linux-toradex.git/fs/proc/namespaces.c, branch v4.9.62

switch all procfs directories ->iterate_shared()

2016-05-02T23:49:30+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

cgroup: introduce cgroup namespaces

2016-02-16T18:04:58+00:00

Introduce the ability to create new cgroup namespace. The newly created
cgroup namespace remembers the cgroup of the process at the point
of creation of the cgroup namespace (referred as cgroupns-root).
The main purpose of cgroup namespace is to virtualize the contents
of /proc/self/cgroup file. Processes inside a cgroup namespace
are only able to see paths relative to their namespace root
(unless they are moved outside of their cgroupns-root, at which point
 they will see a relative path from their cgroupns-root).
For a correctly setup container this enables container-tools
(like libcontainer, lxc, lmctfy, etc.) to create completely virtualized
containers without leaking system level cgroup hierarchy to the task.
This patch only implements the 'unshare' part of the cgroupns.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Kali 
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-01-21T01:09:18+00:00

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

switch ->get_link() to delayed_call, kill ->put_link()

2015-12-30T18:01:03+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

replace ->follow_link() with new method that could stay in RCU mode

2015-12-09T03:41:54+00:00

new method: ->get_link(); replacement of ->follow_link().  The differences
are:
	* inode and dentry are passed separately
	* might be called both in RCU and non-RCU mode;
the former is indicated by passing it a NULL dentry.
	* when called that way it isn't allowed to block
and should return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) if it needs to be called
in non-RCU mode.

It's a flagday change - the old method is gone, all in-tree instances
converted.  Conversion isn't hard; said that, so far very few instances
do not immediately bail out when called in RCU mode.  That'll change
in the next commits.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

don't pass nameidata to ->follow_link()

2015-05-11T02:20:15+00:00

its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain
it from current->nameidata

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

new ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventions

2015-05-11T02:19:45+00:00

a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning
an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_
that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns
the symlink body.  Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic
symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks.  Stored pointer
is ignored in all cases except the last one.

Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call
of ->put_link().

b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata).
Now only the opaque pointer is.  In the cases when we used the symlink body
to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition
to returning it.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations

2015-04-15T19:06:57+00:00

that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

kill proc_ns completely

2014-12-11T02:30:57+00:00

procfs inodes need only the ns_ops part; nsfs inodes don't need it at all

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

take the targets of /proc//ns/ symlinks to separate fs

2014-12-11T02:30:20+00:00

New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs.  Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.).  Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().

This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot.  The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).

Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present.  See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.

As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent  pair it gets
from ns_get_path().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro