<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs, branch v2.6.32.28</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check.</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tavis Ormandy</name>
<email>taviso@cmpxchg8b.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-09T14:29:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6c2cde9c2835cfd03daa039f3e9742aa17c3d0e5'/>
<id>6c2cde9c2835cfd03daa039f3e9742aa17c3d0e5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 462e635e5b73ba9a4c03913b77138cd57ce4b050 upstream.

The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the
vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local
attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting
the available pages for special mappings.

bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, and although I don't think this can
be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have
the security check.

  $ uname -m
  x86_64
  $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
  65536
  $ cat install_special_mapping.s
  section .bss
      resb BSS_SIZE
  section .text
      global _start
      _start:
          mov     eax, __NR_pause
          int     0x80
  $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
  $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
  $ ./install_special_mapping &amp;
  [1] 14303
  $ cat /proc/14303/maps
  0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [vdso]
  00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665                            /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
  00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [stack]

It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to
4096.

Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki &lt;swiecki@google.com&gt;
[ Changed to not drop the error code - akpm ]
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 462e635e5b73ba9a4c03913b77138cd57ce4b050 upstream.

The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the
vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local
attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting
the available pages for special mappings.

bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, and although I don't think this can
be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have
the security check.

  $ uname -m
  x86_64
  $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
  65536
  $ cat install_special_mapping.s
  section .bss
      resb BSS_SIZE
  section .text
      global _start
      _start:
          mov     eax, __NR_pause
          int     0x80
  $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
  $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
  $ ./install_special_mapping &amp;
  [1] 14303
  $ cat /proc/14303/maps
  0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [vdso]
  00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665                            /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
  00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [stack]

It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to
4096.

Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki &lt;swiecki@google.com&gt;
[ Changed to not drop the error code - akpm ]
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Fix fcntl F_GETLK not reporting some conflicts</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sergey Vlasov</name>
<email>vsu@altlinux.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-28T21:04:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dd143426eaaadea159c8dd2d3c9ff5e9da94bcfd'/>
<id>dd143426eaaadea159c8dd2d3c9ff5e9da94bcfd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 21ac19d484a8ffb66f64487846c8d53afef04d2b upstream.

The commit 129a84de2347002f09721cda3155ccfd19fade40 (locks: fix F_GETLK
regression (failure to find conflicts)) fixed the posix_test_lock()
function by itself, however, its usage in NFS changed by the commit
9d6a8c5c213e34c475e72b245a8eb709258e968c (locks: give posix_test_lock
same interface as -&gt;lock) remained broken - subsequent NFS-specific
locking code received F_UNLCK instead of the user-specified lock type.
To fix the problem, fl-&gt;fl_type needs to be saved before the
posix_test_lock() call and restored if no local conflicts were reported.

Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23892
Tested-by: Alexander Morozov &lt;amorozov@etersoft.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sergey Vlasov &lt;vsu@altlinux.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 21ac19d484a8ffb66f64487846c8d53afef04d2b upstream.

The commit 129a84de2347002f09721cda3155ccfd19fade40 (locks: fix F_GETLK
regression (failure to find conflicts)) fixed the posix_test_lock()
function by itself, however, its usage in NFS changed by the commit
9d6a8c5c213e34c475e72b245a8eb709258e968c (locks: give posix_test_lock
same interface as -&gt;lock) remained broken - subsequent NFS-specific
locking code received F_UNLCK instead of the user-specified lock type.
To fix the problem, fl-&gt;fl_type needs to be saved before the
posix_test_lock() call and restored if no local conflicts were reported.

Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23892
Tested-by: Alexander Morozov &lt;amorozov@etersoft.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sergey Vlasov &lt;vsu@altlinux.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: Fix possible BUG_ON firing in set_change_info</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Brown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-02T00:14:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=54cc1ed394a5fb6b6976597f0f0bc023e888f196'/>
<id>54cc1ed394a5fb6b6976597f0f0bc023e888f196</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1ac3ffcd0bc7e9617f62be8c7043d53ab84deac upstream.

If vfs_getattr in fill_post_wcc returns an error, we don't
set fh_post_change.
For NFSv4, this can result in set_change_info triggering a BUG_ON.
i.e. fh_post_saved being zero isn't really a bug.

So:
 - instead of BUGging when fh_post_saved is zero, just clear -&gt;atomic.
 - if vfs_getattr fails in fill_post_wcc, take a copy of i_ctime anyway.
   This will be used i seg_change_info, but not overly trusted.
 - While we are there, remove the pointless 'if' statements in set_change_info.
   There is no harm setting all the values.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c1ac3ffcd0bc7e9617f62be8c7043d53ab84deac upstream.

If vfs_getattr in fill_post_wcc returns an error, we don't
set fh_post_change.
For NFSv4, this can result in set_change_info triggering a BUG_ON.
i.e. fh_post_saved being zero isn't really a bug.

So:
 - instead of BUGging when fh_post_saved is zero, just clear -&gt;atomic.
 - if vfs_getattr fails in fill_post_wcc, take a copy of i_ctime anyway.
   This will be used i seg_change_info, but not overly trusted.
 - While we are there, remove the pointless 'if' statements in set_change_info.
   There is no harm setting all the values.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Fix panic after nfs_umount()</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chuck Lever</name>
<email>chuck.lever@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-10T17:31:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=22e20005d20239adc8c2ac2fb28db693602b470e'/>
<id>22e20005d20239adc8c2ac2fb28db693602b470e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b362ac3799ff4225c40935500f520cad4d7ed66 upstream.

After a few unsuccessful NFS mount attempts in which the client and
server cannot agree on an authentication flavor both support, the
client panics.  nfs_umount() is invoked in the kernel in this case.

Turns out nfs_umount()'s UMNT RPC invocation causes the RPC client to
write off the end of the rpc_clnt's iostat array.  This is because the
mount client's nrprocs field is initialized with the count of defined
procedures (two: MNT and UMNT), rather than the size of the client's
proc array (four).

The fix is to use the same initialization technique used by most other
upper layer clients in the kernel.

Introduced by commit 0b524123, which failed to update nrprocs when
support was added for UMNT in the kernel.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24302
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/683938

Reported-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5b362ac3799ff4225c40935500f520cad4d7ed66 upstream.

After a few unsuccessful NFS mount attempts in which the client and
server cannot agree on an authentication flavor both support, the
client panics.  nfs_umount() is invoked in the kernel in this case.

Turns out nfs_umount()'s UMNT RPC invocation causes the RPC client to
write off the end of the rpc_clnt's iostat array.  This is because the
mount client's nrprocs field is initialized with the count of defined
procedures (two: MNT and UMNT), rather than the size of the client's
proc array (four).

The fix is to use the same initialization technique used by most other
upper layer clients in the kernel.

Introduced by commit 0b524123, which failed to update nrprocs when
support was added for UMNT in the kernel.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24302
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/683938

Reported-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: fix ioctl when server is 32bit</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-30T15:39:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f68de59cbe6e5458d0b755ed0fc945fddfbc042'/>
<id>9f68de59cbe6e5458d0b755ed0fc945fddfbc042</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d9d318d39dd5cb686660504a3565aac453709ccc upstream.

If a 32bit CUSE server is run on 64bit this results in EIO being
returned to the caller.

The reason is that FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY reply was defined to use 'struct
iovec', which is different on 32bit and 64bit archs.

Work around this by looking at the size of the reply to determine
which struct was used.  This is only needed if CONFIG_COMPAT is
defined.

A more permanent fix for the interface will be to use the same struct
on both 32bit and 64bit.

Reported-by: "ccmail111" &lt;ccmail111@yahoo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
CC: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d9d318d39dd5cb686660504a3565aac453709ccc upstream.

If a 32bit CUSE server is run on 64bit this results in EIO being
returned to the caller.

The reason is that FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY reply was defined to use 'struct
iovec', which is different on 32bit and 64bit archs.

Work around this by looking at the size of the reply to determine
which struct was used.  This is only needed if CONFIG_COMPAT is
defined.

A more permanent fix for the interface will be to use the same struct
on both 32bit and 64bit.

Reported-by: "ccmail111" &lt;ccmail111@yahoo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
CC: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: verify ioctl retries</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-30T15:39:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=326aa6201f5e61711e75979dc5022487a88fe548'/>
<id>326aa6201f5e61711e75979dc5022487a88fe548</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16 upstream.

Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
CC: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16 upstream.

Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
CC: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: fix attributes after open(O_TRUNC)</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ken Sumrall</name>
<email>ksumrall@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T20:57:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ca20422682e1da682252203cd65c714a97358363'/>
<id>ca20422682e1da682252203cd65c714a97358363</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a0822c55779d9319939eac69f00bb729ea9d23da upstream.

The attribute cache for a file was not being cleared when a file is opened
with O_TRUNC.

If the filesystem's open operation truncates the file ("atomic_o_trunc"
feature flag is set) then the kernel should invalidate the cached st_mtime
and st_ctime attributes.

Also i_size should be explicitly be set to zero as it is used sometimes
without refreshing the cache.

Signed-off-by: Ken Sumrall &lt;ksumrall@android.com&gt;
Cc: Anfei &lt;anfei.zhou@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Anand V. Avati" &lt;avati@gluster.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a0822c55779d9319939eac69f00bb729ea9d23da upstream.

The attribute cache for a file was not being cleared when a file is opened
with O_TRUNC.

If the filesystem's open operation truncates the file ("atomic_o_trunc"
feature flag is set) then the kernel should invalidate the cached st_mtime
and st_ctime attributes.

Also i_size should be explicitly be set to zero as it is used sometimes
without refreshing the cache.

Signed-off-by: Ken Sumrall &lt;ksumrall@android.com&gt;
Cc: Anfei &lt;anfei.zhou@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Anand V. Avati" &lt;avati@gluster.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bio: take care not overflow page count when mapping/copying user data</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:26:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>jaxboe@fusionio.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-10T13:36:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cbe7684480e2b379eeae1317b6aa7fab413501a8'/>
<id>cbe7684480e2b379eeae1317b6aa7fab413501a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cb4644cac4a2797afc847e6c92736664d4b0ea34 upstream.

If the iovec is being set up in a way that causes uaddr + PAGE_SIZE
to overflow, we could end up attempting to map a huge number of
pages. Check for this invalid input type.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;jaxboe@fusionio.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cb4644cac4a2797afc847e6c92736664d4b0ea34 upstream.

If the iovec is being set up in a way that causes uaddr + PAGE_SIZE
to overflow, we could end up attempting to map a huge number of
pages. Check for this invalid input type.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;jaxboe@fusionio.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Clear LOOKUP_OPEN flag when creating lower file</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:26:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-09-23T07:35:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5cc0261b6abb36ceeaf5da4ea28dcc8b360899c7'/>
<id>5cc0261b6abb36ceeaf5da4ea28dcc8b360899c7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2e21b3f124eceb6ab5a07c8a061adce14ac94e14 upstream.

eCryptfs was passing the LOOKUP_OPEN flag through to the lower file
system, even though ecryptfs_create() doesn't support the flag. A valid
filp for the lower filesystem could be returned in the nameidata if the
lower file system's create() function supported LOOKUP_OPEN, possibly
resulting in unencrypted writes to the lower file.

However, this is only a potential problem in filesystems (FUSE, NFS,
CIFS, CEPH, 9p) that eCryptfs isn't known to support today.

https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/641703

Reported-by: Kevin Buhr
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2e21b3f124eceb6ab5a07c8a061adce14ac94e14 upstream.

eCryptfs was passing the LOOKUP_OPEN flag through to the lower file
system, even though ecryptfs_create() doesn't support the flag. A valid
filp for the lower filesystem could be returned in the nameidata if the
lower file system's create() function supported LOOKUP_OPEN, possibly
resulting in unencrypted writes to the lower file.

However, this is only a potential problem in filesystems (FUSE, NFS,
CIFS, CEPH, 9p) that eCryptfs isn't known to support today.

https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/641703

Reported-by: Kevin Buhr
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: limit vec count in bio_kmalloc() and bio_alloc_map_data()</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:26:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>jaxboe@fusionio.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-29T17:46:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=870cd3681836a2e822090522c8cb6fce19cf9e5c'/>
<id>870cd3681836a2e822090522c8cb6fce19cf9e5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f3f63c1c28bc861a931fac283b5bc3585efb8967 upstream.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;jaxboe@fusionio.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f3f63c1c28bc861a931fac283b5bc3585efb8967 upstream.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;jaxboe@fusionio.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
