linux-toradex.git/fs/proc/array.c, branch v4.10-rc7

fs/proc/array.c: slightly improve render_sigset_t

2016-12-13T02:55:09+00:00

format_decode and vsnprintf occasionally show up in perf top, so I went
looking for places that might not need the full printf power.  With the
help of kprobes, I gathered some statistics on which format strings we
mostly pass to vsnprintf.  On a trivial desktop workload, I hit "%x" 25%
of the time, so something apparently reads /proc/pid/status (which does
5*16 printf("%x") calls) a lot.

With this patch, reading /proc/pid/status is 30% faster according to
this microbenchmark:

	char buf[4096];
	int i, fd;
	for (i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) {
		fd = open("/proc/self/status", O_RDONLY);
		read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
		close(fd);
	}

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474410485-1305-1-git-send-email-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes 
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: report no_new_privs state

2016-12-13T02:55:09+00:00

Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly
confined with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting,
so this adds it to /proc/$pid/status.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161103214041.GA58566@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Cc: Rodrigo Freire 
Cc: John Stultz 
Cc: Ross Zwisler 
Cc: Robert Ho 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: "Richard W.M. Jones" 
Cc: Joe Perches 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat

2016-10-20T07:21:41+00:00

Reporting these fields on a non-current task is dangerous.  If the
task is in any state other than normal kernel code, they may contain
garbage or even kernel addresses on some architectures.  (x86_64
used to do this.  I bet lots of architectures still do.)  With
CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y, it can OOPS, too.

As far as I know, there are no use programs that make any material
use of these fields, so just get rid of them.

Reported-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Linux API 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Tetsuo Handa 
Cc: Tycho Andersen 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a5fed4c3f4e33ed25d4bb03567e329bc5a712bcc.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups

2016-10-08T01:46:30+00:00

Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.

If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes).  But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.

2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).

All of the above is unnecessary.  Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme.  Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed.  Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).

Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes.  I
think kernel can handle such allocation.

On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!

Nice side effects:

 - "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,

 - fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
   should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,

 - aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Vasily Kulikov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

seq/proc: modify seq_put_decimal_[u]ll to take a const char *, not char

2016-10-08T01:46:30+00:00

Allow some seq_puts removals by taking a string instead of a single
char.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update vmstat_show(), per Joe]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/667e1cf3d436de91a5698170a1e98d882905e956.1470704995.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches 
Cc: Joe Perches 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: faster /proc/*/status

2016-10-08T01:46:30+00:00

top(1) opens the following files for every PID:

	/proc/*/stat
	/proc/*/statm
	/proc/*/status

This patch switches /proc/*/status away from seq_printf().
The result is 13.5% speedup.

Benchmark is open("/proc/self/status")+read+close 1.000.000 million times.

				BEFORE
$ perf stat -r 10 taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status

 Performance counter stats for 'taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status' (10 runs):

      10748.474301      task-clock (msec)         #    0.954 CPUs utilized            ( +-  0.91% )
                12      context-switches          #    0.001 K/sec                    ( +-  1.09% )
                 1      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec
               104      page-faults               #    0.010 K/sec                    ( +-  0.45% )
    37,424,127,876      cycles                    #    3.482 GHz                      ( +-  0.04% )
     8,453,010,029      stalled-cycles-frontend   #   22.59% frontend cycles idle     ( +-  0.12% )
     3,747,609,427      stalled-cycles-backend    #  10.01% backend cycles idle       ( +-  0.68% )
    65,632,764,147      instructions              #    1.75  insn per cycle
                                                  #    0.13  stalled cycles per insn  ( +-  0.00% )
    13,981,324,775      branches                  # 1300.773 M/sec                    ( +-  0.00% )
       138,967,110      branch-misses             #    0.99% of all branches          ( +-  0.18% )

      11.263885428 seconds time elapsed                                          ( +-  0.04% )
      ^^^^^^^^^^^^

				AFTER
$ perf stat -r 10 taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status

 Performance counter stats for 'taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status' (10 runs):

       9010.521776      task-clock (msec)         #    0.925 CPUs utilized            ( +-  1.54% )
                11      context-switches          #    0.001 K/sec                    ( +-  1.54% )
                 1      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec                    ( +- 11.11% )
               103      page-faults               #    0.011 K/sec                    ( +-  0.60% )
    32,352,310,603      cycles                    #    3.591 GHz                      ( +-  0.07% )
     7,849,199,578      stalled-cycles-frontend   #   24.26% frontend cycles idle     ( +-  0.27% )
     3,269,738,842      stalled-cycles-backend    #  10.11% backend cycles idle       ( +-  0.73% )
    56,012,163,567      instructions              #    1.73  insn per cycle
                                                  #    0.14  stalled cycles per insn  ( +-  0.00% )
    11,735,778,795      branches                  # 1302.453 M/sec                    ( +-  0.00% )
        98,084,459      branch-misses             #    0.84% of all branches          ( +-  0.28% )

       9.741247736 seconds time elapsed                                          ( +-  0.07% )
       ^^^^^^^^^^^

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160806125608.GB1187@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Joe Perches 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

procfs: expose umask in /proc//status

2016-05-21T00:58:30+00:00

It's not possible to read the process umask without also modifying it,
which is what umask(2) does.  A library cannot read umask safely,
especially if the main program might be multithreaded.

Add a new status line ("Umask") in /proc//status.  It contains the
file mode creation mask (umask) in octal.  It is only shown for tasks
which have task->fs.

This patch is adapted from one originally written by Pierre Carrier.

The use case is that we have endless trouble with people setting weird
umask() values (usually on the grounds of "security"), and then
everything breaking.  I'm on the hook to fix these.  We'd like to add
debugging to our program so we can dump out the umask in debug reports.

Previous versions of the patch used a syscall so you could only read
your own umask.  That's all I need.  However there was quite a lot of
push-back from those, so this new version exports it in /proc.

See:
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/13/704 [umask2]
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/13/487 [getumask]

Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones 
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Pierre Carrier 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-01-21T01:09:18+00:00

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/array.c: set overflow flag in case of error

2015-11-07T01:50:42+00:00

For now in task_name() we ignore the return code of string_escape_str()
call.  This is not good if buffer suddenly becomes not big enough.  Do the
proper error handling there.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchan

2015-10-01T10:55:34+00:00

So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains
the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in)
leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space:

        seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);

The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if
KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason:

static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
                          struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
        unsigned long wchan;
        char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];

        wchan = get_wchan(task);

        if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) {
                if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
                        return 0;
                seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan);
        } else {
                seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
        }

        return 0;
}

This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset
to any local attacker:

  fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35)
  ffffffff8123b380

Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic:

  ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm

and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat:

  triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1
  open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY)     = 6

There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the
absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality
by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked
(whether there's a wchan address).

These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason
user-space would be interested in  the absolute address. The
absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we
didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the
decoding itself via the System.map.

So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only
symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan.

( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via
  perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. )

Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: kasan-dev 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar