<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/fs, branch v4.9.131</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body</title>
<updated>2018-10-04T00:01:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-16T19:40:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3a282476161c54df1a2ef1ba664c8a3514ef49f4'/>
<id>3a282476161c54df1a2ef1ba664c8a3514ef49f4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8cdb5240ec5928b20490a2bb34cb87e9a5f40226 upstream.

When expanding the extra isize space, we must never move the
system.data xattr out of the inode body.  For performance reasons, it
doesn't make any sense, and the inline data implementation assumes
that system.data xattr is never in the external xattr block.

This addresses CVE-2018-10880

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200005

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
[groeck: Context changes]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8cdb5240ec5928b20490a2bb34cb87e9a5f40226 upstream.

When expanding the extra isize space, we must never move the
system.data xattr out of the inode body.  For performance reasons, it
doesn't make any sense, and the inline data implementation assumes
that system.data xattr is never in the external xattr block.

This addresses CVE-2018-10880

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200005

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
[groeck: Context changes]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: fix corrupted reply to badly ordered compound</title>
<updated>2018-10-04T00:01:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-13T19:21:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cacafc212394253d7e941ae0c0b8b5a64feb64e0'/>
<id>cacafc212394253d7e941ae0c0b8b5a64feb64e0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5b7b15aee641904ae269be9846610a3950cbd64c ]

We're encoding a single op in the reply but leaving the number of ops
zero, so the reply makes no sense.

Somewhat academic as this isn't a case any real client will hit, though
in theory perhaps that could change in a future protocol extension.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5b7b15aee641904ae269be9846610a3950cbd64c ]

We're encoding a single op in the reply but leaving the number of ops
zero, so the reply makes no sense.

Somewhat academic as this isn't a case any real client will hit, though
in theory perhaps that could change in a future protocol extension.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: show test_dummy_encryption mount option in /proc/mounts</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-15T18:28:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=797488ac4975d62613a0c68e6ecb8575f06404b4'/>
<id>797488ac4975d62613a0c68e6ecb8575f06404b4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 338affb548c243d2af25b1ca628e67819350de6b upstream.

When in effect, add "test_dummy_encryption" to _ext4_show_options() so
that it is shown in /proc/mounts and other relevant procfs files.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 338affb548c243d2af25b1ca628e67819350de6b upstream.

When in effect, add "test_dummy_encryption" to _ext4_show_options() so
that it is shown in /proc/mounts and other relevant procfs files.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't mark mmp buffer head dirty</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Dongyang</name>
<email>dongyangli@ddn.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-15T21:11:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b344b3a7328b4e879a384b542d4b06be998436df'/>
<id>b344b3a7328b4e879a384b542d4b06be998436df</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe18d649891d813964d3aaeebad873f281627fbc upstream.

Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback
pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the
duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of
reading and writing the mmp block.
Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on
the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because
kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting
new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested
by writeback.

Signed-off-by: Li Dongyang &lt;dongyangli@ddn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fe18d649891d813964d3aaeebad873f281627fbc upstream.

Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback
pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the
duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of
reading and writing the mmp block.
Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on
the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because
kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting
new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested
by writeback.

Signed-off-by: Li Dongyang &lt;dongyangli@ddn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix online resizing for bigalloc file systems with a 1k block size</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-04T02:25:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4ba9e687ed89fd2a3fe6a3d7e95daea8669edb94'/>
<id>4ba9e687ed89fd2a3fe6a3d7e95daea8669edb94</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5f8c10936fab2b69a487400f2872902e597dd320 upstream.

An online resize of a file system with the bigalloc feature enabled
and a 1k block size would be refused since ext4_resize_begin() did not
understand s_first_data_block is 0 for all bigalloc file systems, even
when the block size is 1k.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5f8c10936fab2b69a487400f2872902e597dd320 upstream.

An online resize of a file system with the bigalloc feature enabled
and a 1k block size would be refused since ext4_resize_begin() did not
understand s_first_data_block is 0 for all bigalloc file systems, even
when the block size is 1k.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix online resize's handling of a too-small final block group</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-04T02:19:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=205dc0da96dffe78c6684a37ee0b574c929f5155'/>
<id>205dc0da96dffe78c6684a37ee0b574c929f5155</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f0a459dec5495a3580f8d784555e6f8f3bf7f263 upstream.

Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block
group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in
the block group.

This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer:

umount /mnt
mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \
	-E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M
mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt
truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img
resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400
umount /mnt
e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img

Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich &lt;torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f0a459dec5495a3580f8d784555e6f8f3bf7f263 upstream.

Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block
group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in
the block group.

This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer:

umount /mnt
mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \
	-E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M
mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt
truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img
resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400
umount /mnt
e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img

Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich &lt;torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: recalucate superblock checksum after updating free blocks/inodes</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-01T18:42:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=67770b40a351bfaaa96ed8b5dae4c17528275263'/>
<id>67770b40a351bfaaa96ed8b5dae4c17528275263</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4274f516d4bc50648a4d97e4f67ecbd7b65cde4a upstream.

When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free
blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock.  It's not
strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to
keep them roughly aligned to reality.

Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't
call ext4_commit_super().  The problem is that it's in
ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum.  So
if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call
ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is
consistent.

Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling
ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time
the file system is unmounted.  However, it doesn't work in this
sequence:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M
mount /dev/vdc /vdc
cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc
godown /vdc
umount /vdc
mount /dev/vdc
tune2fs -l /dev/vdc

With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails.

Reported-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4274f516d4bc50648a4d97e4f67ecbd7b65cde4a upstream.

When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free
blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock.  It's not
strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to
keep them roughly aligned to reality.

Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't
call ext4_commit_super().  The problem is that it's in
ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum.  So
if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call
ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is
consistent.

Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling
ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time
the file system is unmounted.  However, it doesn't work in this
sequence:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M
mount /dev/vdc /vdc
cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc
godown /vdc
umount /vdc
mount /dev/vdc
tune2fs -l /dev/vdc

With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails.

Reported-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@gmx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: avoid divide by zero fault when deleting corrupted inline directories</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-27T13:22:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=acf32cf208b96164eeeec326446b57ded229b981'/>
<id>acf32cf208b96164eeeec326446b57ded229b981</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4d982e25d0bdc83d8c64e66fdeca0b89240b3b85 upstream.

A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into
reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run
into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero
fault.  Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of
dir-&gt;i_size.

Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the
message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division
by zero trap if the size passed in is zero.  (I'm not sure why we
coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is
actually more confusing and less useful.)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Wen Xu &lt;wen.xu@gatech.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4d982e25d0bdc83d8c64e66fdeca0b89240b3b85 upstream.

A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into
reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run
into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero
fault.  Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of
dir-&gt;i_size.

Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the
message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division
by zero trap if the size passed in is zero.  (I'm not sure why we
coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is
actually more confusing and less useful.)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Wen Xu &lt;wen.xu@gatech.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: check to make sure the rename(2)'s destination is not freed</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-27T05:47:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=23f57cb1f1a3bddfccddc6f7026461b2a4d9bcc7'/>
<id>23f57cb1f1a3bddfccddc6f7026461b2a4d9bcc7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b50282f3241acee880514212d88b6049fb5039c8 upstream.

If the destination of the rename(2) system call exists, the inode's
link count (i_nlinks) must be non-zero.  If it is, the inode can end
up on the orphan list prematurely, leading to all sorts of hilarity,
including a use-after-free.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200931

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Wen Xu &lt;wen.xu@gatech.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b50282f3241acee880514212d88b6049fb5039c8 upstream.

If the destination of the rename(2) system call exists, the inode's
link count (i_nlinks) must be non-zero.  If it is, the inode can end
up on the orphan list prematurely, leading to all sorts of hilarity,
including a use-after-free.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200931

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Wen Xu &lt;wen.xu@gatech.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read block panic</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:07:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junxiao Bi</name>
<email>junxiao.bi@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-20T19:22:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=44ae7181db0a86607f639beac3ce7dbed32ed3a8'/>
<id>44ae7181db0a86607f639beac3ce7dbed32ed3a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 234b69e3e089d850a98e7b3145bd00e9b52b1111 upstream.

While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying
storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head.
Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into
journal, that will trigger the following panic.

[203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342!
[203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2
[203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015
[203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000
[203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa05e9f09&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa05e9f09&gt;] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818  EFLAGS: 00010206
[203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000
[203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe
[203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0
[203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000
[203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000
[203748.705871] FS:  00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[203748.706370] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670
[203748.707124] Stack:
[203748.707371]  ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001
[203748.707885]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00
[203748.708399]  00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[203748.708915] Call Trace:
[203748.709175]  [&lt;ffffffffa0609f52&gt;] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2]
[203748.709680]  [&lt;ffffffffa05eca00&gt;] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2]
[203748.710185]  [&lt;ffffffffa05ec0cb&gt;] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2]
[203748.710691]  [&lt;ffffffffa05f0fbf&gt;] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2]
[203748.711204]  [&lt;ffffffffa065660f&gt;] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2]
[203748.711716]  [&lt;ffffffffa05f4f3a&gt;] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2]
[203748.712227]  [&lt;ffffffffa05f442e&gt;] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2]
[203748.712737]  [&lt;ffffffffa061b2f2&gt;] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2]
[203748.713003]  [&lt;ffffffffa061c385&gt;] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2]
[203748.713263]  [&lt;ffffffff8121714b&gt;] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150
[203748.713518]  [&lt;ffffffff8121b225&gt;] do_last+0x815/0x1210
[203748.713772]  [&lt;ffffffff812192e9&gt;] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450
[203748.714123]  [&lt;ffffffff8121bca0&gt;] path_openat+0x80/0x600
[203748.714378]  [&lt;ffffffff811bcd45&gt;] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620
[203748.714634]  [&lt;ffffffff8121d7ba&gt;] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0
[203748.714888]  [&lt;ffffffff8122a767&gt;] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[203748.715143]  [&lt;ffffffff81209ffc&gt;] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220
[203748.715403]  [&lt;ffffffff81026ddb&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180
[203748.715668]  [&lt;ffffffff816f0c9f&gt;] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190
[203748.715928]  [&lt;ffffffff8120a10e&gt;] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[203748.716184]  [&lt;ffffffff816f0d5e&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7
[203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10
[203748.717505] RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa05e9f09&gt;] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.717775]  RSP &lt;ffff88006ff4b818&gt;

Joesph ever reported a similar panic.
Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;ge.changwei@h3c.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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commit 234b69e3e089d850a98e7b3145bd00e9b52b1111 upstream.

While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying
storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head.
Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into
journal, that will trigger the following panic.

[203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342!
[203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2
[203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015
[203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000
[203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa05e9f09&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa05e9f09&gt;] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818  EFLAGS: 00010206
[203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000
[203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe
[203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0
[203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000
[203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000
[203748.705871] FS:  00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[203748.706370] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670
[203748.707124] Stack:
[203748.707371]  ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001
[203748.707885]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00
[203748.708399]  00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[203748.708915] Call Trace:
[203748.709175]  [&lt;ffffffffa0609f52&gt;] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2]
[203748.709680]  [&lt;ffffffffa05eca00&gt;] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2]
[203748.710185]  [&lt;ffffffffa05ec0cb&gt;] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2]
[203748.710691]  [&lt;ffffffffa05f0fbf&gt;] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2]
[203748.711204]  [&lt;ffffffffa065660f&gt;] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2]
[203748.711716]  [&lt;ffffffffa05f4f3a&gt;] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2]
[203748.712227]  [&lt;ffffffffa05f442e&gt;] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2]
[203748.712737]  [&lt;ffffffffa061b2f2&gt;] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2]
[203748.713003]  [&lt;ffffffffa061c385&gt;] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2]
[203748.713263]  [&lt;ffffffff8121714b&gt;] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150
[203748.713518]  [&lt;ffffffff8121b225&gt;] do_last+0x815/0x1210
[203748.713772]  [&lt;ffffffff812192e9&gt;] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450
[203748.714123]  [&lt;ffffffff8121bca0&gt;] path_openat+0x80/0x600
[203748.714378]  [&lt;ffffffff811bcd45&gt;] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620
[203748.714634]  [&lt;ffffffff8121d7ba&gt;] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0
[203748.714888]  [&lt;ffffffff8122a767&gt;] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[203748.715143]  [&lt;ffffffff81209ffc&gt;] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220
[203748.715403]  [&lt;ffffffff81026ddb&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180
[203748.715668]  [&lt;ffffffff816f0c9f&gt;] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190
[203748.715928]  [&lt;ffffffff8120a10e&gt;] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[203748.716184]  [&lt;ffffffff816f0d5e&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7
[203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10
[203748.717505] RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa05e9f09&gt;] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.717775]  RSP &lt;ffff88006ff4b818&gt;

Joesph ever reported a similar panic.
Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;ge.changwei@h3c.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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