<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs, branch v3.4.54</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Handle big endianness in NTLM (ntlmv2) authentication</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve French</name>
<email>smfrench@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-25T19:03:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c1ee953c457d8dcca26c8586576066a887b4e0dd'/>
<id>c1ee953c457d8dcca26c8586576066a887b4e0dd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fdf96a907c1fbb93c633e2b7ede3b8df26d6a4c0 upstream.

This is RH bug 970891
Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails
because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars.

Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage.

[To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed
this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated
by sparse -- steve f.]

Reported-by: steve &lt;sanpatr1@in.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar &lt;shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fdf96a907c1fbb93c633e2b7ede3b8df26d6a4c0 upstream.

This is RH bug 970891
Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails
because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars.

Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage.

[To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed
this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated
by sparse -- steve f.]

Reported-by: steve &lt;sanpatr1@in.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar &lt;shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't allow ext4_free_blocks() to fail due to ENOMEM</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-13T04:40:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6e514ac663f8d9ad5d533d9beb163b9d3142632f'/>
<id>6e514ac663f8d9ad5d533d9beb163b9d3142632f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7676a704ee0a1ef71a6b23760b5a8f6896cb1a1 upstream.

The filesystem should not be marked inconsistent if ext4_free_blocks()
is not able to allocate memory.  Unfortunately some callers (most
notably ext4_truncate) don't have a way to reflect an error back up to
the VFS.  And even if we did, most userspace applications won't deal
with most system calls returning ENOMEM anyway.

Reported-by: Nagachandra P &lt;nagachandra@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e7676a704ee0a1ef71a6b23760b5a8f6896cb1a1 upstream.

The filesystem should not be marked inconsistent if ext4_free_blocks()
is not able to allocate memory.  Unfortunately some callers (most
notably ext4_truncate) don't have a way to reflect an error back up to
the VFS.  And even if we did, most userspace applications won't deal
with most system calls returning ENOMEM anyway.

Reported-by: Nagachandra P &lt;nagachandra@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix overflow when counting used blocks on 32-bit architectures</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-31T23:39:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=39dfe5bb5f6adba9c4a127695440fa69b2f2f361'/>
<id>39dfe5bb5f6adba9c4a127695440fa69b2f2f361</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8af8eecc1331dbf5e8c662022272cf667e213da5 upstream.

The arithmetics adding delalloc blocks to the number of used blocks in
ext4_getattr() can easily overflow on 32-bit archs as we first multiply
number of blocks by blocksize and then divide back by 512. Make the
arithmetics more clever and also use proper type (unsigned long long
instead of unsigned long).

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8af8eecc1331dbf5e8c662022272cf667e213da5 upstream.

The arithmetics adding delalloc blocks to the number of used blocks in
ext4_getattr() can easily overflow on 32-bit archs as we first multiply
number of blocks by blocksize and then divide back by 512. Make the
arithmetics more clever and also use proper type (unsigned long long
instead of unsigned long).

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix data offset overflow in ext4_xattr_fiemap() on 32-bit archs</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-31T23:38:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ee324d3e345d68772a6d0dc794759be39926e63d'/>
<id>ee324d3e345d68772a6d0dc794759be39926e63d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a60697f411eb365fb09e639e6f183fe33d1eb796 upstream.

On 32-bit architectures with 32-bit sector_t computation of data offset
in ext4_xattr_fiemap() can overflow resulting in reporting bogus data
location. Fix the problem by typing block number to proper type before
shifting.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a60697f411eb365fb09e639e6f183fe33d1eb796 upstream.

On 32-bit architectures with 32-bit sector_t computation of data offset
in ext4_xattr_fiemap() can overflow resulting in reporting bogus data
location. Fix the problem by typing block number to proper type before
shifting.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junxiao Bi</name>
<email>junxiao.bi@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-03T22:01:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=26a849f49fb3347d126a0ed6611173f903374ef4'/>
<id>26a849f49fb3347d126a0ed6611173f903374ef4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ef962df057aaafd714f5c22ba3de1be459571fdf upstream.

Inlined xattr shared free space of inode block with inlined data or data
extent record, so the size of the later two should be adjusted when
inlined xattr is enabled.  See ocfs2_xattr_ibody_init().  But this isn't
done well when reflink.  For inode with inlined data, its max inlined
data size is adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(), no problem.  But
for inode with data extent record, its record count isn't adjusted.  Fix
it, or data extent record and inlined xattr may overwrite each other,
then cause data corruption or xattr failure.

One panic caused by this bug in our test environment is the following:

  kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1435!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Pid: 10871, comm: multi_reflink_t Not tainted 2.6.39-300.17.1.el5uek #1
  RIP: ocfs2_xa_offset_pointer+0x17/0x20 [ocfs2]
  RSP: e02b:ffff88007a587948  EFLAGS: 00010283
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 00000000000051e4
  RDX: ffff880057092060 RSI: 0000000000000f80 RDI: ffff88007a587a68
  RBP: ffff88007a587948 R08: 00000000000062f4 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
  R13: ffff88007a587a68 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88007a587c68
  FS:  00007fccff7f06e0(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
  CR2: 00000000015cf000 CR3: 000000007aa76000 CR4: 0000000000000660
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Process multi_reflink_t
  Call Trace:
    ocfs2_xa_reuse_entry+0x60/0x280 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry+0x17e/0x2a0 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xa_set+0xcc/0x250 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x98/0x230 [ocfs2]
    __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x4f/0x700 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xattr_set+0x6c6/0x890 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xattr_user_set+0x46/0x50 [ocfs2]
    generic_setxattr+0x70/0x90
    __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x80/0x1a0
    vfs_setxattr+0xa9/0xb0
    setxattr+0xc3/0x120
    sys_fsetxattr+0xa8/0xd0
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu &lt;jeff.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sunil Mushran &lt;sunil.mushran@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ef962df057aaafd714f5c22ba3de1be459571fdf upstream.

Inlined xattr shared free space of inode block with inlined data or data
extent record, so the size of the later two should be adjusted when
inlined xattr is enabled.  See ocfs2_xattr_ibody_init().  But this isn't
done well when reflink.  For inode with inlined data, its max inlined
data size is adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(), no problem.  But
for inode with data extent record, its record count isn't adjusted.  Fix
it, or data extent record and inlined xattr may overwrite each other,
then cause data corruption or xattr failure.

One panic caused by this bug in our test environment is the following:

  kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1435!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Pid: 10871, comm: multi_reflink_t Not tainted 2.6.39-300.17.1.el5uek #1
  RIP: ocfs2_xa_offset_pointer+0x17/0x20 [ocfs2]
  RSP: e02b:ffff88007a587948  EFLAGS: 00010283
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 00000000000051e4
  RDX: ffff880057092060 RSI: 0000000000000f80 RDI: ffff88007a587a68
  RBP: ffff88007a587948 R08: 00000000000062f4 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
  R13: ffff88007a587a68 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88007a587c68
  FS:  00007fccff7f06e0(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
  CR2: 00000000015cf000 CR3: 000000007aa76000 CR4: 0000000000000660
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Process multi_reflink_t
  Call Trace:
    ocfs2_xa_reuse_entry+0x60/0x280 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry+0x17e/0x2a0 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xa_set+0xcc/0x250 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x98/0x230 [ocfs2]
    __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x4f/0x700 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xattr_set+0x6c6/0x890 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_xattr_user_set+0x46/0x50 [ocfs2]
    generic_setxattr+0x70/0x90
    __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x80/0x1a0
    vfs_setxattr+0xa9/0xb0
    setxattr+0xc3/0x120
    sys_fsetxattr+0xa8/0xd0
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu &lt;jeff.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sunil Mushran &lt;sunil.mushran@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext3,ext4: don't mess with dir_file-&gt;f_pos in htree_dirblock_to_tree()</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-01T12:12:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cd9c898c13afe7577790a32d29109386342045fe'/>
<id>cd9c898c13afe7577790a32d29109386342045fe</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 64cb927371cd2ec43758d8a094a003d27bc3d0dc upstream.

Both ext3 and ext4 htree_dirblock_to_tree() is just filling the
in-core rbtree for use by call_filldir().  All updates of -&gt;f_pos are
done by the latter; bumping it here (on error) is obviously wrong - we
might very well have it nowhere near the block we'd found an error in.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 64cb927371cd2ec43758d8a094a003d27bc3d0dc upstream.

Both ext3 and ext4 htree_dirblock_to_tree() is just filling the
in-core rbtree for use by call_filldir().  All updates of -&gt;f_pos are
done by the latter; bumping it here (on error) is obviously wrong - we
might very well have it nowhere near the block we'd found an error in.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jbd2: fix theoretical race in jbd2__journal_restart</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-01T12:12:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3cba6eb1c7cd51176b972ae47736d8e7a0720706'/>
<id>3cba6eb1c7cd51176b972ae47736d8e7a0720706</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39c04153fda8c32e85b51c96eb5511a326ad7609 upstream.

Once we decrement transaction-&gt;t_updates, if this is the last handle
holding the transaction from closing, and once we release the
t_handle_lock spinlock, it's possible for the transaction to commit
and be released.  In practice with normal kernels, this probably won't
happen, since the commit happens in a separate kernel thread and it's
unlikely this could all happen within the space of a few CPU cycles.

On the other hand, with a real-time kernel, this could potentially
happen, so save the tid found in transaction-&gt;t_tid before we release
t_handle_lock.  It would require an insane configuration, such as one
where the jbd2 thread was set to a very high real-time priority,
perhaps because a high priority real-time thread is trying to read or
write to a file system.  But some people who use real-time kernels
have been known to do insane things, including controlling
laser-wielding industrial robots.  :-)

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 39c04153fda8c32e85b51c96eb5511a326ad7609 upstream.

Once we decrement transaction-&gt;t_updates, if this is the last handle
holding the transaction from closing, and once we release the
t_handle_lock spinlock, it's possible for the transaction to commit
and be released.  In practice with normal kernels, this probably won't
happen, since the commit happens in a separate kernel thread and it's
unlikely this could all happen within the space of a few CPU cycles.

On the other hand, with a real-time kernel, this could potentially
happen, so save the tid found in transaction-&gt;t_tid before we release
t_handle_lock.  It would require an insane configuration, such as one
where the jbd2 thread was set to a very high real-time priority,
perhaps because a high priority real-time thread is trying to read or
write to a file system.  But some people who use real-time kernels
have been known to do insane things, including controlling
laser-wielding industrial robots.  :-)

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS use sensible file nlink values if unprovided</title>
<updated>2013-07-22T01:19:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve French</name>
<email>smfrench@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-04T19:38:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e2c411cce27a933da365034968f431a874e0001a'/>
<id>e2c411cce27a933da365034968f431a874e0001a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6658b9f70ebca5fc0795b1d6d733996af1e2caa7 upstream.

Certain servers may not set the NumberOfLinks field in query file/path
info responses. In such a case, cifs_inode_needs_reval() assumes that
all regular files are hardlinks and triggers revalidation, leading to
excessive and unnecessary network traffic.

This change hardcodes cf_nlink (and subsequently i_nlink) when not
returned by the server, similar to what already occurs in cifs_mkdir().

Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp &lt;ddiss@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6658b9f70ebca5fc0795b1d6d733996af1e2caa7 upstream.

Certain servers may not set the NumberOfLinks field in query file/path
info responses. In such a case, cifs_inode_needs_reval() assumes that
all regular files are hardlinks and triggers revalidation, leading to
excessive and unnecessary network traffic.

This change hardcodes cf_nlink (and subsequently i_nlink) when not
returned by the server, similar to what already occurs in cifs_mkdir().

Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp &lt;ddiss@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd4: fix decoding of compounds across page boundaries</title>
<updated>2013-07-13T18:03:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-21T15:48:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ffdae5d98228dfbf7479cb777853ca031fbdfd3d'/>
<id>ffdae5d98228dfbf7479cb777853ca031fbdfd3d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 247500820ebd02ad87525db5d9b199e5b66f6636 upstream.

A freebsd NFSv4.0 client was getting rare IO errors expanding a tarball.
A network trace showed the server returning BAD_XDR on the final getattr
of a getattr+write+getattr compound.  The final getattr started on a
page boundary.

I believe the Linux client ignores errors on the post-write getattr, and
that that's why we haven't seen this before.

Reported-by: Rick Macklem &lt;rmacklem@uoguelph.ca&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 247500820ebd02ad87525db5d9b199e5b66f6636 upstream.

A freebsd NFSv4.0 client was getting rare IO errors expanding a tarball.
A network trace showed the server returning BAD_XDR on the final getattr
of a getattr+write+getattr compound.  The final getattr started on a
page boundary.

I believe the Linux client ignores errors on the post-write getattr, and
that that's why we haven't seen this before.

Reported-by: Rick Macklem &lt;rmacklem@uoguelph.ca&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hpfs: better test for errors</title>
<updated>2013-07-13T18:03:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-04T16:42:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5f855daf6487b64eae1f201483b5830f42b2e9bb'/>
<id>5f855daf6487b64eae1f201483b5830f42b2e9bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3ebacb05044f82c5f0bb456a894eb9dc57d0ed90 upstream.

The test if bitmap access is out of bound could errorneously pass if the
device size is divisible by 16384 sectors and we are asking for one bitmap
after the end.

Check for invalid size in the superblock. Invalid size could cause integer
overflows in the rest of the code.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3ebacb05044f82c5f0bb456a894eb9dc57d0ed90 upstream.

The test if bitmap access is out of bound could errorneously pass if the
device size is divisible by 16384 sectors and we are asking for one bitmap
after the end.

Check for invalid size in the superblock. Invalid size could cause integer
overflows in the rest of the code.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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