<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs/verity, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversions</title>
<updated>2026-11-06T05:55:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees+treewide@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-29T06:08:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0af298e62e5cff4ebf9bec47b8711177a7e2f115'/>
<id>0af298e62e5cff4ebf9bec47b8711177a7e2f115</id>
<content type='text'>
Refresh the tree with run of the existing Coccinelle rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci, now that they also convert
arrays of multi-byte integers.

The conversions break down as:

	435	kzalloc_objs()
	169	kmalloc_objs()
	 52	kvzalloc_objs()
	 47	kzalloc_obj()
	 42	kvmalloc_objs()
	  8	kmalloc_obj()
	  2	kzalloc_flex()
	  2	kvmalloc_flex()

and 37 existing kmalloc_obj() family calls drop a redundant GFP_KERNEL.

Build tested with allmodconfig on x86_64 with GCC 16.2.0, and, together
with the devm_kmalloc_obj() conversion that follows, on x86_64, arm64,
i386, arm, riscv, s390, m68k, mips, parisc, sparc, loongarch, arc,
xtensa, and openrisc with GCC 16.2.0 with no new warnings.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees+treewide@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Refresh the tree with run of the existing Coccinelle rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci, now that they also convert
arrays of multi-byte integers.

The conversions break down as:

	435	kzalloc_objs()
	169	kmalloc_objs()
	 52	kvzalloc_objs()
	 47	kzalloc_obj()
	 42	kvmalloc_objs()
	  8	kmalloc_obj()
	  2	kzalloc_flex()
	  2	kvmalloc_flex()

and 37 existing kmalloc_obj() family calls drop a redundant GFP_KERNEL.

Build tested with allmodconfig on x86_64 with GCC 16.2.0, and, together
with the devm_kmalloc_obj() conversion that follows, on x86_64, arm64,
i386, arm, riscv, s390, m68k, mips, parisc, sparc, loongarch, arc,
xtensa, and openrisc with GCC 16.2.0 with no new warnings.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees+treewide@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: Set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible</title>
<updated>2026-10-28T17:53:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-25T20:48:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c349b233d6ab0fc3517401a1e2d36f5f90eb8c9b'/>
<id>c349b233d6ab0fc3517401a1e2d36f5f90eb8c9b</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the
fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to
make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly
earlier than they did before.

Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(),
it now happens when -&gt;end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY.

However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY,
causing a use-after-free.

Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no
longer possible.  On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back
the filesystem-specific verity flag.

Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug
more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info.

Finally, tweak some comments.  Clarify one, and move information from
another to its proper place in the comment for -&gt;end_enable_verity().

Fixes: f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025204807.122875-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the
fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to
make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly
earlier than they did before.

Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(),
it now happens when -&gt;end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY.

However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY,
causing a use-after-free.

Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no
longer possible.  On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back
the filesystem-specific verity flag.

Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug
more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info.

Finally, tweak some comments.  Clarify one, and move information from
another to its proper place in the comment for -&gt;end_enable_verity().

Fixes: f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025204807.122875-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: Tell LSMs about signature only after verity is enabled</title>
<updated>2026-10-28T17:53:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-25T20:45:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=28d74059fddbd8ae83c7715056b303c402071f6f'/>
<id>28d74059fddbd8ae83c7715056b303c402071f6f</id>
<content type='text'>
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY calls security_inode_setintegrity() before verity
has finished being enabled.  That's broken because enabling verity can
still fail at that point, e.g. due to insufficient xattr space.

Afterwards, arbitrary contents can be written to the file, which doesn't
actually have verity enabled.  The in-core inode stays the same, so the
LSM considers it to have verity enabled with a valid signature.  (Or
rather, in the case of IPE, which is the only LSM that implements
security_inode_setintegrity(), it also checks IS_VERITY(), which can be
bypassed by enabling verity with no signature after the file writes.)

Fix this by moving the call to security_inode_setintegrity() out of
fsverity_verify_signature() and into a new function that is called from
the appropriate places.

Fixes: 7c373e4f1445 ("fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Fan Wu &lt;wufan@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Fan Wu &lt;wufan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025204534.122506-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY calls security_inode_setintegrity() before verity
has finished being enabled.  That's broken because enabling verity can
still fail at that point, e.g. due to insufficient xattr space.

Afterwards, arbitrary contents can be written to the file, which doesn't
actually have verity enabled.  The in-core inode stays the same, so the
LSM considers it to have verity enabled with a valid signature.  (Or
rather, in the case of IPE, which is the only LSM that implements
security_inode_setintegrity(), it also checks IS_VERITY(), which can be
bypassed by enabling verity with no signature after the file writes.)

Fix this by moving the call to security_inode_setintegrity() out of
fsverity_verify_signature() and into a new function that is called from
the appropriate places.

Fixes: 7c373e4f1445 ("fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Fan Wu &lt;wufan@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Fan Wu &lt;wufan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025204534.122506-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: Be more careful with return value of -&gt;get_verity_descriptor()</title>
<updated>2026-10-28T17:53:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-25T20:38:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8f8faec82aa902b1997ae578c46bcc84afbad811'/>
<id>8f8faec82aa902b1997ae578c46bcc84afbad811</id>
<content type='text'>
If fsverity_operations::get_verity_descriptor() returns that the verity
descriptor has 0 size, then a zero-size buffer is allocated to hold it,
and it's called again with bufsize=0.

But bufsize=0 is a special case that says to return the actual size.  If
in the meantime the filesystem has decided that the size is some
actually valid size, it will return that size, and then
validate_fsverity_descriptor() will read from ZERO_SIZE_PTR and crash.

Of course, for the filesystem to misbehave in that strange way, it
generally would require direct writes to the block device.

Regardless, fsverity_get_descriptor() might as well guard against it.
Make it do so.  Specifically, validate that the first call to
-&gt;get_verity_descriptor() returns at least the minimum descriptor size,
and validate that the second call returns the same size as the first.

Fixes: fd2d1acfcadf ("fs-verity: add the hook for file -&gt;open()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025203831.120095-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If fsverity_operations::get_verity_descriptor() returns that the verity
descriptor has 0 size, then a zero-size buffer is allocated to hold it,
and it's called again with bufsize=0.

But bufsize=0 is a special case that says to return the actual size.  If
in the meantime the filesystem has decided that the size is some
actually valid size, it will return that size, and then
validate_fsverity_descriptor() will read from ZERO_SIZE_PTR and crash.

Of course, for the filesystem to misbehave in that strange way, it
generally would require direct writes to the block device.

Regardless, fsverity_get_descriptor() might as well guard against it.
Make it do so.  Specifically, validate that the first call to
-&gt;get_verity_descriptor() returns at least the minimum descriptor size,
and validate that the second call returns the same size as the first.

Fixes: fd2d1acfcadf ("fs-verity: add the hook for file -&gt;open()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025203831.120095-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: Explicitly require FMODE_READ to retrieve hashes</title>
<updated>2026-10-28T17:52:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-22T21:15:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1acb4fd2d011c4bd6cc961095ae17361c71ff61a'/>
<id>1acb4fd2d011c4bd6cc961095ae17361c71ff61a</id>
<content type='text'>
The comment in fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(), which justifies not
checking for FMODE_READ, doesn't consider that the nonstandard access
mode 3 (ioctl-only) exists.

Opening an ioctl-only fd generally requires read (and write) permission.
However, there are gaps with certain LSMs: an ioctl-only fd requests
read (and write) permission via security_inode_permission, but not
security_file_open.  With certain LSMs relying on the latter, such as
Landlock and AppArmor, an ioctl-only fd can be opened without the LSM
granting read (and write) permission.

Since FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA returns hashes of file contents
blocks, it should require read permission.  This also applies to
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, which returns a hash for the whole file.

Meanwhile, ioctl-only fds are a rarely-used feature, not known to be
used with either ioctl.

Therefore, just disallow these ioctls on ioctl-only file descriptors,
similar to what was already done with FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.

More specifically, explicitly check for FMODE_READ.  This also covers
write-only fds to non-verity files which otherwise would have failed
with ENODATA.  This change in error code for write-only fds should be
fine too, as these ioctls cannot be usefully used with write-only fds
anyway, but it's worth noting as another technicality.

Fixes: 4dd893d832cf ("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl")
Fixes: e17fe6579de0 ("fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andrey Albershteyn &lt;aalbersh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022211522.1489943-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The comment in fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(), which justifies not
checking for FMODE_READ, doesn't consider that the nonstandard access
mode 3 (ioctl-only) exists.

Opening an ioctl-only fd generally requires read (and write) permission.
However, there are gaps with certain LSMs: an ioctl-only fd requests
read (and write) permission via security_inode_permission, but not
security_file_open.  With certain LSMs relying on the latter, such as
Landlock and AppArmor, an ioctl-only fd can be opened without the LSM
granting read (and write) permission.

Since FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA returns hashes of file contents
blocks, it should require read permission.  This also applies to
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, which returns a hash for the whole file.

Meanwhile, ioctl-only fds are a rarely-used feature, not known to be
used with either ioctl.

Therefore, just disallow these ioctls on ioctl-only file descriptors,
similar to what was already done with FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.

More specifically, explicitly check for FMODE_READ.  This also covers
write-only fds to non-verity files which otherwise would have failed
with ENODATA.  This change in error code for write-only fds should be
fine too, as these ioctls cannot be usefully used with write-only fds
anyway, but it's worth noting as another technicality.

Fixes: 4dd893d832cf ("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl")
Fixes: e17fe6579de0 ("fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andrey Albershteyn &lt;aalbersh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022211522.1489943-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.keyring' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2026-10-27T18:01:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-27T18:01:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=62c457528529cdcfa32bc52b331ceca10f3937b6'/>
<id>62c457528529cdcfa32bc52b331ceca10f3937b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs keyring updates from Christian Brauner:
 "The kernel has two keyrings that userspace fills with X.509
  certificates at boot: .fs-verity for fs-verity built-in signatures
  and .dm-verity for dm-verity root hash signatures.

  Neither is linked into any process keyring. Hence, request_key() and
  KEYCTL_SEARCH can't find them. The only way for userspace to identify
  them is to read their serial number out of /proc/keys. That is not
  just a large file often the names can also be reused and appear
  multiple times which allows forging these keyrings.

  This adds two fixed special key ids, KEY_SPEC_DM_VERITY_KEYRING and
  KEY_SPEC_FS_VERITY_KEYRING next to KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING. The latter
  went in through bpf-next this merge window.

  lookup_user_key() resolves the fixed key ids to the two keyrings. So
  userspace can add a dm-verity (fixed keyring id: -10) certificate with

	keyctl padd asymmetric "" -10 &lt; cert.der

  and seal the keyring with

	keyctl restrict_keyring -10

  without looking anything up first"

* tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.keyring' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  Documentation: keys: document IDs added since KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY
  keys: add KEY_SPEC_FS_VERITY_KEYRING
  keys: add KEY_SPEC_DM_VERITY_KEYRING
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs keyring updates from Christian Brauner:
 "The kernel has two keyrings that userspace fills with X.509
  certificates at boot: .fs-verity for fs-verity built-in signatures
  and .dm-verity for dm-verity root hash signatures.

  Neither is linked into any process keyring. Hence, request_key() and
  KEYCTL_SEARCH can't find them. The only way for userspace to identify
  them is to read their serial number out of /proc/keys. That is not
  just a large file often the names can also be reused and appear
  multiple times which allows forging these keyrings.

  This adds two fixed special key ids, KEY_SPEC_DM_VERITY_KEYRING and
  KEY_SPEC_FS_VERITY_KEYRING next to KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING. The latter
  went in through bpf-next this merge window.

  lookup_user_key() resolves the fixed key ids to the two keyrings. So
  userspace can add a dm-verity (fixed keyring id: -10) certificate with

	keyctl padd asymmetric "" -10 &lt; cert.der

  and seal the keyring with

	keyctl restrict_keyring -10

  without looking anything up first"

* tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.keyring' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  Documentation: keys: document IDs added since KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY
  keys: add KEY_SPEC_FS_VERITY_KEYRING
  keys: add KEY_SPEC_DM_VERITY_KEYRING
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux</title>
<updated>2026-10-21T01:51:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-21T01:51:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9e73b189c88fcba63af4775d637d395de0af4fdb'/>
<id>9e73b189c88fcba63af4775d637d395de0af4fdb</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull fsverity updates from Eric Biggers:
 "Patches from Andrey Albershteyn to prepare for XFS fsverity support:

   - Report verification errors through fserror, instead of only through
     an unstructured log message and generic I/O error return

   - Move the reporting of STATX_ATTR_VERITY into the VFS, so that each
     fsverity-capable filesystem doesn't need to do it. This also fixes
     a bug where btrfs didn't return STATX_ATTR_VERITY in
     attributes_mask

   - Make the VFS prevent enabling DAX on fsverity files, so that it
     will be handled in a single place for ext4 and XFS

   - Move ext4 and f2fs's code to read verity metadata from the
     pagecache into shared code, so that XFS will be able to use it too

   - Export fsverity_ensure_verity_info() for XFS scrub to use

   - Pass all-zeroes hash to -&gt;write_merkle_tree_block() so that XFS
     will be able to implement an optimization for sparse files"

* tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux:
  fsverity: hoist statx reporting of fs-verity flag
  fsverity: don't allow setting DAX file attribute on fsverity files
  fsverity: hoist pagecache_read from f2fs/ext4 to fsverity
  fsverity: pass digest size and hash of the all-zeroes block to -&gt;write
  fsverity: expose ensure_fsverity_info()
  fsverity: report validation errors through fserror to fsnotify
  MAINTAINERS: List the fsverity branches
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull fsverity updates from Eric Biggers:
 "Patches from Andrey Albershteyn to prepare for XFS fsverity support:

   - Report verification errors through fserror, instead of only through
     an unstructured log message and generic I/O error return

   - Move the reporting of STATX_ATTR_VERITY into the VFS, so that each
     fsverity-capable filesystem doesn't need to do it. This also fixes
     a bug where btrfs didn't return STATX_ATTR_VERITY in
     attributes_mask

   - Make the VFS prevent enabling DAX on fsverity files, so that it
     will be handled in a single place for ext4 and XFS

   - Move ext4 and f2fs's code to read verity metadata from the
     pagecache into shared code, so that XFS will be able to use it too

   - Export fsverity_ensure_verity_info() for XFS scrub to use

   - Pass all-zeroes hash to -&gt;write_merkle_tree_block() so that XFS
     will be able to implement an optimization for sparse files"

* tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux:
  fsverity: hoist statx reporting of fs-verity flag
  fsverity: don't allow setting DAX file attribute on fsverity files
  fsverity: hoist pagecache_read from f2fs/ext4 to fsverity
  fsverity: pass digest size and hash of the all-zeroes block to -&gt;write
  fsverity: expose ensure_fsverity_info()
  fsverity: report validation errors through fserror to fsnotify
  MAINTAINERS: List the fsverity branches
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: add KEY_SPEC_FS_VERITY_KEYRING</title>
<updated>2026-10-12T21:37:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Halaney</name>
<email>andrew@amutable.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-08T20:57:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5ab0054676ff947af49855c6daaa1ce3270148c1'/>
<id>5ab0054676ff947af49855c6daaa1ce3270148c1</id>
<content type='text'>
Same problem as the dm-verity keyring: .fs-verity is allocated unlinked,
so the only way for userspace to name it is to scrape /proc/keys.

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Halaney &lt;andrew@amutable.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008-ajhalaney-dmverity-key-identifier-v2-2-008456d189cb@amutable.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Same problem as the dm-verity keyring: .fs-verity is allocated unlinked,
so the only way for userspace to name it is to scrape /proc/keys.

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Halaney &lt;andrew@amutable.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008-ajhalaney-dmverity-key-identifier-v2-2-008456d189cb@amutable.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: RCU-delay the freeing of struct fsverity_info</title>
<updated>2026-10-05T08:50:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-01T17:13:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e58c3805ed325fe2d4ae2dd467c0486cc860b733'/>
<id>e58c3805ed325fe2d4ae2dd467c0486cc860b733</id>
<content type='text'>
__fsverity_get_info() calls rhashtable_lookup_fast(), which just uses
rcu_read_lock() and doesn't directly synchronize with
fsverity_remove_info().

For the same inode this isn't a problem: its fsverity_info is removed
only at inode eviction time or upon failure to enable verity, when the
inode no longer needs its fsverity_info and it will no longer be
accessed via that inode.

However, this is broken and can cause a use-after-free for concurrent
__fsverity_get_info() for *different* inodes.  Those rely on following
fsverity_info::rhash_head in the rhashtable under rcu_read_lock() only.
They also use fsverity_info::inode to do the key comparison.

Fix this by RCU-delaying the freeing of 'struct fsverity_info' after
it's been removed from the rhashtable.

Fixes: f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sandeep Dhavale &lt;dhavale@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261001171349.81454-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
__fsverity_get_info() calls rhashtable_lookup_fast(), which just uses
rcu_read_lock() and doesn't directly synchronize with
fsverity_remove_info().

For the same inode this isn't a problem: its fsverity_info is removed
only at inode eviction time or upon failure to enable verity, when the
inode no longer needs its fsverity_info and it will no longer be
accessed via that inode.

However, this is broken and can cause a use-after-free for concurrent
__fsverity_get_info() for *different* inodes.  Those rely on following
fsverity_info::rhash_head in the rhashtable under rcu_read_lock() only.
They also use fsverity_info::inode to do the key comparison.

Fix this by RCU-delaying the freeing of 'struct fsverity_info' after
it's been removed from the rhashtable.

Fixes: f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sandeep Dhavale &lt;dhavale@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261001171349.81454-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: hoist pagecache_read from f2fs/ext4 to fsverity</title>
<updated>2026-10-04T17:47:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Albershteyn</name>
<email>aalbersh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-02T22:36:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9e74c01463f608d72f2da55d0ffe870f03edd124'/>
<id>9e74c01463f608d72f2da55d0ffe870f03edd124</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the same function to read from pageache. XFS will also need
this, so move this to core fsverity.

Note that f2fs and ext4 functions diverged a bit, as ext4 operated over
folios and f2fs operated over pages. The common one will operate over
folios.

Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn &lt;aalbersh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002223705.2175542-5-aalbersh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is the same function to read from pageache. XFS will also need
this, so move this to core fsverity.

Note that f2fs and ext4 functions diverged a bit, as ext4 operated over
folios and f2fs operated over pages. The common one will operate over
folios.

Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn &lt;aalbersh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002223705.2175542-5-aalbersh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
