linux-toradex.git/fs/proc/array.c, branch tegra-10.9.4

procfs: fix /proc//stat stack pointer for kernel threads

2009-11-18T01:40:33+00:00

Fix a small issue for the stack pointer in /proc//stat.  In case of a
kernel thread the value of the printed stack pointer should be 0.

Signed-off-by: Stefani Seibold 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

procfs: disable per-task stack usage on NOMMU

2009-09-25T00:11:24+00:00

It needs walk_page_range().

Reported-by: Michal Simek 
Tested-by: Michal Simek 
Cc: Stefani Seibold 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: Paul Mundt 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Greg Ungerer 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

procfs: provide stack information for threads

2009-09-23T14:39:41+00:00

A patch to give a better overview of the userland application stack usage,
especially for embedded linux.

Currently you are only able to dump the main process/thread stack usage
which is showed in /proc/pid/status by the "VmStk" Value.  But you get no
information about the consumed stack memory of the the threads.

There is an enhancement in the /proc//{task/*,}/*maps and which marks
the vm mapping where the thread stack pointer reside with "[thread stack
xxxxxxxx]".  xxxxxxxx is the maximum size of stack.  This is a value
information, because libpthread doesn't set the start of the stack to the
top of the mapped area, depending of the pthread usage.

A sample output of /proc//task//maps looks like:

08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 8312       /opt/z
08049000-0804a000 rw-p 00001000 03:00 8312       /opt/z
0804a000-0806b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]
a7d12000-a7d13000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
a7d13000-a7f13000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [thread stack: 001ff4b4]
a7f13000-a7f14000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
a7f14000-a7f36000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a7f36000-a8069000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 4222       /lib/libc.so.6
a8069000-a806b000 r--p 00133000 03:00 4222       /lib/libc.so.6
a806b000-a806c000 rw-p 00135000 03:00 4222       /lib/libc.so.6
a806c000-a806f000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a806f000-a8083000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 14462      /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8083000-a8084000 r--p 00013000 03:00 14462      /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8084000-a8085000 rw-p 00014000 03:00 14462      /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8085000-a8088000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a8088000-a80a4000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 8317       /lib/ld-linux.so.2
a80a4000-a80a5000 r--p 0001b000 03:00 8317       /lib/ld-linux.so.2
a80a5000-a80a6000 rw-p 0001c000 03:00 8317       /lib/ld-linux.so.2
afaf5000-afb0a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [stack]
ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0          [vdso]

Also there is a new entry "stack usage" in /proc//{task/*,}/status
which will you give the current stack usage in kb.

A sample output of /proc/self/status looks like:

Name:	cat
State:	R (running)
Tgid:	507
Pid:	507
.
.
.
CapBnd:	fffffffffffffeff
voluntary_ctxt_switches:	0
nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:	0
Stack usage:	12 kB

I also fixed stack base address in /proc//{task/*,}/stat to the base
address of the associated thread stack and not the one of the main
process.  This makes more sense.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/proc/array.c now needs walk_page_range()]
Signed-off-by: Stefani Seibold 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes

2009-05-04T22:14:23+00:00

By using the same test as is used for /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps,
only allow processes that can ptrace() a given process to see information
that might be used to bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR).
These include eip, esp, wchan, and start_stack in /proc/pid/stat as well
as the non-symbolic output from /proc/pid/wchan.

ASLR can be bypassed by sampling eip as shown by the proof-of-concept
code at http://code.google.com/p/fuzzyaslr/ As part of a presentation
(http://www.cr0.org/paper/to-jt-linux-alsr-leak.pdf) esp and wchan were
also noted as possibly usable information leaks as well.  The
start_stack address also leaks potentially useful information.

Cc: Stable Team 
Signed-off-by: Jake Edge 
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven 
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds

2008-11-13T23:39:19+00:00

Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct

2008-11-13T23:39:16+00:00

Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne 

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

Switch to a valid email address...

2008-10-27T15:40:17+00:00

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branches 'timers/clocksource', 'timers/hrtimers', 'timers/nohz', 'timers/ntp', 'timers/posixtimers' and 'timers/debug' into v28-timers-for-linus

2008-10-20T11:14:06+00:00

proc: remove now unneeded ADDBUF macro

2008-10-10T00:18:58+00:00

After local seq_file conversion it was forgotten.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan

[PATCH] signal, procfs: some lock_task_sighand() users do not need rcu_read_lock()

2008-10-10T00:18:57+00:00

lock_task_sighand() make sure task->sighand is being protected,
so we do not need rcu_read_lock().
[ exec() will get task->sighand->siglock before change task->sighand! ]

But code using rcu_read_lock() _just_ to protect lock_task_sighand()
only appear in procfs. (and some code in procfs use lock_task_sighand()
without such redundant protection.)

Other subsystem may put lock_task_sighand() into rcu_read_lock()
critical region, but these rcu_read_lock() are used for protecting
"for_each_process()", "find_task_by_vpid()" etc. , not for protecting
lock_task_sighand().

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan 
[ok from Oleg]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan