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<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/ext4/crypto.c, branch v4.2.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: fix ext4_get_crypto_ctx()'s calling convention in ext4_decrypt_one</title>
<updated>2015-06-08T15:54:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-08T15:54:56+00:00</published>
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<id>ad0a0ce894d554b112afab6a48fd500e636686a6</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: allocate bounce pages using GFP_NOWAIT</title>
<updated>2015-06-03T13:32:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-03T13:32:39+00:00</published>
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<content type='text'>
Previously we allocated bounce pages using a combination of
alloc_page() and mempool_alloc() with the __GFP_WAIT bit set.
Instead, use mempool_alloc() with GFP_NOWAIT.  The mempool_alloc()
function will try using alloc_pages() initially, and then only use the
mempool reserve of pages if alloc_pages() is unable to fulfill the
request.

This minimizes the the impact on the mm layer when we need to do a
large amount of writeback of encrypted files, as Jaeguk Kim had
reported that under a heavy fio workload on a system with restricted
amounts memory (which unfortunately, includes many mobile handsets),
he had observed the the OOM killer getting triggered several times.
Using GFP_NOWAIT

If the mempool_alloc() function fails, we will retry the page
writeback at a later time; the function of the mempool is to ensure
that we can writeback at least 32 pages at a time, so we can more
efficiently dispatch I/O under high memory pressure situations.  In
the future we should make this be a tunable so we can determine the
best tradeoff between permanently sequestering memory and the ability
to quickly launder pages so we can free up memory quickly when
necessary.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
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<pre>
Previously we allocated bounce pages using a combination of
alloc_page() and mempool_alloc() with the __GFP_WAIT bit set.
Instead, use mempool_alloc() with GFP_NOWAIT.  The mempool_alloc()
function will try using alloc_pages() initially, and then only use the
mempool reserve of pages if alloc_pages() is unable to fulfill the
request.

This minimizes the the impact on the mm layer when we need to do a
large amount of writeback of encrypted files, as Jaeguk Kim had
reported that under a heavy fio workload on a system with restricted
amounts memory (which unfortunately, includes many mobile handsets),
he had observed the the OOM killer getting triggered several times.
Using GFP_NOWAIT

If the mempool_alloc() function fails, we will retry the page
writeback at a later time; the function of the mempool is to ensure
that we can writeback at least 32 pages at a time, so we can more
efficiently dispatch I/O under high memory pressure situations.  In
the future we should make this be a tunable so we can determine the
best tradeoff between permanently sequestering memory and the ability
to quickly launder pages so we can free up memory quickly when
necessary.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: handle unexpected lack of encryption keys</title>
<updated>2015-05-31T17:35:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-31T17:35:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=abdd438b26b409eaccf9c847fcf9c3ab52f1959e'/>
<id>abdd438b26b409eaccf9c847fcf9c3ab52f1959e</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix up attempts by users to try to write to a file when they don't
have access to the encryption key.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
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<pre>
Fix up attempts by users to try to write to a file when they don't
have access to the encryption key.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: fix memory leaks in ext4_encrypted_zeroout</title>
<updated>2015-05-31T17:34:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-31T17:34:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=95ea68b4c7105179f507d31f7bf571623373aa0b'/>
<id>95ea68b4c7105179f507d31f7bf571623373aa0b</id>
<content type='text'>
ext4_encrypted_zeroout() could end up leaking a bio and bounce page.
Fortunately it's not used much.  While we're fixing things up,
refactor out common code into the static function alloc_bounce_page()
and fix up error handling if mempool_alloc() fails.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;

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<pre>
ext4_encrypted_zeroout() could end up leaking a bio and bounce page.
Fortunately it's not used much.  While we're fixing things up,
refactor out common code into the static function alloc_bounce_page()
and fix up error handling if mempool_alloc() fails.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: use per-inode tfm structure</title>
<updated>2015-05-31T17:34:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-31T17:34:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c936e1ec2879e43599d801dfa6fe58e7ccfee433'/>
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<content type='text'>
As suggested by Herbert Xu, we shouldn't allocate a new tfm each time
we read or write a page.  Instead we can use a single tfm hanging off
the inode's crypt_info structure for all of our encryption needs for
that inode, since the tfm can be used by multiple crypto requests in
parallel.

Also use cmpxchg() to avoid races that could result in crypt_info
structure getting doubly allocated or doubly freed.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
As suggested by Herbert Xu, we shouldn't allocate a new tfm each time
we read or write a page.  Instead we can use a single tfm hanging off
the inode's crypt_info structure for all of our encryption needs for
that inode, since the tfm can be used by multiple crypto requests in
parallel.

Also use cmpxchg() to avoid races that could result in crypt_info
structure getting doubly allocated or doubly freed.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: shrink size of the ext4_crypto_ctx structure</title>
<updated>2015-05-31T17:31:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-31T17:31:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=614def7013574ffcd54019b6df40ac1c0df754af'/>
<id>614def7013574ffcd54019b6df40ac1c0df754af</id>
<content type='text'>
Some fields are only used when the crypto_ctx is being used on the
read path, some are only used on the write path, and some are only
used when the structure is on free list.  Optimize memory use by using
a union.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Some fields are only used when the crypto_ctx is being used on the
read path, some are only used on the write path, and some are only
used when the structure is on free list.  Optimize memory use by using
a union.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: get rid of ci_mode from struct ext4_crypt_info</title>
<updated>2015-05-18T17:20:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-18T17:20:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1aaa6e8b24114757a836ae0e62d2096deb76f274'/>
<id>1aaa6e8b24114757a836ae0e62d2096deb76f274</id>
<content type='text'>
The ci_mode field was superfluous, and getting rid of it gets rid of
an unused hole in the structure.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
The ci_mode field was superfluous, and getting rid of it gets rid of
an unused hole in the structure.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: use slab caches</title>
<updated>2015-05-18T17:19:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-18T17:19:47+00:00</published>
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<id>8ee0371470038371729a39ee6669a2132ac47649</id>
<content type='text'>
Use slab caches the ext4_crypto_ctx and ext4_crypt_info structures for
slighly better memory efficiency and debuggability.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Use slab caches the ext4_crypto_ctx and ext4_crypt_info structures for
slighly better memory efficiency and debuggability.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode</title>
<updated>2015-05-18T17:17:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-18T17:17:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b7236e21d55ff9008737621c84dd8ee6c37c7c6d'/>
<id>b7236e21d55ff9008737621c84dd8ee6c37c7c6d</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:

1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
   data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
   This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
   using encryption.

2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
   encryption structure instead.  This remove an unnecessary memory
   allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
   to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
   creations.

3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
   structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
   extended attributes.

4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
   instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
   per-inode key.  This allows us to test to see if the key has been
   revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
   it.

5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
   will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
   left hanging around in memory.  This implies that when a user logs
   out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
   and then finally, to use "echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
   release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
   caches.

6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
   100.  :-)

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:

1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
   data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
   This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
   using encryption.

2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
   encryption structure instead.  This remove an unnecessary memory
   allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
   to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
   creations.

3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
   structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
   extended attributes.

4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
   instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
   per-inode key.  This allows us to test to see if the key has been
   revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
   it.

5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
   will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
   left hanging around in memory.  This implies that when a user logs
   out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
   and then finally, to use "echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
   release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
   caches.

6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
   100.  :-)

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4 crypto: separate kernel and userspace structure for the key</title>
<updated>2015-05-18T17:16:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-18T17:16:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e2881b1b51d871a72911faf2fc7e090655940506'/>
<id>e2881b1b51d871a72911faf2fc7e090655940506</id>
<content type='text'>
Use struct ext4_encryption_key only for the master key passed via the
kernel keyring.

For internal kernel space users, we now use struct ext4_crypt_info.
This will allow us to put information from the policy structure so we
can cache it and avoid needing to constantly looking up the extended
attribute.  We will do this in a spearate patch.  This patch is mostly
mechnical to make it easier for patch review.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Use struct ext4_encryption_key only for the master key passed via the
kernel keyring.

For internal kernel space users, we now use struct ext4_crypt_info.
This will allow us to put information from the policy structure so we
can cache it and avoid needing to constantly looking up the extended
attribute.  We will do this in a spearate patch.  This patch is mostly
mechnical to make it easier for patch review.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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