linux-toradex.git/fs/seq_file.c, branch v4.4.93

Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces

2017-08-07T02:19:42+00:00

commit 34dbbcdbf63360661ff7bda6c5f52f99ac515f92 upstream.

A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.

The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.

So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones.  Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.

It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though.  Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.

[sumits: this is used in Ubuntu as a fix for CVE-2015-8944]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/seq_file: fix out-of-bounds read

2016-09-07T06:32:43+00:00

commit 088bf2ff5d12e2e32ee52a4024fec26e582f44d3 upstream.

seq_read() is a nasty piece of work, not to mention buggy.

It has (I think) an old bug which allows unprivileged userspace to read
beyond the end of m->buf.

I was getting these:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 at addr ffff880116889880
    Read of size 2713 by task trinity-c2/1329
    CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #96
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
      kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x80
      kasan_report_error+0x2cb/0x7e0
      kasan_report+0x4e/0x80
      check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0
      kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
      seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480
      proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260
      do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0
      do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860
      vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0
      do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0
      SyS_readv+0xb/0x10
      do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
      entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Object at ffff880116889100, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096
    Allocated:
    PID = 1329
      save_stack_trace+0x26/0x80
      save_stack+0x46/0xd0
      kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
      __kmalloc+0x1aa/0x4a0
      seq_buf_alloc+0x35/0x40
      seq_read+0x7d8/0x1480
      proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260
      do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0
      do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860
      vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0
      do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0
      SyS_readv+0xb/0x10
      do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
      return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    Freed:
    PID = 0
    (stack is not available)
    Memory state around the buggy address:
     ffff88011688a000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     ffff88011688a080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    >ffff88011688a100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
		       ^
     ffff88011688a180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
     ffff88011688a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    ==================================================================
    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

This seems to be the same thing that Dave Jones was seeing here:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/334

There are multiple issues here:

  1) If we enter the function with a non-empty buffer, there is an attempt
     to flush it. But it was not clearing m->from after doing so, which
     means that if we try to do this flush twice in a row without any call
     to traverse() in between, we are going to be reading from the wrong
     place -- the splat above, fixed by this patch.

  2) If there's a short write to userspace because of page faults, the
     buffer may already contain multiple lines (i.e. pos has advanced by
     more than 1), but we don't save the progress that was made so the
     next call will output what we've already returned previously. Since
     that is a much less serious issue (and I have a headache after
     staring at seq_read() for the past 8 hours), I'll leave that for now.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471447270-32093-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum 
Reported-by: Dave Jones 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs, seqfile: always allow oom killer

2015-11-07T01:50:42+00:00

Since 5cec38ac866b ("fs, seq_file: fallback to vmalloc instead of oom kill
processes") seq_buf_alloc() avoids calling the oom killer for PAGE_SIZE or
smaller allocations; but larger allocations can use the oom killer via
vmalloc().  Thus reads of small files can return ENOMEM, but larger files
use the oom killer to avoid ENOMEM.

The effect of this bug is that reads from /proc and other virtual
filesystems can return ENOMEM instead of the preferred behavior - oom
killing something (possibly the calling process).  I don't know of anyone
except Google who has noticed the issue.

I suspect the fix is more needed in smaller systems where there isn't any
reclaimable memory.  But these seem like the kinds of systems which
probably don't use the oom killer for production situations.

Memory overcommit requires use of the oom killer to select a victim
regardless of file size.

Enable oom killer for small seq_buf_alloc() allocations.

Fixes: 5cec38ac866b ("fs, seq_file: fallback to vmalloc instead of oom kill processes")
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes 
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

seq_file: reuse string_escape_str()

2015-11-07T01:50:42+00:00

strint_escape_str() escapes input string by given criteria.  In case of
seq_escape() the criteria is to convert some characters to their octal
representation.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/seq_file: use seq_* helpers in seq_hex_dump()

2015-11-07T01:50:42+00:00

This improves code readability.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/seq_file: convert int seq_vprint/seq_printf/etc... returns to void

2015-09-11T22:21:34+00:00

The seq_ function return values were frequently misused.

See: commit 1f33c41c03da ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
     seq_has_overflowed() and make public")

All uses of these return values have been removed, so convert the
return types to void.

Miscellanea:

o Move seq_put_decimal_ and seq_escape prototypes closer the
  other seq_vprintf prototypes
o Reorder seq_putc and seq_puts to return early on overflow
o Add argument names to seq_vprintf and seq_printf
o Update the seq_escape kernel-doc
o Convert a couple of leading spaces to tabs in seq_escape

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Mark Brown 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Joerg Roedel 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

seq_file: provide an analogue of print_hex_dump()

2015-09-10T20:29:01+00:00

This introduces a new helper and switches current users to use it.  All
patches are compiled tested. kmemleak is tested via its own test suite.

This patch (of 6):

The new seq_hex_dump() is a complete analogue of print_hex_dump().

We have few users of this functionality already. It allows to reduce their
codebase.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Joe Perches 
Cc: Tadeusz Struk 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Ingo Tuchscherer 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Vladimir Kondratiev 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2015-07-05T02:36:06+00:00

Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
  that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
  stuff).  UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle).  9P fixes.
  fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"

[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups".  The
  file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
  fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge.   - Linus ]

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
  9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
  p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
  9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
  dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
  block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
  dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
  dax: Add block size note to documentation
  fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
  fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
  fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
  vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
  namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
  make simple_positive() public
  ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
  pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
  remove the pointless include of lglock.h
  fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
  xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
  fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
  fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
  ...

Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)

2015-07-02T00:47:51+00:00

Merge third patchbomb from Andrew Morton:

 - the rest of MM

 - scripts/gdb updates

 - ipc/ updates

 - lib/ updates

 - MAINTAINERS updates

 - various other misc things

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton : (67 commits)
  genalloc: rename of_get_named_gen_pool() to of_gen_pool_get()
  genalloc: rename dev_get_gen_pool() to gen_pool_get()
  x86: opt into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, for both 32-bit and 64-bit
  MAINTAINERS: add zpool
  MAINTAINERS: BCACHE: Kent Overstreet has changed email address
  MAINTAINERS: move Jens Osterkamp to CREDITS
  MAINTAINERS: remove unused nbd.h pattern
  MAINTAINERS: update brcm gpio filename pattern
  MAINTAINERS: update brcm dts pattern
  MAINTAINERS: update sound soc intel patterns
  MAINTAINERS: remove website for paride
  MAINTAINERS: update Emulex ocrdma email addresses
  bcache: use kvfree() in various places
  libcxgbi: use kvfree() in cxgbi_free_big_mem()
  target: use kvfree() in session alloc and free
  IB/ehca: use kvfree() in ipz_queue_{cd}tor()
  drm/nouveau/gem: use kvfree() in u_free()
  drm: use kvfree() in drm_free_large()
  cxgb4: use kvfree() in t4_free_mem()
  cxgb3: use kvfree() in cxgb_free_mem()
  ...

fs: document seq_open()'s usage of file->private_data

2015-07-01T02:44:57+00:00

seq_open() stores its struct seq_file in file->private_data, thus it must
not be modified by user of seq_file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1433193673.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds