<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/pidfs.c, branch v6.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: remove d_op-&gt;d_delete</title>
<updated>2025-02-24T10:27:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-24T10:27:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=02cfe2b6529c6c5fcf39d52a826927f4f93392af'/>
<id>02cfe2b6529c6c5fcf39d52a826927f4f93392af</id>
<content type='text'>
Pidfs only deals with unhashed dentries and there's currently no way for
them to become hashed. So remove d_op-&gt;d_delete.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pidfs only deals with unhashed dentries and there's currently no way for
them to become hashed. So remove d_op-&gt;d_delete.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: improve ioctl handling</title>
<updated>2025-02-07T09:27:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-04T13:51:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=091ee63e36e8289f9067f659a48d497911e49d6f'/>
<id>091ee63e36e8289f9067f659a48d497911e49d6f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pidfs supports extensible and non-extensible ioctls. The extensible
ioctls need to check for the ioctl number itself not just the ioctl
command otherwise both backward- and forward compatibility are broken.

The pidfs ioctl handler also needs to look at the type of the ioctl
command to guard against cases where "[...] a daemon receives some
random file descriptor from a (potentially less privileged) client and
expects the FD to be of some specific type, it might call ioctl() on
this FD with some type-specific command and expect the call to fail if
the FD is of the wrong type; but due to the missing type check, the
kernel instead performs some action that userspace didn't expect."
(cf. [1]]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250204-work-pidfs-ioctl-v1-1-04987d239575@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez2K9A5GwtgqO31u9ZL292we8ZwAA=TJwwEv7wRuJ3j4Lw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Fixes: 8ce352818820 ("pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands")
Acked-by: Luca Boccassi &lt;luca.boccassi@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13; please backport with 8ce352818820 ("pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pidfs supports extensible and non-extensible ioctls. The extensible
ioctls need to check for the ioctl number itself not just the ioctl
command otherwise both backward- and forward compatibility are broken.

The pidfs ioctl handler also needs to look at the type of the ioctl
command to guard against cases where "[...] a daemon receives some
random file descriptor from a (potentially less privileged) client and
expects the FD to be of some specific type, it might call ioctl() on
this FD with some type-specific command and expect the call to fail if
the FD is of the wrong type; but due to the missing type check, the
kernel instead performs some action that userspace didn't expect."
(cf. [1]]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250204-work-pidfs-ioctl-v1-1-04987d239575@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez2K9A5GwtgqO31u9ZL292we8ZwAA=TJwwEv7wRuJ3j4Lw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Fixes: 8ce352818820 ("pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands")
Acked-by: Luca Boccassi &lt;luca.boccassi@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13; please backport with 8ce352818820 ("pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: allow bind-mounts</title>
<updated>2024-12-22T10:03:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-19T17:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ef4144ac2dec35d47de666f35cd873eb1be4172e'/>
<id>ef4144ac2dec35d47de666f35cd873eb1be4172e</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow bind-mounting pidfds. Similar to nsfs let's allow bind-mounts for
pidfds. This allows pidfds to be safely recovered and checked for
process recycling.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219-work-pidfs-mount-v1-1-dbc56198b839@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Allow bind-mounting pidfds. Similar to nsfs let's allow bind-mounts for
pidfds. This allows pidfds to be safely recovered and checked for
process recycling.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219-work-pidfs-mount-v1-1-dbc56198b839@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: lookup pid through rbtree</title>
<updated>2024-12-17T08:16:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-14T21:01:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=16ecd47cb0cd895c7c2f5dd5db50f6c005c51639'/>
<id>16ecd47cb0cd895c7c2f5dd5db50f6c005c51639</id>
<content type='text'>
The new pid inode number allocation scheme is neat but I overlooked a
possible, even though unlikely, attack that can be used to trigger an
overflow on both 32bit and 64bit.

An unique 64 bit identifier was constructed for each struct pid by two
combining a 32 bit idr with a 32 bit generation number. A 32bit number
was allocated using the idr_alloc_cyclic() infrastructure. When the idr
wrapped around a 32 bit wraparound counter was incremented. The 32 bit
wraparound counter served as the upper 32 bits and the allocated idr
number as the lower 32 bits.

Since the idr can only allocate up to INT_MAX entries everytime a
wraparound happens INT_MAX - 1 entries are lost (Ignoring that numbering
always starts at 2 to avoid theoretical collisions with the root inode
number.).

If userspace fully populates the idr such that and puts itself into
control of two entries such that one entry is somewhere in the middle
and the other entry is the INT_MAX entry then it is possible to overflow
the wraparound counter. That is probably difficult to pull off but the
mere possibility is annoying.

The problem could be contained to 32 bit by switching to a data
structure such as the maple tree that allows allocating 64 bit numbers
on 64 bit machines. That would leave 32 bit in a lurch but that probably
doesn't matter that much. The other problem is that removing entries
form the maple tree is somewhat non-trivial because the removal code can
be called under the irq write lock of tasklist_lock and
irq{save,restore} code.

Instead, allocate unique identifiers for struct pid by simply
incrementing a 64 bit counter and insert each struct pid into the rbtree
so it can be looked up to decode file handles avoiding to leak actual
pids across pid namespaces in file handles.

On both 64 bit and 32 bit the same 64 bit identifier is used to lookup
struct pid in the rbtree. On 64 bit the unique identifier for struct pid
simply becomes the inode number. Comparing two pidfds continues to be as
simple as comparing inode numbers.

On 32 bit the 64 bit number assigned to struct pid is split into two 32
bit numbers. The lower 32 bits are used as the inode number and the
upper 32 bits are used as the inode generation number. Whenever a
wraparound happens on 32 bit the 64 bit number will be incremented by 2
so inode numbering starts at 2 again.

When a wraparound happens on 32 bit multiple pidfds with the same inode
number are likely to exist. This isn't a problem since before pidfs
pidfds used the anonymous inode meaning all pidfds had the same inode
number. On 32 bit sserspace can thus reconstruct the 64 bit identifier
by retrieving both the inode number and the inode generation number to
compare, or use file handles. This gives the same guarantees on both 32
bit and 64 bit.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241214-gekoppelt-erdarbeiten-a1f9a982a5a6@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The new pid inode number allocation scheme is neat but I overlooked a
possible, even though unlikely, attack that can be used to trigger an
overflow on both 32bit and 64bit.

An unique 64 bit identifier was constructed for each struct pid by two
combining a 32 bit idr with a 32 bit generation number. A 32bit number
was allocated using the idr_alloc_cyclic() infrastructure. When the idr
wrapped around a 32 bit wraparound counter was incremented. The 32 bit
wraparound counter served as the upper 32 bits and the allocated idr
number as the lower 32 bits.

Since the idr can only allocate up to INT_MAX entries everytime a
wraparound happens INT_MAX - 1 entries are lost (Ignoring that numbering
always starts at 2 to avoid theoretical collisions with the root inode
number.).

If userspace fully populates the idr such that and puts itself into
control of two entries such that one entry is somewhere in the middle
and the other entry is the INT_MAX entry then it is possible to overflow
the wraparound counter. That is probably difficult to pull off but the
mere possibility is annoying.

The problem could be contained to 32 bit by switching to a data
structure such as the maple tree that allows allocating 64 bit numbers
on 64 bit machines. That would leave 32 bit in a lurch but that probably
doesn't matter that much. The other problem is that removing entries
form the maple tree is somewhat non-trivial because the removal code can
be called under the irq write lock of tasklist_lock and
irq{save,restore} code.

Instead, allocate unique identifiers for struct pid by simply
incrementing a 64 bit counter and insert each struct pid into the rbtree
so it can be looked up to decode file handles avoiding to leak actual
pids across pid namespaces in file handles.

On both 64 bit and 32 bit the same 64 bit identifier is used to lookup
struct pid in the rbtree. On 64 bit the unique identifier for struct pid
simply becomes the inode number. Comparing two pidfds continues to be as
simple as comparing inode numbers.

On 32 bit the 64 bit number assigned to struct pid is split into two 32
bit numbers. The lower 32 bits are used as the inode number and the
upper 32 bits are used as the inode generation number. Whenever a
wraparound happens on 32 bit the 64 bit number will be incremented by 2
so inode numbering starts at 2 again.

When a wraparound happens on 32 bit multiple pidfds with the same inode
number are likely to exist. This isn't a problem since before pidfs
pidfds used the anonymous inode meaning all pidfds had the same inode
number. On 32 bit sserspace can thus reconstruct the 64 bit identifier
by retrieving both the inode number and the inode generation number to
compare, or use file handles. This gives the same guarantees on both 32
bit and 64 bit.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241214-gekoppelt-erdarbeiten-a1f9a982a5a6@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands</title>
<updated>2024-12-17T08:16:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T20:16:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8ce3528188207a2e1896cc3173fba6d99a59013a'/>
<id>8ce3528188207a2e1896cc3173fba6d99a59013a</id>
<content type='text'>
Prior to doing any work, check whether the provided ioctl command is
supported by pidfs.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Prior to doing any work, check whether the provided ioctl command is
supported by pidfs.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: implement file handle support</title>
<updated>2024-12-17T08:16:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T13:38:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b3caba8f7a34a2bbaf45ffc6ff3a49b70afeb192'/>
<id>b3caba8f7a34a2bbaf45ffc6ff3a49b70afeb192</id>
<content type='text'>
On 64-bit platforms, userspace can read the pidfd's inode in order to
get a never-repeated PID identifier. On 32-bit platforms this identifier
is not exposed, as inodes are limited to 32 bits. Instead expose the
identifier via export_fh, which makes it available to userspace via
name_to_handle_at.

In addition we implement fh_to_dentry, which allows userspace to
recover a pidfd from a pidfs file handle.

Signed-off-by: Erin Shepherd &lt;erin.shepherd@e43.eu&gt;
[brauner: patch heavily rewritten]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-file_handle-v1-6-87d803a42495@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Co-Developed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On 64-bit platforms, userspace can read the pidfd's inode in order to
get a never-repeated PID identifier. On 32-bit platforms this identifier
is not exposed, as inodes are limited to 32 bits. Instead expose the
identifier via export_fh, which makes it available to userspace via
name_to_handle_at.

In addition we implement fh_to_dentry, which allows userspace to
recover a pidfd from a pidfs file handle.

Signed-off-by: Erin Shepherd &lt;erin.shepherd@e43.eu&gt;
[brauner: patch heavily rewritten]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-file_handle-v1-6-87d803a42495@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Co-Developed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: support FS_IOC_GETVERSION</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T11:40:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T13:02:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=230536ff6b06b199995687aa7fbf164970ebda85'/>
<id>230536ff6b06b199995687aa7fbf164970ebda85</id>
<content type='text'>
This will allow 32 bit userspace to detect when a given inode number has
been recycled and also to construct a unique 64 bit identifier.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-v2-3-61043d66fbce@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This will allow 32 bit userspace to detect when a given inode number has
been recycled and also to construct a unique 64 bit identifier.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-v2-3-61043d66fbce@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: remove 32bit inode number handling</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T11:40:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T13:02:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=03c212bf3fa86820baa5bcad75cfabb845166ccd'/>
<id>03c212bf3fa86820baa5bcad75cfabb845166ccd</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that we have a unified inode number handling model remove the custom
ida-based allocation for 32bit.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-v2-2-61043d66fbce@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that we have a unified inode number handling model remove the custom
ida-based allocation for 32bit.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-v2-2-61043d66fbce@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfs: rework inode number allocation</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T11:40:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T13:02:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9698d5a4836549d394e6efd858b5200878c9f255'/>
<id>9698d5a4836549d394e6efd858b5200878c9f255</id>
<content type='text'>
Recently we received a patchset that aims to enable file handle encoding
and decoding via name_to_handle_at(2) and open_by_handle_at(2).

A crucical step in the patch series is how to go from inode number to
struct pid without leaking information into unprivileged contexts. The
issue is that in order to find a struct pid the pid number in the
initial pid namespace must be encoded into the file handle via
name_to_handle_at(2). This can be used by containers using a separate
pid namespace to learn what the pid number of a given process in the
initial pid namespace is. While this is a weak information leak it could
be used in various exploits and in general is an ugly wart in the design.

To solve this problem a new way is needed to lookup a struct pid based
on the inode number allocated for that struct pid. The other part is to
remove the custom inode number allocation on 32bit systems that is also
an ugly wart that should go away.

So, a new scheme is used that I was discusssing with Tejun some time
back. A cyclic ida is used for the lower 32 bits and a the high 32 bits
are used for the generation number. This gives a 64 bit inode number
that is unique on both 32 bit and 64 bit. The lower 32 bit number is
recycled slowly and can be used to lookup struct pids.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-v2-1-61043d66fbce@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Recently we received a patchset that aims to enable file handle encoding
and decoding via name_to_handle_at(2) and open_by_handle_at(2).

A crucical step in the patch series is how to go from inode number to
struct pid without leaking information into unprivileged contexts. The
issue is that in order to find a struct pid the pid number in the
initial pid namespace must be encoded into the file handle via
name_to_handle_at(2). This can be used by containers using a separate
pid namespace to learn what the pid number of a given process in the
initial pid namespace is. While this is a weak information leak it could
be used in various exploits and in general is an ugly wart in the design.

To solve this problem a new way is needed to lookup a struct pid based
on the inode number allocated for that struct pid. The other part is to
remove the custom inode number allocation on 32bit systems that is also
an ugly wart that should go away.

So, a new scheme is used that I was discusssing with Tejun some time
back. A cyclic ida is used for the lower 32 bits and a the high 32 bits
are used for the generation number. This gives a 64 bit inode number
that is unique on both 32 bit and 64 bit. The lower 32 bit number is
recycled slowly and can be used to lookup struct pids.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-work-pidfs-v2-1-61043d66fbce@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidfd: add ioctl to retrieve pid info</title>
<updated>2024-10-24T11:54:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luca Boccassi</name>
<email>luca.boccassi@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-10T15:52:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cdda1f26e74bac732eca537a69f19f6a37b641be'/>
<id>cdda1f26e74bac732eca537a69f19f6a37b641be</id>
<content type='text'>
A common pattern when using pid fds is having to get information
about the process, which currently requires /proc being mounted,
resolving the fd to a pid, and then do manual string parsing of
/proc/N/status and friends. This needs to be reimplemented over
and over in all userspace projects (e.g.: I have reimplemented
resolving in systemd, dbus, dbus-daemon, polkit so far), and
requires additional care in checking that the fd is still valid
after having parsed the data, to avoid races.

Having a programmatic API that can be used directly removes all
these requirements, including having /proc mounted.

As discussed at LPC24, add an ioctl with an extensible struct
so that more parameters can be added later if needed. Start with
returning pid/tgid/ppid and creds unconditionally, and cgroupid
optionally.

Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi &lt;luca.boccassi@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010155401.2268522-1-luca.boccassi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A common pattern when using pid fds is having to get information
about the process, which currently requires /proc being mounted,
resolving the fd to a pid, and then do manual string parsing of
/proc/N/status and friends. This needs to be reimplemented over
and over in all userspace projects (e.g.: I have reimplemented
resolving in systemd, dbus, dbus-daemon, polkit so far), and
requires additional care in checking that the fd is still valid
after having parsed the data, to avoid races.

Having a programmatic API that can be used directly removes all
these requirements, including having /proc mounted.

As discussed at LPC24, add an ioctl with an extensible struct
so that more parameters can be added later if needed. Start with
returning pid/tgid/ppid and creds unconditionally, and cgroupid
optionally.

Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi &lt;luca.boccassi@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010155401.2268522-1-luca.boccassi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
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