<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs, branch v4.4.65</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts</title>
<updated>2017-04-30T03:49:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-28T05:27:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c50fd34e10897114a7be2120133bd7e0b4184024'/>
<id>c50fd34e10897114a7be2120133bd7e0b4184024</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 upstream.

CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt; pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.

    mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
    mount --make-rshared /
    for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done

Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.

As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.

Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt; described the situation for autofs users
as follows:

&gt; The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
&gt; the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
&gt; problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
&gt; than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
&gt;
&gt; Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
&gt; have been triggered and not yet expired.
&gt;
&gt; The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
&gt; case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
&gt; not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
&gt;
&gt; The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
&gt; number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
&gt; more active mounts.

So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000.  This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts.  Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.

For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.

Tested-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 upstream.

CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt; pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.

    mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
    mount --make-rshared /
    for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done

Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.

As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.

Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt; described the situation for autofs users
as follows:

&gt; The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
&gt; the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
&gt; problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
&gt; than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
&gt;
&gt; Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
&gt; have been triggered and not yet expired.
&gt;
&gt; The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
&gt; case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
&gt; not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
&gt;
&gt; The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
&gt; number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
&gt; more active mounts.

So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000.  This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts.  Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.

For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.

Tested-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gfs2: avoid uninitialized variable warning</title>
<updated>2017-04-30T03:49:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-26T18:08:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d39cb4a597295c6fd5e01795a134f1e3c0914049'/>
<id>d39cb4a597295c6fd5e01795a134f1e3c0914049</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 67893f12e5374bbcaaffbc6e570acbc2714ea884 upstream.

We get a bogus warning about a potential uninitialized variable
use in gfs2, because the compiler does not figure out that we
never use the leaf number if get_leaf_nr() returns an error:

fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'get_first_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:802:9: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'dir_split_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:1021:8: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]

Changing the 'if (!error)' to 'if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(error))' is
sufficient to let gcc understand that this is exactly the same
condition as in IS_ERR() so it can optimize the code path enough
to understand it.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson &lt;rpeterso@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 67893f12e5374bbcaaffbc6e570acbc2714ea884 upstream.

We get a bogus warning about a potential uninitialized variable
use in gfs2, because the compiler does not figure out that we
never use the leaf number if get_leaf_nr() returns an error:

fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'get_first_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:802:9: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'dir_split_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:1021:8: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]

Changing the 'if (!error)' to 'if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(error))' is
sufficient to let gcc understand that this is exactly the same
condition as in IS_ERR() so it can optimize the code path enough
to understand it.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson &lt;rpeterso@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: remove bad_network_name flag</title>
<updated>2017-04-27T07:09:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Germano Percossi</name>
<email>germano.percossi@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-07T11:29:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=859d615b5be1a6123b68f08233e548ee7f4e4298'/>
<id>859d615b5be1a6123b68f08233e548ee7f4e4298</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a0918f1ce6a43ac980b42b300ec443c154970979 upstream.

STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME can be received during node failover,
causing the flag to be set and making the reconnect thread
always unsuccessful, thereafter.

Once the only place where it is set is removed, the remaining
bits are rendered moot.

Removing it does not prevent "mount" from failing when a non
existent share is passed.

What happens when the share really ceases to exist while the
share is mounted is undefined now as much as it was before.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi &lt;germano.percossi@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a0918f1ce6a43ac980b42b300ec443c154970979 upstream.

STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME can be received during node failover,
causing the flag to be set and making the reconnect thread
always unsuccessful, thereafter.

Once the only place where it is set is removed, the remaining
bits are rendered moot.

Removing it does not prevent "mount" from failing when a non
existent share is passed.

What happens when the share really ceases to exist while the
share is mounted is undefined now as much as it was before.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi &lt;germano.percossi@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: Do not send echoes before Negotiate is complete</title>
<updated>2017-04-27T07:09:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sachin Prabhu</name>
<email>sprabhu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-16T19:37:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f8fe51c86583ccb38263277ee471f77053a9482a'/>
<id>f8fe51c86583ccb38263277ee471f77053a9482a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 62a6cfddcc0a5313e7da3e8311ba16226fe0ac10 upstream.

commit 4fcd1813e640 ("Fix reconnect to not defer smb3 session reconnect
long after socket reconnect") added support for Negotiate requests to
be initiated by echo calls.

To avoid delays in calling echo after a reconnect, I added the patch
introduced by the commit b8c600120fc8 ("Call echo service immediately
after socket reconnect").

This has however caused a regression with cifs shares which do not have
support for echo calls to trigger Negotiate requests. On connections
which need to call Negotiation, the echo calls trigger an error which
triggers a reconnect which in turn triggers another echo call. This
results in a loop which is only broken when an operation is performed on
the cifs share. For an idle share, it can DOS a server.

The patch uses the smb_operation can_echo() for cifs so that it is
called only if connection has been already been setup.

kernel bz: 194531

Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jonathan Liu &lt;net147@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 62a6cfddcc0a5313e7da3e8311ba16226fe0ac10 upstream.

commit 4fcd1813e640 ("Fix reconnect to not defer smb3 session reconnect
long after socket reconnect") added support for Negotiate requests to
be initiated by echo calls.

To avoid delays in calling echo after a reconnect, I added the patch
introduced by the commit b8c600120fc8 ("Call echo service immediately
after socket reconnect").

This has however caused a regression with cifs shares which do not have
support for echo calls to trigger Negotiate requests. On connections
which need to call Negotiation, the echo calls trigger an error which
triggers a reconnect which in turn triggers another echo call. This
results in a loop which is only broken when an operation is performed on
the cifs share. For an idle share, it can DOS a server.

The patch uses the smb_operation can_echo() for cifs so that it is
called only if connection has been already been setup.

kernel bz: 194531

Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jonathan Liu &lt;net147@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix inode checksum calculation problem if i_extra_size is small</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daeho Jeong</name>
<email>daeho.jeong@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T16:49:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=51f8d95c89b4aa74e591015d076d2775d9286704'/>
<id>51f8d95c89b4aa74e591015d076d2775d9286704</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05ac5aa18abd7db341e54df4ae2b4c98ea0e43b7 upstream.

We've fixed the race condition problem in calculating ext4 checksum
value in commit b47820edd163 ("ext4: avoid modifying checksum fields
directly during checksum veficationon"). However, by this change,
when calculating the checksum value of inode whose i_extra_size is
less than 4, we couldn't calculate the checksum value in a proper way.
This problem was found and reported by Nix, Thank you.

Reported-by: Nix &lt;nix@esperi.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong &lt;daeho.jeong@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Youngjin Gil &lt;youngjin.gil@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 05ac5aa18abd7db341e54df4ae2b4c98ea0e43b7 upstream.

We've fixed the race condition problem in calculating ext4 checksum
value in commit b47820edd163 ("ext4: avoid modifying checksum fields
directly during checksum veficationon"). However, by this change,
when calculating the checksum value of inode whose i_extra_size is
less than 4, we couldn't calculate the checksum value in a proper way.
This problem was found and reported by Nix, Thank you.

Reported-by: Nix &lt;nix@esperi.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong &lt;daeho.jeong@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Youngjin Gil &lt;youngjin.gil@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: store results of cifs_reopen_file to avoid infinite wait</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Germano Percossi</name>
<email>germano.percossi@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-07T11:29:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f0899d0e1e9ea7b71a3b05889c047d74b729dbf6'/>
<id>f0899d0e1e9ea7b71a3b05889c047d74b729dbf6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1fa839b4986d648b907d117275869a0e46c324b9 upstream.

This fixes Continuous Availability when errors during
file reopen are encountered.

cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev would wait for ever if
results of cifs_reopen_file are not stored and for later inspection.

In fact, results are checked and, in case of errors, a chain
of function calls leading to reads and writes to be scheduled in
a separate thread is skipped.
These threads will wake up the corresponding waiters once reads
and writes are done.

However, given the return value is not stored, when rc is checked
for errors a previous one (always zero) is inspected instead.
This leads to pending reads/writes added to the list, making
cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev wait for ever.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi &lt;germano.percossi@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1fa839b4986d648b907d117275869a0e46c324b9 upstream.

This fixes Continuous Availability when errors during
file reopen are encountered.

cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev would wait for ever if
results of cifs_reopen_file are not stored and for later inspection.

In fact, results are checked and, in case of errors, a chain
of function calls leading to reads and writes to be scheduled in
a separate thread is skipped.
These threads will wake up the corresponding waiters once reads
and writes are done.

However, given the return value is not stored, when rc is checked
for errors a previous one (always zero) is inspected instead.
This leads to pending reads/writes added to the list, making
cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev wait for ever.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi &lt;germano.percossi@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs clear soft dirty race</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-13T21:56:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ef4c962825c08609d8077c00cf73f26fbdc638cc'/>
<id>ef4c962825c08609d8077c00cf73f26fbdc638cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b7abeae3af8c08c577e599dd0578b9e3ee6687b upstream.

Yet another instance of the same race.

Fix is identical to change_huge_pmd().

See "thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs.  numa balancing race" for more details.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302151034.27829-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5b7abeae3af8c08c577e599dd0578b9e3ee6687b upstream.

Yet another instance of the same race.

Fix is identical to change_huge_pmd().

See "thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs.  numa balancing race" for more details.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302151034.27829-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Reset TreeId to zero on SMB2 TREE_CONNECT</title>
<updated>2017-04-12T10:38:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan-Marek Glogowski</name>
<email>glogow@fbihome.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-20T11:25:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5a69c2b268ed938d44011274e6bc87562542ef94'/>
<id>5a69c2b268ed938d44011274e6bc87562542ef94</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 806a28efe9b78ffae5e2757e1ee924b8e50c08ab upstream.

Currently the cifs module breaks the CIFS specs on reconnect as
described in http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246529.aspx:

"TreeId (4 bytes): Uniquely identifies the tree connect for the
command. This MUST be 0 for the SMB2 TREE_CONNECT Request."

Signed-off-by: Jan-Marek Glogowski &lt;glogow@fbihome.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 806a28efe9b78ffae5e2757e1ee924b8e50c08ab upstream.

Currently the cifs module breaks the CIFS specs on reconnect as
described in http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246529.aspx:

"TreeId (4 bytes): Uniquely identifies the tree connect for the
command. This MUST be 0 for the SMB2 TREE_CONNECT Request."

Signed-off-by: Jan-Marek Glogowski &lt;glogow@fbihome.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs: be careful of error returns from ops-&gt;show()</title>
<updated>2017-04-12T10:38:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-03T01:30:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=69d8d58bf50d9cd1bb6f000bbdf54026e74717a3'/>
<id>69d8d58bf50d9cd1bb6f000bbdf54026e74717a3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c8a139d001a1aab1ea8734db14b22dac9dd143b6 upstream.

ops-&gt;show() can return a negative error code.
Commit 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
(in v4.4) caused this to be stored in an unsigned 'size_t' variable, so errors
would look like large numbers.
As a result, if an error is returned, sysfs_kf_read() will return the
value of 'count', typically 4096.

Commit 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
(in v4.8) extended this error to use the unsigned large 'len' as a size for
memmove().
Consequently, if -&gt;show returns an error, then the first read() on the
sysfs file will return 4096 and could return uninitialized memory to
user-space.
If the application performs a subsequent read, this will trigger a memmove()
with extremely large count, and is likely to crash the machine is bizarre ways.

This bug can currently only be triggered by reading from an md
sysfs attribute declared with __ATTR_PREALLOC() during the
brief period between when mddev_put() deletes an mddev from
the -&gt;all_mddevs list, and when mddev_delayed_delete() - which is
scheduled on a workqueue - completes.
Before this, an error won't be returned by the -&gt;show()
After this, the -&gt;show() won't be called.

I can reproduce it reliably only by putting delay like
	usleep_range(500000,700000);
early in mddev_delayed_delete(). Then after creating an
md device md0 run
  echo clear &gt; /sys/block/md0/md/array_state; cat /sys/block/md0/md/array_state

The bug can be triggered without the usleep.

Fixes: 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
Fixes: 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c8a139d001a1aab1ea8734db14b22dac9dd143b6 upstream.

ops-&gt;show() can return a negative error code.
Commit 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
(in v4.4) caused this to be stored in an unsigned 'size_t' variable, so errors
would look like large numbers.
As a result, if an error is returned, sysfs_kf_read() will return the
value of 'count', typically 4096.

Commit 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
(in v4.8) extended this error to use the unsigned large 'len' as a size for
memmove().
Consequently, if -&gt;show returns an error, then the first read() on the
sysfs file will return 4096 and could return uninitialized memory to
user-space.
If the application performs a subsequent read, this will trigger a memmove()
with extremely large count, and is likely to crash the machine is bizarre ways.

This bug can currently only be triggered by reading from an md
sysfs attribute declared with __ATTR_PREALLOC() during the
brief period between when mddev_put() deletes an mddev from
the -&gt;all_mddevs list, and when mddev_delayed_delete() - which is
scheduled on a workqueue - completes.
Before this, an error won't be returned by the -&gt;show()
After this, the -&gt;show() won't be called.

I can reproduce it reliably only by putting delay like
	usleep_range(500000,700000);
early in mddev_delayed_delete(). Then after creating an
md device md0 run
  echo clear &gt; /sys/block/md0/md/array_state; cat /sys/block/md0/md/array_state

The bug can be triggered without the usleep.

Fixes: 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
Fixes: 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation</title>
<updated>2017-03-31T07:49:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-21T23:07:11+00:00</published>
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<id>7a5202190810dde1467718235c1f650fcf57592a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
</feed>
