<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/proc/base.c, branch v3.5.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Fix /proc/&lt;tid&gt;/fdinfo/&lt;fd&gt; file handling</title>
<updated>2012-06-04T18:00:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-04T18:00:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0640113be25d283e0ff77a9f041e1242182387f0'/>
<id>0640113be25d283e0ff77a9f041e1242182387f0</id>
<content type='text'>
Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit
30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into
tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right.

The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the &lt;tid&gt;/fd
symlinks, it's also used for the &lt;tid&gt;/fdinfo/&lt;fd&gt; files, and the
permission model for those are different.

So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making
the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are.

Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the
symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be
the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'.  That would have avoided this issue too, but
since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the
reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people
do apparently use this feature.

[ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo"
  replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or
  writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink.  So the feature
  does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably
  shouldn't have done it to begin with. ]

Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit
30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into
tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right.

The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the &lt;tid&gt;/fd
symlinks, it's also used for the &lt;tid&gt;/fdinfo/&lt;fd&gt; files, and the
permission model for those are different.

So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making
the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are.

Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the
symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be
the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'.  That would have avoided this issue too, but
since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the
reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people
do apparently use this feature.

[ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo"
  replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or
  writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink.  So the feature
  does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably
  shouldn't have done it to begin with. ]

Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs, proc: introduce /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/task/&lt;tid&gt;/children entry</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T00:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-31T23:26:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=818411616baf46ceba0cff6f05af3a9b294734f7'/>
<id>818411616baf46ceba0cff6f05af3a9b294734f7</id>
<content type='text'>
When we do checkpoint of a task we need to know the list of children the
task, has but there is no easy and fast way to generate reverse
parent-&gt;children chain from arbitrary &lt;pid&gt; (while a parent pid is
provided in "PPid" field of /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/status).

So instead of walking over all pids in the system (creating one big
process tree in memory, just to figure out which children a task has) --
we add explicit /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/task/&lt;tid&gt;/children entry, because the kernel
already has this kind of information but it is not yet exported.

This is a first level children, not the whole process tree.

Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When we do checkpoint of a task we need to know the list of children the
task, has but there is no easy and fast way to generate reverse
parent-&gt;children chain from arbitrary &lt;pid&gt; (while a parent pid is
provided in "PPid" field of /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/status).

So instead of walking over all pids in the system (creating one big
process tree in memory, just to figure out which children a task has) --
we add explicit /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/task/&lt;tid&gt;/children entry, because the kernel
already has this kind of information but it is not yet exported.

This is a first level children, not the whole process tree.

Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: pass "fd" by value in /proc/*/{fd,fdinfo} code</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T00:49:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-31T23:26:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af5e6171437c9d62d84459b24877c94c23782676'/>
<id>af5e6171437c9d62d84459b24877c94c23782676</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass "fd" directly, not via pointer -- one less memory read.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pass "fd" directly, not via pointer -- one less memory read.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: don't do dummy rcu_read_lock/rcu_read_unlock on error path</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T00:49:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-31T23:26:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f05ed3f1abefd37c08fbf08c766d2abd40607777'/>
<id>f05ed3f1abefd37c08fbf08c766d2abd40607777</id>
<content type='text'>
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is nop for TINY_RCU, but is not a nop
for, say, PREEMPT_RCU.

proc_fill_cache() is called without RCU lock, there is no need to
lock/unlock on error path, simply jump out of the loop.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is nop for TINY_RCU, but is not a nop
for, say, PREEMPT_RCU.

proc_fill_cache() is called without RCU lock, there is no need to
lock/unlock on error path, simply jump out of the loop.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: use mm_access() instead of ptrace_may_access()</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T00:49:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-31T23:26:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2344bec788b097b2d1198758bd29c583812b864e'/>
<id>2344bec788b097b2d1198758bd29c583812b864e</id>
<content type='text'>
mm_access() handles this much better, and avoids some race conditions.

Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
mm_access() handles this much better, and avoids some race conditions.

Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: remove mm_for_maps()</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T00:49:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-31T23:26:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e7dcd9990e42ccfc798d4eb55e2dbf9d7d434c6b'/>
<id>e7dcd9990e42ccfc798d4eb55e2dbf9d7d434c6b</id>
<content type='text'>
mm_for_maps() is a simple wrapper for mm_access(), and the name is
misleading, so just remove it and use mm_access() directly.

Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
mm_for_maps() is a simple wrapper for mm_access(), and the name is
misleading, so just remove it and use mm_access() directly.

Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: clean up /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/environ handling</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T00:49:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-31T23:26:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b409e578d9a4ec95913e06d8fea2a33f1754ea69'/>
<id>b409e578d9a4ec95913e06d8fea2a33f1754ea69</id>
<content type='text'>
Similar to e268337dfe26 ("proc: clean up and fix /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/mem
handling"), move the check of permission to open(), this will simplify
read() code.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Similar to e268337dfe26 ("proc: clean up and fix /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/mem
handling"), move the check of permission to open(), this will simplify
read() code.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, oom: normalize oom scores to oom_score_adj scale only for userspace</title>
<updated>2012-05-29T23:22:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-29T22:06:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a7f638f999ff42310e9582273b1fe25ea6e469ba'/>
<id>a7f638f999ff42310e9582273b1fe25ea6e469ba</id>
<content type='text'>
The oom_score_adj scale ranges from -1000 to 1000 and represents the
proportion of memory available to the process at allocation time.  This
means an oom_score_adj value of 300, for example, will bias a process as
though it was using an extra 30.0% of available memory and a value of
-350 will discount 35.0% of available memory from its usage.

The oom killer badness heuristic also uses this scale to report the oom
score for each eligible process in determining the "best" process to
kill.  Thus, it can only differentiate each process's memory usage by
0.1% of system RAM.

On large systems, this can end up being a large amount of memory: 256MB
on 256GB systems, for example.

This can be fixed by having the badness heuristic to use the actual
memory usage in scoring threads and then normalizing it to the
oom_score_adj scale for userspace.  This results in better comparison
between eligible threads for kill and no change from the userspace
perspective.

Suggested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The oom_score_adj scale ranges from -1000 to 1000 and represents the
proportion of memory available to the process at allocation time.  This
means an oom_score_adj value of 300, for example, will bias a process as
though it was using an extra 30.0% of available memory and a value of
-350 will discount 35.0% of available memory from its usage.

The oom killer badness heuristic also uses this scale to report the oom
score for each eligible process in determining the "best" process to
kill.  Thus, it can only differentiate each process's memory usage by
0.1% of system RAM.

On large systems, this can end up being a large amount of memory: 256MB
on 256GB systems, for example.

This can be fixed by having the badness heuristic to use the actual
memory usage in scoring threads and then normalizing it to the
oom_score_adj scale for userspace.  This results in better comparison
between eligible threads for kill and no change from the userspace
perspective.

Suggested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-05-24T00:42:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-24T00:42:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7'/>
<id>644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's patch-bomb)</title>
<updated>2012-05-18T22:56:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-18T22:56:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=73f1f5dd3ee3ec6e20768d831d9759b0330fad0e'/>
<id>73f1f5dd3ee3ec6e20768d831d9759b0330fad0e</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton.

* emailed from Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;: (4 patches)
  frv: delete incorrect task prototypes causing compile fail
  slub: missing test for partial pages flush work in flush_all()
  fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries
  drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c: configure correct wday for 2000-01-01
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton.

* emailed from Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;: (4 patches)
  frv: delete incorrect task prototypes causing compile fail
  slub: missing test for partial pages flush work in flush_all()
  fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries
  drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c: configure correct wday for 2000-01-01
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
