<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/namei.c, branch v5.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-12-25T18:54:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-25T18:54:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7bb5226c8a4bbf26a9ededc90532b0ad539d2017'/>
<id>7bb5226c8a4bbf26a9ededc90532b0ad539d2017</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted patches from previous cycle(s)..."

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fix hostfs_open() use of -&gt;f_path.dentry
  Make sure that make_create_in_sticky() never sees uninitialized value of dir_mode
  fs: Kill DCACHE_DONTCACHE dentry even if DCACHE_REFERENCED is set
  fs: Handle I_DONTCACHE in iput_final() instead of generic_drop_inode()
  fs/namespace.c: WARN if mnt_count has become negative
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted patches from previous cycle(s)..."

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fix hostfs_open() use of -&gt;f_path.dentry
  Make sure that make_create_in_sticky() never sees uninitialized value of dir_mode
  fs: Kill DCACHE_DONTCACHE dentry even if DCACHE_REFERENCED is set
  fs: Handle I_DONTCACHE in iput_final() instead of generic_drop_inode()
  fs/namespace.c: WARN if mnt_count has become negative
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make sure that make_create_in_sticky() never sees uninitialized value of dir_mode</title>
<updated>2020-12-10T22:33:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-19T16:55:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1a97d899ecbc4b60c8e8f9b41cde443510b5b1bf'/>
<id>1a97d899ecbc4b60c8e8f9b41cde443510b5b1bf</id>
<content type='text'>
make sure nd-&gt;dir_mode is always initialized after success exit from
link_path_walk(); in case of empty path it did not happen.

Reported-by: Anant Thazhemadam &lt;anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anant Thazhemadam &lt;anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
make sure nd-&gt;dir_mode is always initialized after success exit from
link_path_walk(); in case of empty path it did not happen.

Reported-by: Anant Thazhemadam &lt;anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anant Thazhemadam &lt;anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: make do_renameat2() take struct filename</title>
<updated>2020-12-09T19:03:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-26T23:20:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e886663cfd029b64a1d8da7efae7014526d884e9'/>
<id>e886663cfd029b64a1d8da7efae7014526d884e9</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass in the struct filename pointers instead of the user string, and
update the three callers to do the same.

This behaves like do_unlinkat(), which also takes a filename struct and
puts it when it is done. Converting callers is then trivial.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pass in the struct filename pointers instead of the user string, and
update the three callers to do the same.

This behaves like do_unlinkat(), which also takes a filename struct and
puts it when it is done. Converting callers is then trivial.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-10-24T19:26:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-24T19:26:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0eac1102e94807023e57d032bbba51830928b78e'/>
<id>0eac1102e94807023e57d032bbba51830928b78e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff all over the place (the largest group here is
  Christoph's stat cleanups)"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: remove KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS
  fs: remove vfs_stat_set_lookup_flags
  fs: move vfs_fstatat out of line
  fs: implement vfs_stat and vfs_lstat in terms of vfs_fstatat
  fs: remove vfs_statx_fd
  fs: omfs: use kmemdup() rather than kmalloc+memcpy
  [PATCH] reduce boilerplate in fsid handling
  fs: Remove duplicated flag O_NDELAY occurring twice in VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
  selftests: mount: add nosymfollow tests
  Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff all over the place (the largest group here is
  Christoph's stat cleanups)"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: remove KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS
  fs: remove vfs_stat_set_lookup_flags
  fs: move vfs_fstatat out of line
  fs: implement vfs_stat and vfs_lstat in terms of vfs_fstatat
  fs: remove vfs_statx_fd
  fs: omfs: use kmemdup() rather than kmalloc+memcpy
  [PATCH] reduce boilerplate in fsid handling
  fs: Remove duplicated flag O_NDELAY occurring twice in VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
  selftests: mount: add nosymfollow tests
  Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: remove the unused SB_I_MULTIROOT flag</title>
<updated>2020-09-24T19:43:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-24T06:51:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=402dd2cf46b177be5bcb138b7d7fd8f38aa130e4'/>
<id>402dd2cf46b177be5bcb138b7d7fd8f38aa130e4</id>
<content type='text'>
The last user of SB_I_MULTIROOT is disappeared with commit f2aedb713c28
("NFS: Add fs_context support.")

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The last user of SB_I_MULTIROOT is disappeared with commit f2aedb713c28
("NFS: Add fs_context support.")

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.</title>
<updated>2020-08-27T20:06:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mattias Nissler</name>
<email>mnissler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-27T17:09:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dab741e0e02bd3c4f5e2e97be74b39df2523fc6e'/>
<id>dab741e0e02bd3c4f5e2e97be74b39df2523fc6e</id>
<content type='text'>
For mounts that have the new "nosymfollow" option, don't follow symlinks
when resolving paths. The new option is similar in spirit to the
existing "nodev", "noexec", and "nosuid" options, as well as to the
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS resolve flag in the openat2(2) syscall. Various BSD
variants have been supporting the "nosymfollow" mount option for a long
time with equivalent implementations.

Note that symlinks may still be created on file systems mounted with
the "nosymfollow" option present. readlink() remains functional, so
user space code that is aware of symlinks can still choose to follow
them explicitly.

Setting the "nosymfollow" mount option helps prevent privileged
writers from modifying files unintentionally in case there is an
unexpected link along the accessed path. The "nosymfollow" option is
thus useful as a defensive measure for systems that need to deal with
untrusted file systems in privileged contexts.

More information on the history and motivation for this patch can be
found here:

https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/hardening-against-malicious-stateful-data#TOC-Restricting-symlink-traversal

Signed-off-by: Mattias Nissler &lt;mnissler@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For mounts that have the new "nosymfollow" option, don't follow symlinks
when resolving paths. The new option is similar in spirit to the
existing "nodev", "noexec", and "nosuid" options, as well as to the
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS resolve flag in the openat2(2) syscall. Various BSD
variants have been supporting the "nosymfollow" mount option for a long
time with equivalent implementations.

Note that symlinks may still be created on file systems mounted with
the "nosymfollow" option present. readlink() remains functional, so
user space code that is aware of symlinks can still choose to follow
them explicitly.

Setting the "nosymfollow" mount option helps prevent privileged
writers from modifying files unintentionally in case there is an
unexpected link along the accessed path. The "nosymfollow" option is
thus useful as a defensive measure for systems that need to deal with
untrusted file systems in privileged contexts.

More information on the history and motivation for this patch can be
found here:

https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/hardening-against-malicious-stateful-data#TOC-Restricting-symlink-traversal

Signed-off-by: Mattias Nissler &lt;mnissler@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: restore EACCES of S_ISDIR execve()</title>
<updated>2020-08-15T02:56:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-15T00:30:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fc4177be963dccad73b98d7db3a8a38911f952b7'/>
<id>fc4177be963dccad73b98d7db3a8a38911f952b7</id>
<content type='text'>
Patch series "Fix S_ISDIR execve() errno".

Fix an errno change for execve() of directories, noticed by Marc Zyngier.
Along with the fix, include a regression test to avoid seeing this return
in the future.

This patch (of 2):

The return code for attempting to execute a directory has always been
EACCES.  Adjust the S_ISDIR exec test to reflect the old errno instead of
the general EISDIR for other kinds of "open" attempts on directories.

Fixes: 633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier")
Reported-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@android.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200813231723.2725102-2-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200813151305.6191993b@why
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Patch series "Fix S_ISDIR execve() errno".

Fix an errno change for execve() of directories, noticed by Marc Zyngier.
Along with the fix, include a regression test to avoid seeing this return
in the future.

This patch (of 2):

The return code for attempting to execute a directory has always been
EACCES.  Adjust the S_ISDIR exec test to reflect the old errno instead of
the general EISDIR for other kinds of "open" attempts on directories.

Fixes: 633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier")
Reported-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@android.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200813231723.2725102-2-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200813151305.6191993b@why
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)</title>
<updated>2020-08-12T18:24:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-12T18:24:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9ad57f6dfc2345ed5d3a8bf4dabac0a34069c54c'/>
<id>9ad57f6dfc2345ed5d3a8bf4dabac0a34069c54c</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - most of the rest of MM (memcg, hugetlb, vmscan, proc, compaction,
   mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, cma, util,
   memory-hotplug, cleanups, uaccess, migration, gup, pagemap),

 - various other subsystems (alpha, misc, sparse, bitmap, lib, bitops,
   checkpatch, autofs, minix, nilfs, ufs, fat, signals, kmod, coredump,
   exec, kdump, rapidio, panic, kcov, kgdb, ipc).

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;: (164 commits)
  mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code
  mm: clean up the last pieces of page fault accountings
  mm/xtensa: use general page fault accounting
  mm/x86: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sparc64: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sparc32: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sh: use general page fault accounting
  mm/s390: use general page fault accounting
  mm/riscv: use general page fault accounting
  mm/powerpc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/parisc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/openrisc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/nios2: use general page fault accounting
  mm/nds32: use general page fault accounting
  mm/mips: use general page fault accounting
  mm/microblaze: use general page fault accounting
  mm/m68k: use general page fault accounting
  mm/ia64: use general page fault accounting
  mm/hexagon: use general page fault accounting
  mm/csky: use general page fault accounting
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - most of the rest of MM (memcg, hugetlb, vmscan, proc, compaction,
   mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, cma, util,
   memory-hotplug, cleanups, uaccess, migration, gup, pagemap),

 - various other subsystems (alpha, misc, sparse, bitmap, lib, bitops,
   checkpatch, autofs, minix, nilfs, ufs, fat, signals, kmod, coredump,
   exec, kdump, rapidio, panic, kcov, kgdb, ipc).

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;: (164 commits)
  mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code
  mm: clean up the last pieces of page fault accountings
  mm/xtensa: use general page fault accounting
  mm/x86: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sparc64: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sparc32: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sh: use general page fault accounting
  mm/s390: use general page fault accounting
  mm/riscv: use general page fault accounting
  mm/powerpc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/parisc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/openrisc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/nios2: use general page fault accounting
  mm/nds32: use general page fault accounting
  mm/mips: use general page fault accounting
  mm/microblaze: use general page fault accounting
  mm/m68k: use general page fault accounting
  mm/ia64: use general page fault accounting
  mm/hexagon: use general page fault accounting
  mm/csky: use general page fault accounting
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: move path_noexec() check earlier</title>
<updated>2020-08-12T17:58:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-12T01:36:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0fd338b2d2cdf827091ae819ae90ad760b94ad0c'/>
<id>0fd338b2d2cdf827091ae819ae90ad760b94ad0c</id>
<content type='text'>
The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too
late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s.  Check it earlier as well in
may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test under
the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check.

My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

do_open_execat()
    struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
        .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
        .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
        ...
    do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
        path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
            file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
            do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
                may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
                    /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */
                    inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
                        security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
                vfs_open(path, file)
                    do_dentry_open(file, path-&gt;dentry-&gt;d_inode, open)
                        security_file_open(f)
                        open()
    /* old location of path_noexec() test */

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too
late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s.  Check it earlier as well in
may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test under
the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check.

My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

do_open_execat()
    struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
        .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
        .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
        ...
    do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
        path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
            file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
            do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
                may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
                    /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */
                    inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
                        security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
                vfs_open(path, file)
                    do_dentry_open(file, path-&gt;dentry-&gt;d_inode, open)
                        security_file_open(f)
                        open()
    /* old location of path_noexec() test */

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier</title>
<updated>2020-08-12T17:58:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-12T01:36:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=633fb6ac39801514613fbe050db6abdc3fe744d5'/>
<id>633fb6ac39801514613fbe050db6abdc3fe744d5</id>
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The execve(2)/uselib(2) syscalls have always rejected non-regular files.
Recently, it was noticed that a deadlock was introduced when trying to
execute pipes, as the S_ISREG() test was happening too late.  This was
fixed in commit 73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files
during execve()"), but it was added after inode_permission() had already
run, which meant LSMs could see bogus attempts to execute non-regular
files.

Move the test into the other inode type checks (which already look for
other pathological conditions[1]).  Since there is no need to use
FMODE_EXEC while we still have access to "acc_mode", also switch the test
to MAY_EXEC.

Also include a comment with the redundant S_ISREG() checks at the end of
execve(2)/uselib(2) to note that they are present to avoid any mistakes.

My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

do_open_execat()
    struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
        .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
        .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
        ...
    do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
        path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
            file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
            do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
                may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
		    /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
                    inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
                        security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
                vfs_open(path, file)
                    do_dentry_open(file, path-&gt;dentry-&gt;d_inode, open)
                        /* old location of FMODE_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
                        security_file_open(f)
                        open()

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006041910.9EF0C602@keescook/

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
The execve(2)/uselib(2) syscalls have always rejected non-regular files.
Recently, it was noticed that a deadlock was introduced when trying to
execute pipes, as the S_ISREG() test was happening too late.  This was
fixed in commit 73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files
during execve()"), but it was added after inode_permission() had already
run, which meant LSMs could see bogus attempts to execute non-regular
files.

Move the test into the other inode type checks (which already look for
other pathological conditions[1]).  Since there is no need to use
FMODE_EXEC while we still have access to "acc_mode", also switch the test
to MAY_EXEC.

Also include a comment with the redundant S_ISREG() checks at the end of
execve(2)/uselib(2) to note that they are present to avoid any mistakes.

My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

do_open_execat()
    struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
        .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
        .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
        ...
    do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
        path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
            file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
            do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
                may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
		    /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
                    inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
                        security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
                vfs_open(path, file)
                    do_dentry_open(file, path-&gt;dentry-&gt;d_inode, open)
                        /* old location of FMODE_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
                        security_file_open(f)
                        open()

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006041910.9EF0C602@keescook/

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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