linux-toradex.git/fs, branch v4.18-rc4 Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 2018-07-08T18:10:30+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2018-07-08T18:10:30+00:00 70a2dc6abc8af028b0c71af6b3520574ee09e814 Pull ext4 bugfixes from Ted Ts'o: "Bug fixes for ext4; most of which relate to vulnerabilities where a maliciously crafted file system image can result in a kernel OOPS or hang. At least one fix addresses an inline data bug could be triggered by userspace without the need of a crafted file system (although it does require that the inline data feature be enabled)" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: check superblock mapped prior to committing ext4: add more mount time checks of the superblock ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data ext4: include the illegal physical block in the bad map ext4_error msg ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent() ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid ext4: make sure bitmaps and the inode table don't overlap with bg descriptors ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap() ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry() ext4: add warn_on_error mount option 
Pull ext4 bugfixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "Bug fixes for ext4; most of which relate to vulnerabilities where a
  maliciously crafted file system image can result in a kernel OOPS or
  hang.

  At least one fix addresses an inline data bug could be triggered by
  userspace without the need of a crafted file system (although it does
  require that the inline data feature be enabled)"

* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
  ext4: check superblock mapped prior to committing
  ext4: add more mount time checks of the superblock
  ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks
  ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file
  jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits
  ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body
  ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data
  ext4: include the illegal physical block in the bad map ext4_error msg
  ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent()
  ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid
  ext4: make sure bitmaps and the inode table don't overlap with bg descriptors
  ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap()
  ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks
  ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry()
  ext4: add warn_on_error mount option
Merge tag '4.18-rc3-smb3fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6 2018-07-08T01:31:34+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2018-07-08T01:31:34+00:00 b2d44d145d2a72386b1b17da59a5e04989594897 Pull cifs fixes from Steve French: "Five smb3/cifs fixes for stable (including for some leaks and memory overwrites) and also a few fixes for recent regressions in packet signing. Additional testing at the recent SMB3 test event, and some good work by Paulo and others spotted the issues fixed here. In addition to my xfstest runs on these, Aurelien and Stefano did additional test runs to verify this set" * tag '4.18-rc3-smb3fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: cifs: Fix stack out-of-bounds in smb{2,3}_create_lease_buf() cifs: Fix infinite loop when using hard mount option cifs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in send_set_info() on SMB2 ACE setting cifs: Fix memory leak in smb2_set_ea() cifs: fix SMB1 breakage cifs: Fix validation of signed data in smb2 cifs: Fix validation of signed data in smb3+ cifs: Fix use after free of a mid_q_entry 
Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
 "Five smb3/cifs fixes for stable (including for some leaks and memory
  overwrites) and also a few fixes for recent regressions in packet
  signing.

  Additional testing at the recent SMB3 test event, and some good work
  by Paulo and others spotted the issues fixed here. In addition to my
  xfstest runs on these, Aurelien and Stefano did additional test runs
  to verify this set"

* tag '4.18-rc3-smb3fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  cifs: Fix stack out-of-bounds in smb{2,3}_create_lease_buf()
  cifs: Fix infinite loop when using hard mount option
  cifs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in send_set_info() on SMB2 ACE setting
  cifs: Fix memory leak in smb2_set_ea()
  cifs: fix SMB1 breakage
  cifs: Fix validation of signed data in smb2
  cifs: Fix validation of signed data in smb3+
  cifs: Fix use after free of a mid_q_entry
Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories 2018-07-05T19:36:36+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2018-07-04T00:10:19+00:00 0fa3ecd87848c9c93c2c828ef4c3a8ca36ce46c7 sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for group-shared directories. But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to confuse things even more). Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid.  This is historically used for
group-shared directories.

But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cifs: Fix stack out-of-bounds in smb{2,3}_create_lease_buf() 2018-07-05T18:48:25+00:00 Stefano Brivio sbrivio@redhat.com 2018-07-05T13:10:02+00:00 729c0c9dd55204f0c9a823ac8a7bfa83d36c7e78 smb{2,3}_create_lease_buf() store a lease key in the lease context for later usage on a lease break. In most paths, the key is currently sourced from data that happens to be on the stack near local variables for oplock in SMB2_open() callers, e.g. from open_shroot(), whereas smb2_open_file() properly allocates space on its stack for it. The address of those local variables holding the oplock is then passed to create_lease_buf handlers via SMB2_open(), and 16 bytes near oplock are used. This causes a stack out-of-bounds access as reported by KASAN on SMB2.1 and SMB3 mounts (first out-of-bounds access is shown here): [ 111.528823] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in smb3_create_lease_buf+0x399/0x3b0 [cifs] [ 111.530815] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88010829f249 by task mount.cifs/985 [ 111.532838] CPU: 3 PID: 985 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #91 [ 111.534656] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 111.536838] Call Trace: [ 111.537528] dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b [ 111.540890] print_address_description+0x6a/0x270 [ 111.542185] kasan_report+0x258/0x380 [ 111.544701] smb3_create_lease_buf+0x399/0x3b0 [cifs] [ 111.546134] SMB2_open+0x1ef8/0x4b70 [cifs] [ 111.575883] open_shroot+0x339/0x550 [cifs] [ 111.591969] smb3_qfs_tcon+0x32c/0x1e60 [cifs] [ 111.617405] cifs_mount+0x4f3/0x2fc0 [cifs] [ 111.674332] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x263/0xf10 [cifs] [ 111.677915] mount_fs+0x55/0x2b0 [ 111.679504] vfs_kern_mount.part.22+0xaa/0x430 [ 111.684511] do_mount+0xc40/0x2660 [ 111.698301] ksys_mount+0x80/0xd0 [ 111.701541] do_syscall_64+0x14e/0x4b0 [ 111.711807] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 111.713665] RIP: 0033:0x7f372385b5fa [ 111.715311] Code: 48 8b 0d 99 78 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 66 78 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 111.720330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff27049d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 111.722601] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f372385b5fa [ 111.724842] RDX: 000055c2ecdc73b2 RSI: 000055c2ecdc73f9 RDI: 00007ffff270580f [ 111.727083] RBP: 00007ffff2705804 R08: 000055c2ee976060 R09: 0000000000001000 [ 111.729319] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f3723f4d000 [ 111.731615] R13: 000055c2ee976060 R14: 00007f3723f4f90f R15: 0000000000000000 [ 111.735448] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 111.737420] page:ffffea000420a7c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 [ 111.739890] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000() [ 111.741750] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 [ 111.744216] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 111.746679] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 111.750482] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 111.752562] ffff88010829f100: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 111.754991] ffff88010829f180: 00 00 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 111.757401] >ffff88010829f200: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 [ 111.759801] ^ [ 111.762034] ffff88010829f280: f2 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 111.764486] ffff88010829f300: f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 111.766913] ================================================================== Lease keys are however already generated and stored in fid data on open and create paths: pass them down to the lease context creation handlers and use them. Suggested-by: Aurélien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Fixes: b8c32dbb0deb ("CIFS: Request SMB2.1 leases") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> 
smb{2,3}_create_lease_buf() store a lease key in the lease
context for later usage on a lease break.

In most paths, the key is currently sourced from data that
happens to be on the stack near local variables for oplock in
SMB2_open() callers, e.g. from open_shroot(), whereas
smb2_open_file() properly allocates space on its stack for it.

The address of those local variables holding the oplock is then
passed to create_lease_buf handlers via SMB2_open(), and 16
bytes near oplock are used. This causes a stack out-of-bounds
access as reported by KASAN on SMB2.1 and SMB3 mounts (first
out-of-bounds access is shown here):

[  111.528823] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in smb3_create_lease_buf+0x399/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  111.530815] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88010829f249 by task mount.cifs/985
[  111.532838] CPU: 3 PID: 985 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #91
[  111.534656] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[  111.536838] Call Trace:
[  111.537528]  dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b
[  111.540890]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
[  111.542185]  kasan_report+0x258/0x380
[  111.544701]  smb3_create_lease_buf+0x399/0x3b0 [cifs]
[  111.546134]  SMB2_open+0x1ef8/0x4b70 [cifs]
[  111.575883]  open_shroot+0x339/0x550 [cifs]
[  111.591969]  smb3_qfs_tcon+0x32c/0x1e60 [cifs]
[  111.617405]  cifs_mount+0x4f3/0x2fc0 [cifs]
[  111.674332]  cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x263/0xf10 [cifs]
[  111.677915]  mount_fs+0x55/0x2b0
[  111.679504]  vfs_kern_mount.part.22+0xaa/0x430
[  111.684511]  do_mount+0xc40/0x2660
[  111.698301]  ksys_mount+0x80/0xd0
[  111.701541]  do_syscall_64+0x14e/0x4b0
[  111.711807]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  111.713665] RIP: 0033:0x7f372385b5fa
[  111.715311] Code: 48 8b 0d 99 78 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 66 78 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  111.720330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff27049d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[  111.722601] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f372385b5fa
[  111.724842] RDX: 000055c2ecdc73b2 RSI: 000055c2ecdc73f9 RDI: 00007ffff270580f
[  111.727083] RBP: 00007ffff2705804 R08: 000055c2ee976060 R09: 0000000000001000
[  111.729319] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f3723f4d000
[  111.731615] R13: 000055c2ee976060 R14: 00007f3723f4f90f R15: 0000000000000000

[  111.735448] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  111.737420] page:ffffea000420a7c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[  111.739890] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
[  111.741750] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[  111.744216] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  111.746679] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  111.750482] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  111.752562]  ffff88010829f100: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  111.754991]  ffff88010829f180: 00 00 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  111.757401] >ffff88010829f200: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
[  111.759801]                                               ^
[  111.762034]  ffff88010829f280: f2 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  111.764486]  ffff88010829f300: f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  111.766913] ==================================================================

Lease keys are however already generated and stored in fid data
on open and create paths: pass them down to the lease context
creation handlers and use them.

Suggested-by: Aurélien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Fixes: b8c32dbb0deb ("CIFS: Request SMB2.1 leases")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
cifs: Fix infinite loop when using hard mount option 2018-07-05T18:48:25+00:00 Paulo Alcantara paulo@paulo.ac 2018-07-05T16:46:34+00:00 7ffbe65578b44fafdef577a360eb0583929f7c6e For every request we send, whether it is SMB1 or SMB2+, we attempt to reconnect tcon (cifs_reconnect_tcon or smb2_reconnect) before carrying out the request. So, while server->tcpStatus != CifsNeedReconnect, we wait for the reconnection to succeed on wait_event_interruptible_timeout(). If it returns, that means that either the condition was evaluated to true, or timeout elapsed, or it was interrupted by a signal. Since we're not handling the case where the process woke up due to a received signal (-ERESTARTSYS), the next call to wait_event_interruptible_timeout() will _always_ fail and we end up looping forever inside either cifs_reconnect_tcon() or smb2_reconnect(). Here's an example of how to trigger that: $ mount.cifs //foo/share /mnt/test -o username=foo,password=foo,vers=1.0,hard (break connection to server before executing bellow cmd) $ stat -f /mnt/test & sleep 140 [1] 2511 $ ps -aux -q 2511 USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND root 2511 0.0 0.0 12892 1008 pts/0 S 12:24 0:00 stat -f /mnt/test $ kill -9 2511 (wait for a while; process is stuck in the kernel) $ ps -aux -q 2511 USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND root 2511 83.2 0.0 12892 1008 pts/0 R 12:24 30:01 stat -f /mnt/test By using 'hard' mount point means that cifs.ko will keep retrying indefinitely, however we must allow the process to be killed otherwise it would hang the system. Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> 
For every request we send, whether it is SMB1 or SMB2+, we attempt to
reconnect tcon (cifs_reconnect_tcon or smb2_reconnect) before carrying
out the request.

So, while server->tcpStatus != CifsNeedReconnect, we wait for the
reconnection to succeed on wait_event_interruptible_timeout(). If it
returns, that means that either the condition was evaluated to true, or
timeout elapsed, or it was interrupted by a signal.

Since we're not handling the case where the process woke up due to a
received signal (-ERESTARTSYS), the next call to
wait_event_interruptible_timeout() will _always_ fail and we end up
looping forever inside either cifs_reconnect_tcon() or smb2_reconnect().

Here's an example of how to trigger that:

$ mount.cifs //foo/share /mnt/test -o
username=foo,password=foo,vers=1.0,hard

(break connection to server before executing bellow cmd)
$ stat -f /mnt/test & sleep 140
[1] 2511

$ ps -aux -q 2511
USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root      2511  0.0  0.0  12892  1008 pts/0    S    12:24   0:00 stat -f
/mnt/test

$ kill -9 2511

(wait for a while; process is stuck in the kernel)
$ ps -aux -q 2511
USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root      2511 83.2  0.0  12892  1008 pts/0    R    12:24  30:01 stat -f
/mnt/test

By using 'hard' mount point means that cifs.ko will keep retrying
indefinitely, however we must allow the process to be killed otherwise
it would hang the system.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
cifs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in send_set_info() on SMB2 ACE setting 2018-07-05T18:48:25+00:00 Stefano Brivio sbrivio@redhat.com 2018-07-05T09:46:42+00:00 f46ecbd97f508e68a7806291a139499794874f3d A "small" CIFS buffer is not big enough in general to hold a setacl request for SMB2, and we end up overflowing the buffer in send_set_info(). For instance: # mount.cifs //127.0.0.1/test /mnt/test -o username=test,password=test,nounix,cifsacl # touch /mnt/test/acltest # getcifsacl /mnt/test/acltest REVISION:0x1 CONTROL:0x9004 OWNER:S-1-5-21-2926364953-924364008-418108241-1000 GROUP:S-1-22-2-1001 ACL:S-1-5-21-2926364953-924364008-418108241-1000:ALLOWED/0x0/0x1e01ff ACL:S-1-22-2-1001:ALLOWED/0x0/R ACL:S-1-22-2-1001:ALLOWED/0x0/R ACL:S-1-5-21-2926364953-924364008-418108241-1000:ALLOWED/0x0/0x1e01ff ACL:S-1-1-0:ALLOWED/0x0/R # setcifsacl -a "ACL:S-1-22-2-1004:ALLOWED/0x0/R" /mnt/test/acltest this setacl will cause the following KASAN splat: [ 330.777927] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in send_set_info+0x4dd/0xc20 [cifs] [ 330.779696] Write of size 696 at addr ffff88010d5e2860 by task setcifsacl/1012 [ 330.781882] CPU: 1 PID: 1012 Comm: setcifsacl Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2+ #2 [ 330.783140] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 330.784395] Call Trace: [ 330.784789] dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b [ 330.786777] print_address_description+0x6a/0x270 [ 330.787520] kasan_report+0x258/0x380 [ 330.788845] memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 330.789369] send_set_info+0x4dd/0xc20 [cifs] [ 330.799511] SMB2_set_acl+0x76/0xa0 [cifs] [ 330.801395] set_smb2_acl+0x7ac/0xf30 [cifs] [ 330.830888] cifs_xattr_set+0x963/0xe40 [cifs] [ 330.840367] __vfs_setxattr+0x84/0xb0 [ 330.842060] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0xe6/0x370 [ 330.843848] vfs_setxattr+0xc2/0xd0 [ 330.845519] setxattr+0x258/0x320 [ 330.859211] path_setxattr+0x15b/0x1b0 [ 330.864392] __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc0/0x160 [ 330.866133] do_syscall_64+0x14e/0x4b0 [ 330.876631] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 330.878503] RIP: 0033:0x7ff2e507db0a [ 330.880151] Code: 48 8b 0d 89 93 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 bc 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 56 93 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 330.885358] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc4903c18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [ 330.887733] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055d1170de140 RCX: 00007ff2e507db0a [ 330.890067] RDX: 000055d1170de7d0 RSI: 000055d115b39184 RDI: 00007ffdc4904818 [ 330.892410] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055d1170de7e4 [ 330.894785] R10: 00000000000002b8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000007 [ 330.897148] R13: 000055d1170de0c0 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 000055d1170de550 [ 330.901057] Allocated by task 1012: [ 330.902888] kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 [ 330.904714] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x1d0 [ 330.906615] mempool_alloc+0x11e/0x380 [ 330.908496] cifs_small_buf_get+0x35/0x60 [cifs] [ 330.910510] smb2_plain_req_init+0x4a/0xd60 [cifs] [ 330.912551] send_set_info+0x198/0xc20 [cifs] [ 330.914535] SMB2_set_acl+0x76/0xa0 [cifs] [ 330.916465] set_smb2_acl+0x7ac/0xf30 [cifs] [ 330.918453] cifs_xattr_set+0x963/0xe40 [cifs] [ 330.920426] __vfs_setxattr+0x84/0xb0 [ 330.922284] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0xe6/0x370 [ 330.924213] vfs_setxattr+0xc2/0xd0 [ 330.926008] setxattr+0x258/0x320 [ 330.927762] path_setxattr+0x15b/0x1b0 [ 330.929592] __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc0/0x160 [ 330.931459] do_syscall_64+0x14e/0x4b0 [ 330.933314] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 330.936843] Freed by task 0: [ 330.938588] (stack is not available) [ 330.941886] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88010d5e2800 which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 [ 330.946362] The buggy address is located 96 bytes inside of 448-byte region [ffff88010d5e2800, ffff88010d5e29c0) [ 330.950722] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 330.952789] page:ffffea0004357880 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880108fdca80 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 330.955665] flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head) [ 330.957760] raw: 0017ffffc0008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880108fdca80 [ 330.960356] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 330.963005] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 330.967039] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 330.969255] ffff88010d5e2880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 330.971833] ffff88010d5e2900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 330.974397] >ffff88010d5e2980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 330.976956] ^ [ 330.979226] ffff88010d5e2a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 330.981755] ffff88010d5e2a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 330.984225] ================================================================== Fix this by allocating a regular CIFS buffer in smb2_plain_req_init() if the request command is SMB2_SET_INFO. Reported-by: Jianhong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com> Fixes: 366ed846df60 ("cifs: Use smb 2 - 3 and cifsacl mount options setacl function") CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> 
A "small" CIFS buffer is not big enough in general to hold a
setacl request for SMB2, and we end up overflowing the buffer in
send_set_info(). For instance:

 # mount.cifs //127.0.0.1/test /mnt/test -o username=test,password=test,nounix,cifsacl
 # touch /mnt/test/acltest
 # getcifsacl /mnt/test/acltest
 REVISION:0x1
 CONTROL:0x9004
 OWNER:S-1-5-21-2926364953-924364008-418108241-1000
 GROUP:S-1-22-2-1001
 ACL:S-1-5-21-2926364953-924364008-418108241-1000:ALLOWED/0x0/0x1e01ff
 ACL:S-1-22-2-1001:ALLOWED/0x0/R
 ACL:S-1-22-2-1001:ALLOWED/0x0/R
 ACL:S-1-5-21-2926364953-924364008-418108241-1000:ALLOWED/0x0/0x1e01ff
 ACL:S-1-1-0:ALLOWED/0x0/R
 # setcifsacl -a "ACL:S-1-22-2-1004:ALLOWED/0x0/R" /mnt/test/acltest

this setacl will cause the following KASAN splat:

[  330.777927] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in send_set_info+0x4dd/0xc20 [cifs]
[  330.779696] Write of size 696 at addr ffff88010d5e2860 by task setcifsacl/1012

[  330.781882] CPU: 1 PID: 1012 Comm: setcifsacl Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2+ #2
[  330.783140] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[  330.784395] Call Trace:
[  330.784789]  dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b
[  330.786777]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
[  330.787520]  kasan_report+0x258/0x380
[  330.788845]  memcpy+0x34/0x50
[  330.789369]  send_set_info+0x4dd/0xc20 [cifs]
[  330.799511]  SMB2_set_acl+0x76/0xa0 [cifs]
[  330.801395]  set_smb2_acl+0x7ac/0xf30 [cifs]
[  330.830888]  cifs_xattr_set+0x963/0xe40 [cifs]
[  330.840367]  __vfs_setxattr+0x84/0xb0
[  330.842060]  __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0xe6/0x370
[  330.843848]  vfs_setxattr+0xc2/0xd0
[  330.845519]  setxattr+0x258/0x320
[  330.859211]  path_setxattr+0x15b/0x1b0
[  330.864392]  __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc0/0x160
[  330.866133]  do_syscall_64+0x14e/0x4b0
[  330.876631]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  330.878503] RIP: 0033:0x7ff2e507db0a
[  330.880151] Code: 48 8b 0d 89 93 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 bc 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 56 93 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  330.885358] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc4903c18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc
[  330.887733] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055d1170de140 RCX: 00007ff2e507db0a
[  330.890067] RDX: 000055d1170de7d0 RSI: 000055d115b39184 RDI: 00007ffdc4904818
[  330.892410] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055d1170de7e4
[  330.894785] R10: 00000000000002b8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000007
[  330.897148] R13: 000055d1170de0c0 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 000055d1170de550

[  330.901057] Allocated by task 1012:
[  330.902888]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[  330.904714]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x1d0
[  330.906615]  mempool_alloc+0x11e/0x380
[  330.908496]  cifs_small_buf_get+0x35/0x60 [cifs]
[  330.910510]  smb2_plain_req_init+0x4a/0xd60 [cifs]
[  330.912551]  send_set_info+0x198/0xc20 [cifs]
[  330.914535]  SMB2_set_acl+0x76/0xa0 [cifs]
[  330.916465]  set_smb2_acl+0x7ac/0xf30 [cifs]
[  330.918453]  cifs_xattr_set+0x963/0xe40 [cifs]
[  330.920426]  __vfs_setxattr+0x84/0xb0
[  330.922284]  __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0xe6/0x370
[  330.924213]  vfs_setxattr+0xc2/0xd0
[  330.926008]  setxattr+0x258/0x320
[  330.927762]  path_setxattr+0x15b/0x1b0
[  330.929592]  __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc0/0x160
[  330.931459]  do_syscall_64+0x14e/0x4b0
[  330.933314]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[  330.936843] Freed by task 0:
[  330.938588] (stack is not available)

[  330.941886] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88010d5e2800
 which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448
[  330.946362] The buggy address is located 96 bytes inside of
 448-byte region [ffff88010d5e2800, ffff88010d5e29c0)
[  330.950722] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  330.952789] page:ffffea0004357880 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880108fdca80 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[  330.955665] flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
[  330.957760] raw: 0017ffffc0008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880108fdca80
[  330.960356] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  330.963005] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  330.967039] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  330.969255]  ffff88010d5e2880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  330.971833]  ffff88010d5e2900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  330.974397] >ffff88010d5e2980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  330.976956]                                            ^
[  330.979226]  ffff88010d5e2a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  330.981755]  ffff88010d5e2a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  330.984225] ==================================================================

Fix this by allocating a regular CIFS buffer in
smb2_plain_req_init() if the request command is SMB2_SET_INFO.

Reported-by: Jianhong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com>
Fixes: 366ed846df60 ("cifs: Use smb 2 - 3 and cifsacl mount options setacl function")
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
cifs: Fix memory leak in smb2_set_ea() 2018-07-05T18:48:24+00:00 Paulo Alcantara paulo@paulo.ac 2018-07-04T17:16:16+00:00 6aa0c114eceec8cc61715f74a4ce91b048d7561c This patch fixes a memory leak when doing a setxattr(2) in SMB2+. Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> 
This patch fixes a memory leak when doing a setxattr(2) in SMB2+.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
cifs: fix SMB1 breakage 2018-07-05T18:48:24+00:00 Ronnie Sahlberg lsahlber@redhat.com 2018-06-28T00:47:14+00:00 81f39f951b8098b1c59b01ad10d06d7dc01c7019 SMB1 mounting broke in commit 35e2cc1ba755 ("cifs: Use correct packet length in SMB2_TRANSFORM header") Fix it and also rename smb2_rqst_len to smb_rqst_len to make it less unobvious that the function is also called from CIFS/SMB1 Good job by Paulo reviewing and cleaning up Ronnie's original patch. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> 
SMB1 mounting broke in commit 35e2cc1ba755
("cifs: Use correct packet length in SMB2_TRANSFORM header")
Fix it and also rename smb2_rqst_len to smb_rqst_len
to make it less unobvious that the function is also called from
CIFS/SMB1

Good job by Paulo reviewing and cleaning up Ronnie's original patch.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
cifs: Fix validation of signed data in smb2 2018-07-05T18:48:24+00:00 Paulo Alcantara paulo@paulo.ac 2018-06-23T17:52:24+00:00 8de8c4608fe9edc046c31bf82b2b7ebc1daae015 Fixes: c713c8770fa5 ("cifs: push rfc1002 generation down the stack") We failed to validate signed data returned by the server because __cifs_calc_signature() now expects to sign the actual data in iov but we were also passing down the rfc1002 length. Fix smb3_calc_signature() to calculate signature of rfc1002 length prior to passing only the actual data iov[1-N] to __cifs_calc_signature(). In addition, there are a few cases where no rfc1002 length is passed so we make sure there's one (iov_len == 4). Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> 
Fixes: c713c8770fa5 ("cifs: push rfc1002 generation down the stack")

We failed to validate signed data returned by the server because
__cifs_calc_signature() now expects to sign the actual data in iov but
we were also passing down the rfc1002 length.

Fix smb3_calc_signature() to calculate signature of rfc1002 length prior
to passing only the actual data iov[1-N] to __cifs_calc_signature(). In
addition, there are a few cases where no rfc1002 length is passed so we
make sure there's one (iov_len == 4).

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
cifs: Fix validation of signed data in smb3+ 2018-07-05T18:48:24+00:00 Paulo Alcantara paulo@paulo.ac 2018-06-23T17:52:23+00:00 27c32b49c3dbfe1e5f57d2b61823bf9474ae0875 Fixes: c713c8770fa5 ("cifs: push rfc1002 generation down the stack") We failed to validate signed data returned by the server because __cifs_calc_signature() now expects to sign the actual data in iov but we were also passing down the rfc1002 length. Fix smb3_calc_signature() to calculate signature of rfc1002 length prior to passing only the actual data iov[1-N] to __cifs_calc_signature(). In addition, there are a few cases where no rfc1002 length is passed so we make sure there's one (iov_len == 4). Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> 
Fixes: c713c8770fa5 ("cifs: push rfc1002 generation down the stack")

We failed to validate signed data returned by the server because
__cifs_calc_signature() now expects to sign the actual data in iov but
we were also passing down the rfc1002 length.

Fix smb3_calc_signature() to calculate signature of rfc1002 length prior
to passing only the actual data iov[1-N] to __cifs_calc_signature(). In
addition, there are a few cases where no rfc1002 length is passed so we
make sure there's one (iov_len == 4).

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>