<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/sysfs/mount.c, branch v4.4.93</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.</title>
<updated>2015-07-10T15:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-29T19:42:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=90f8572b0f021fdd1baa68e00a8c30482ee9e5f4'/>
<id>90f8572b0f021fdd1baa68e00a8c30482ee9e5f4</id>
<content type='text'>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files.  Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.

Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.

Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.

The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.

This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.

Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc.  Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files.  Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.

Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.

Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.

The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.

This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.

Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc.  Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace</title>
<updated>2015-05-14T02:44:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-09T04:22:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1b852bceb0d111e510d1a15826ecc4a19358d512'/>
<id>1b852bceb0d111e510d1a15826ecc4a19358d512</id>
<content type='text'>
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount.  Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags.  Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.

Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.

Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount.  Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags.  Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.

Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.

Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: move the last knowledge of sysfs out from kernfs</title>
<updated>2014-06-03T15:11:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jianyu Zhan</name>
<email>nasa4836@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-26T07:40:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c9482a5bdcc09be9096f40e858c5fe39c389cd52'/>
<id>c9482a5bdcc09be9096f40e858c5fe39c389cd52</id>
<content type='text'>
There is still one residue of sysfs remaining: the sb_magic
SYSFS_MAGIC. However this should be kernfs user specific,
so this patch moves it out. Kerrnfs user should specify their
magic number while mouting.

Signed-off-by: Jianyu Zhan &lt;nasa4836@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is still one residue of sysfs remaining: the sb_magic
SYSFS_MAGIC. However this should be kernfs user specific,
so this patch moves it out. Kerrnfs user should specify their
magic number while mouting.

Signed-off-by: Jianyu Zhan &lt;nasa4836@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs, sysfs, cgroup: restrict extra perm check on open to sysfs</title>
<updated>2014-05-13T11:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-12T17:56:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=555724a831b4a146e7bdf16ecc989cda032b076d'/>
<id>555724a831b4a146e7bdf16ecc989cda032b076d</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernfs open method - kernfs_fop_open() - inherited extra
permission checks from sysfs.  While the vfs layer allows ignoring the
read/write permissions checks if the issuer has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
sysfs explicitly denied open regardless of the cap if the file doesn't
have any of the UGO perms of the requested access or doesn't implement
the requested operation.  It can be debated whether this was a good
idea or not but the behavior is too subtle and dangerous to change at
this point.

After cgroup got converted to kernfs, this extra perm check also got
applied to cgroup breaking libcgroup which opens write-only files with
O_RDWR as root.  This patch gates the extra open permission check with
a new flag KERNFS_ROOT_EXTRA_OPEN_PERM_CHECK and enables it for sysfs.
For sysfs, nothing changes.  For cgroup, root now can perform any
operation regardless of the permissions as it was before kernfs
conversion.  Note that kernfs still fails unimplemented operations
with -EINVAL.

While at it, add comments explaining KERNFS_ROOT flags.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Wagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Wagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
References: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CANaxB-xUm3rJ-Cbp72q-rQJO5mZe1qK6qXsQM=vh0U8upJ44+A@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2bd59d48ebfb ("cgroup: convert to kernfs")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The kernfs open method - kernfs_fop_open() - inherited extra
permission checks from sysfs.  While the vfs layer allows ignoring the
read/write permissions checks if the issuer has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
sysfs explicitly denied open regardless of the cap if the file doesn't
have any of the UGO perms of the requested access or doesn't implement
the requested operation.  It can be debated whether this was a good
idea or not but the behavior is too subtle and dangerous to change at
this point.

After cgroup got converted to kernfs, this extra perm check also got
applied to cgroup breaking libcgroup which opens write-only files with
O_RDWR as root.  This patch gates the extra open permission check with
a new flag KERNFS_ROOT_EXTRA_OPEN_PERM_CHECK and enables it for sysfs.
For sysfs, nothing changes.  For cgroup, root now can perform any
operation regardless of the permissions as it was before kernfs
conversion.  Note that kernfs still fails unimplemented operations
with -EINVAL.

While at it, add comments explaining KERNFS_ROOT flags.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Wagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Wagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
References: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CANaxB-xUm3rJ-Cbp72q-rQJO5mZe1qK6qXsQM=vh0U8upJ44+A@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2bd59d48ebfb ("cgroup: convert to kernfs")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge 3.14-rc5 into driver-core-next</title>
<updated>2014-03-03T04:09:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-03T04:09:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=13df7977431e3b906a23bb75f29e0f40a8d73f87'/>
<id>13df7977431e3b906a23bb75f29e0f40a8d73f87</id>
<content type='text'>
We want the fixes in here.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We want the fixes in here.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs: fix namespace refcnt leak</title>
<updated>2014-02-25T15:37:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Zefan</name>
<email>lizefan@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-25T11:28:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fed95bab8d29b928fcf6225be72d37ded452e8a2'/>
<id>fed95bab8d29b928fcf6225be72d37ded452e8a2</id>
<content type='text'>
As mount() and kill_sb() is not a one-to-one match, we shoudn't get
ns refcnt unconditionally in sysfs_mount(), and instead we should
get the refcnt only when kernfs_mount() allocated a new superblock.

v2:
- Changed the name of the new argument, suggested by Tejun.
- Made the argument optional, suggested by Tejun.

v3:
- Make the new argument as second-to-last arg, suggested by Tejun.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
 ---
 fs/kernfs/mount.c      | 8 +++++++-
 fs/sysfs/mount.c       | 5 +++--
 include/linux/kernfs.h | 9 +++++----
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As mount() and kill_sb() is not a one-to-one match, we shoudn't get
ns refcnt unconditionally in sysfs_mount(), and instead we should
get the refcnt only when kernfs_mount() allocated a new superblock.

v2:
- Changed the name of the new argument, suggested by Tejun.
- Made the argument optional, suggested by Tejun.

v3:
- Make the new argument as second-to-last arg, suggested by Tejun.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
 ---
 fs/kernfs/mount.c      | 8 +++++++-
 fs/sysfs/mount.c       | 5 +++--
 include/linux/kernfs.h | 9 +++++----
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: allow nodes to be created in the deactivated state</title>
<updated>2014-02-07T23:52:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-03T19:09:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d35258ef702cca0c4e66d799f8e38b78c02ce8a5'/>
<id>d35258ef702cca0c4e66d799f8e38b78c02ce8a5</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, kernfs_nodes are made visible to userland on creation,
which makes it difficult for kernfs users to atomically succeed or
fail creation of multiple nodes.  In addition, if something fails
after creating some nodes, the created nodes might already be in use
and their active refs need to be drained for removal, which has the
potential to introduce tricky reverse locking dependency on active_ref
depending on how the error path is synchronized.

This patch introduces per-root flag KERNFS_ROOT_CREATE_DEACTIVATED.
If set, all nodes under the root are created in the deactivated state
and stay invisible to userland until explicitly enabled by the new
kernfs_activate() API.  Also, nodes which have never been activated
are guaranteed to bypass draining on removal thus allowing error paths
to not worry about lockding dependency on active_ref draining.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, kernfs_nodes are made visible to userland on creation,
which makes it difficult for kernfs users to atomically succeed or
fail creation of multiple nodes.  In addition, if something fails
after creating some nodes, the created nodes might already be in use
and their active refs need to be drained for removal, which has the
potential to introduce tricky reverse locking dependency on active_ref
depending on how the error path is synchronized.

This patch introduces per-root flag KERNFS_ROOT_CREATE_DEACTIVATED.
If set, all nodes under the root are created in the deactivated state
and stay invisible to userland until explicitly enabled by the new
kernfs_activate() API.  Also, nodes which have never been activated
are guaranteed to bypass draining on removal thus allowing error paths
to not worry about lockding dependency on active_ref draining.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: add kernfs_dir_ops</title>
<updated>2013-12-17T16:59:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-11T21:03:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=80b9bbefc345079bddc4959de016ba4074b0c8d6'/>
<id>80b9bbefc345079bddc4959de016ba4074b0c8d6</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for mkdir(2), rmdir(2) and rename(2) syscalls.  This is
implemented through optional kernfs_dir_ops callback table which can
be specified on kernfs_create_root().  An implemented callback is
invoked when the matching syscall is invoked.

As kernfs keep dcache syncs with internal representation and
revalidates dentries on each access, the implementation of these
methods is extremely simple.  Each just discovers the relevant
kernfs_node(s) and invokes the requested callback which is allowed to
do any kernfs operations and the end result doesn't necessarily have
to match the expected semantics of the syscall.

This will be used to convert cgroup to use kernfs instead of its own
filesystem implementation.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add support for mkdir(2), rmdir(2) and rename(2) syscalls.  This is
implemented through optional kernfs_dir_ops callback table which can
be specified on kernfs_create_root().  An implemented callback is
invoked when the matching syscall is invoked.

As kernfs keep dcache syncs with internal representation and
revalidates dentries on each access, the implementation of these
methods is extremely simple.  Each just discovers the relevant
kernfs_node(s) and invokes the requested callback which is allowed to
do any kernfs operations and the end result doesn't necessarily have
to match the expected semantics of the syscall.

This will be used to convert cgroup to use kernfs instead of its own
filesystem implementation.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: s/sysfs_dirent/kernfs_node/ and rename its friends accordingly</title>
<updated>2013-12-11T23:28:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-11T19:11:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=324a56e16e44baecac3ca799fd216154145c14bf'/>
<id>324a56e16e44baecac3ca799fd216154145c14bf</id>
<content type='text'>
kernfs has just been separated out from sysfs and we're already in
full conflict mode.  Nothing can make the situation any worse.  Let's
take the chance to name things properly.

This patch performs the following renames.

* s/sysfs_elem_dir/kernfs_elem_dir/
* s/sysfs_elem_symlink/kernfs_elem_symlink/
* s/sysfs_elem_attr/kernfs_elem_file/
* s/sysfs_dirent/kernfs_node/
* s/sd/kn/ in kernfs proper
* s/parent_sd/parent/
* s/target_sd/target/
* s/dir_sd/parent/
* s/to_sysfs_dirent()/rb_to_kn()/
* misc renames of local vars when they conflict with the above

Because md, mic and gpio dig into sysfs details, this patch ends up
modifying them.  All are sysfs_dirent renames and trivial.  While we
can avoid these by introducing a dummy wrapping struct sysfs_dirent
around kernfs_node, given the limited usage outside kernfs and sysfs
proper, I don't think such workaround is called for.

This patch is strictly rename only and doesn't introduce any
functional difference.

- mic / gpio renames were missing.  Spotted by kbuild test robot.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Ashutosh Dixit &lt;ashutosh.dixit@intel.com&gt;
Cc: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
kernfs has just been separated out from sysfs and we're already in
full conflict mode.  Nothing can make the situation any worse.  Let's
take the chance to name things properly.

This patch performs the following renames.

* s/sysfs_elem_dir/kernfs_elem_dir/
* s/sysfs_elem_symlink/kernfs_elem_symlink/
* s/sysfs_elem_attr/kernfs_elem_file/
* s/sysfs_dirent/kernfs_node/
* s/sd/kn/ in kernfs proper
* s/parent_sd/parent/
* s/target_sd/target/
* s/dir_sd/parent/
* s/to_sysfs_dirent()/rb_to_kn()/
* misc renames of local vars when they conflict with the above

Because md, mic and gpio dig into sysfs details, this patch ends up
modifying them.  All are sysfs_dirent renames and trivial.  While we
can avoid these by introducing a dummy wrapping struct sysfs_dirent
around kernfs_node, given the limited usage outside kernfs and sysfs
proper, I don't think such workaround is called for.

This patch is strictly rename only and doesn't introduce any
functional difference.

- mic / gpio renames were missing.  Spotted by kbuild test robot.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Ashutosh Dixit &lt;ashutosh.dixit@intel.com&gt;
Cc: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs: fix use-after-free in sysfs_kill_sb()</title>
<updated>2013-12-11T06:40:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-10T15:22:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a7560a0132cfc93b25d2df1d277a078a05220cf4'/>
<id>a7560a0132cfc93b25d2df1d277a078a05220cf4</id>
<content type='text'>
While restructuring the [u]mount path, 4b93dc9b1c68 ("sysfs, kernfs:
prepare mount path for kernfs") incorrectly updated sysfs_kill_sb() so
that it first kills super_block and then tries to dereference its
namespace tag to drop it.  Fix it by caching namespace tag before
killing the superblock and then drop the cached namespace tag.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Yuanhan Liu &lt;yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yuanhan Liu &lt;yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/20131205031051.GC5135@yliu-dev.sh.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While restructuring the [u]mount path, 4b93dc9b1c68 ("sysfs, kernfs:
prepare mount path for kernfs") incorrectly updated sysfs_kill_sb() so
that it first kills super_block and then tries to dereference its
namespace tag to drop it.  Fix it by caching namespace tag before
killing the superblock and then drop the cached namespace tag.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Yuanhan Liu &lt;yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yuanhan Liu &lt;yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/20131205031051.GC5135@yliu-dev.sh.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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