16:54:04+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2011-11-21T23:31:29+00:00 19c8acbc4a4d444d72d256a7541b040cebddc78b commit 32001d6fe9ac6b0423e674a3093aa56740849f3b upstream. Dirty pages weren't being written back when an mmap'ed eCryptfs file was closed before the mapping was unmapped. Since f_ops->flush() is not called by the munmap() path, the lower file was simply being released. This patch flushes the eCryptfs file in the vm_ops->close() path. https://launchpad.net/bugs/870326 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> 
commit 32001d6fe9ac6b0423e674a3093aa56740849f3b upstream.

Dirty pages weren't being written back when an mmap'ed eCryptfs file was
closed before the mapping was unmapped. Since f_ops->flush() is not
called by the munmap() path, the lower file was simply being released.
This patch flushes the eCryptfs file in the vm_ops->close() path.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/870326

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
eCryptfs: Prevent file create race condition 2011-12-09T16:54:04+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@canonical.com 2011-11-21T23:31:02+00:00 d1d274cd1ce2eb979c66233a36a7a92abfc0f18f commit b59db43ad4434519feb338eacb01d77eb50825c5 upstream. The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written to the lower file. This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory. https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> 
commit b59db43ad4434519feb338eacb01d77eb50825c5 upstream.

The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and
unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully
allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written
to the lower file.

This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode
operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer
dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid 2011-08-10T04:29:01+00:00 John Johansen john.johansen@canonical.com 2011-07-22T15:14:15+00:00 764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97 Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace. Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> 
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private.  The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
eCryptfs: Fix payload_len unitialized variable warning 2011-08-09T18:42:46+00:00 Tyler Hicks tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com 2011-08-05T09:15:19+00:00 99b373ff2d1246f64b97a3d449a2fd6018d504e6 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set’: fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1991:28: warning: ‘payload_len’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1976:9: note: ‘payload_len’ was declared here Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> 
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set’:
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1991:28: warning: ‘payload_len’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1976:9: note: ‘payload_len’ was declared here

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>