linux-toradex.git/fs/proc/base.c, branch v3.4.73

vfs: Fix /proc//fdinfo/ file handling

2012-06-09T15:36:18+00:00

commit 0640113be25d283e0ff77a9f041e1242182387f0 upstream.

Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit
30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into
tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right.

The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the /fd
symlinks, it's also used for the /fdinfo/ files, and the
permission model for those are different.

So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making
the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are.

Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the
symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be
the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'.  That would have avoided this issue too, but
since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the
reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people
do apparently use this feature.

[ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo"
  replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or
  writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink.  So the feature
  does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably
  shouldn't have done it to begin with. ]

Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's patch-bomb)

2012-05-18T22:56:25+00:00

Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton.

* emailed from Andrew Morton : (4 patches)
  frv: delete incorrect task prototypes causing compile fail
  slub: missing test for partial pages flush work in flush_all()
  fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries
  drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c: configure correct wday for 2000-01-01

proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into tid_fd_revalidate()

2012-05-18T21:06:17+00:00

Instead of doing the i_mode calculations at proc_fd_instantiate() time,
move them into tid_fd_revalidate(), which is where the other inode state
(notably uid/gid information) is updated too.

Otherwise we'll end up with stale i_mode information if an fd is re-used
while the dentry still hangs around.  Not that anything really *cares*
(symlink permissions don't really matter), but Tetsuo Handa noticed that
the owner read/write bits don't always match the state of the
readability of the file descriptor, and we _used_ to get this right a
long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.

Besides, aside from fixing an ugly detail (that has apparently been this
way since commit 61a28784028e: "proc: Remove the hard coded inode
numbers" in 2006), this removes more lines of code than it adds.  And it
just makes sense to update i_mode in the same place we update i_uid/gid.

Al Viro correctly points out that we could just do the inode fill in the
inode iops ->getattr() function instead.  However, that does require
somewhat slightly more invasive changes, and adds yet *another* lookup
of the file descriptor.  We need to do the revalidate() for other
reasons anyway, and have the file descriptor handy, so we might as well
fill in the information at this point.

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Cc: Al Viro 
Acked-by: Eric Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries

2012-05-18T01:00:51+00:00

map_files/ entries are never supposed to be executed, still curious
minds might try to run them, which leads to the following deadlock

  ======================================================
  [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
  3.4.0-rc4-24406-g841e6a6 #121 Not tainted
  -------------------------------------------------------
  bash/1556 is trying to acquire lock:
   (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}, at: do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1

  but task is already holding lock:
   (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2d/0x69

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
         validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
         __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
         lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
         __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
         mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x40/0x45
         lock_trace+0x24/0x59
         proc_map_files_lookup+0x5a/0x165
         __lookup_hash+0x52/0x73
         do_lookup+0x276/0x2b1
         walk_component+0x3d/0x114
         do_last+0xfc/0x540
         path_openat+0xd3/0x306
         do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
         do_sys_open+0x74/0x106
         sys_open+0x21/0x23
         tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

  -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}:
         check_prev_add+0x6a/0x1ef
         validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
         __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
         lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
         __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
         mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x45
         do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
         walk_component+0x3d/0x114
         link_path_walk+0x1f9/0x48f
         path_openat+0xb6/0x306
         do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
         open_exec+0x25/0xa0
         do_execve_common+0xea/0x2f9
         do_execve+0x43/0x45
         sys_execve+0x43/0x5a
         stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0

This is because prepare_bprm_creds grabs task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
and when do_lookup happens we try to grab task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
again in lock_trace.

Fix it using plain ptrace_may_access() helper in proc_map_files_lookup()
and in proc_map_files_readdir() instead of lock_trace(), the caller must
be CAP_SYS_ADMIN granted anyway.

Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Reported-by: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Dave Jones 
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2012-03-30T01:12:23+00:00

Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
  32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
  syscalls.

  This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
  space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
  space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}

* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
  x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
  x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
  x32: Add ptrace for x32
  x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
  x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
  x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
  x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
  x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
  x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
  x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
  fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
  fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
  x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
  x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
  x32: Add x32 VDSO support
  x32: Allow x32 to be configured
  x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
  x32: Handle process creation
  x32: Signal-related system calls
  x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to 
  ...

procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc//maps

2012-03-22T00:54:58+00:00

Stack for a new thread is mapped by userspace code and passed via
sys_clone.  This memory is currently seen as anonymous in
/proc//maps, which makes it difficult to ascertain which mappings
are being used for thread stacks.  This patch uses the individual task
stack pointers to determine which vmas are actually thread stacks.

For a multithreaded program like the following:

	#include 

	void *thread_main(void *foo)
	{
		while(1);
	}

	int main()
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&t, NULL, thread_main, NULL);
		pthread_join(t, NULL);
	}

proc/PID/maps looks like the following:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

Here, one could guess that 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 is a stack since
the earlier vma that has no permissions (7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000) but
that is not always a reliable way to find out which vma is a thread
stack.  Also, /proc/PID/maps and /proc/PID/task/TID/maps has the same
content.

With this patch in place, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps are treated as 'maps
as the task would see it' and hence, only the vma that that task uses as
stack is marked as [stack].  All other 'stack' vmas are marked as
anonymous memory.  /proc/PID/maps acts as a thread group level view,
where all thread stack vmas are marked as [stack:TID] where TID is the
process ID of the task that uses that vma as stack, while the process
stack is marked as [stack].

So /proc/PID/maps will look like this:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack:1442]
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

Thus marking all vmas that are used as stacks by the threads in the
thread group along with the process stack.  The task level maps will
however like this:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

where only the vma that is being used as a stack by *that* task is
marked as [stack].

Analogous changes have been made to /proc/PID/smaps,
/proc/PID/numa_maps, /proc/PID/task/TID/smaps and
/proc/PID/task/TID/numa_maps. Relevant snippets from smaps and
numa_maps:

    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ pgrep a.out
    1441
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack:1442]
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7f8a44492000 default stack:1442 anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
    7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7f8a44492000 default stack anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar 
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Jamie Lokier 
Cc: Mike Frysinger 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Matt Mackall 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sched: Clean up parameter passing of proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice()

2012-03-02T11:23:49+00:00

Pass nice as a value to proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice().

No side effect is expected, and the variable err will be overwritten with
the return value.

Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4F45FBB7.5090607@ct.jp.nec.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable

2012-02-19T18:30:52+00:00

Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.

The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.

This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:

	void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);

Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.

Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array.  Possibly that should exist too.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Al Viro

Fix race in process_vm_rw_core

2012-02-02T20:55:17+00:00

This fixes the race in process_vm_core found by Oleg (see

  http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1235667/

for details).

This has been updated since I last sent it as the creation of the new
mm_access() function did almost exactly the same thing as parts of the
previous version of this patch did.

In order to use mm_access() even when /proc isn't enabled, we move it to
kernel/fork.c where other related process mm access functions already
are.

Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: make sure mem_open() doesn't pin the target's memory

2012-02-01T22:39:01+00:00

Once /proc/pid/mem is opened, the memory can't be released until
mem_release() even if its owner exits.

Change mem_open() to do atomic_inc(mm_count) + mmput(), this only
pins mm_struct. Change mem_rw() to do atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_count)
before access_remote_vm(), this verifies that this mm is still alive.

I am not sure what should mem_rw() return if atomic_inc_not_zero()
fails. With this patch it returns zero to match the "mm == NULL" case,
may be it should return -EINVAL like it did before e268337d.

Perhaps it makes sense to add the additional fatal_signal_pending()
check into the main loop, to ensure we do not hold this memory if
the target task was oom-killed.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds