linux-toradex.git/fs, branch v4.9.33

userfaultfd: fix SIGBUS resulting from false rwsem wakeups

2017-06-17T04:41:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 15a77c6fe494f4b1757d30cd137fe66ab06a38c3 ]

With >=32 CPUs the userfaultfd selftest triggered a graceful but
unexpected SIGBUS because VM_FAULT_RETRY was returned by
handle_userfault() despite the UFFDIO_COPY wasn't completed.

This seems caused by rwsem waking the thread blocked in
handle_userfault() and we can't run up_read() before the wait_event
sequence is complete.

Keeping the wait_even sequence identical to the first one, would require
running userfaultfd_must_wait() again to know if the loop should be
repeated, and it would also require retaking the rwsem and revalidating
the whole vma status.

It seems simpler to wait the targeted wakeup so that if false wakeups
materialize we still wait for our specific wakeup event, unless of
course there are signals or the uffd was released.

Debug code collecting the stack trace of the wakeup showed this:

  $ ./userfaultfd 100 99999
  nr_pages: 25600, nr_pages_per_cpu: 800
  bounces: 99998, mode: racing ver poll, userfaults: 32 35 90 232 30 138 69 82 34 30 139 40 40 31 20 19 43 13 15 28 27 38 21 43 56 22 1 17 31 8 4 2
  bounces: 99997, mode: rnd ver poll, Bus error (core dumped)

    save_stack_trace+0x2b/0x50
    try_to_wake_up+0x2a6/0x580
    wake_up_q+0x32/0x70
    rwsem_wake+0xe0/0x120
    call_rwsem_wake+0x1b/0x30
    up_write+0x3b/0x40
    vm_mmap_pgoff+0x9c/0xc0
    SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x1a9/0x240
    SyS_mmap+0x22/0x30
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbd
    0xffffffffffffffff
    FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 70
  CPU: 24 PID: 1054 Comm: userfaultfd Tainted: G        W       4.8.0+ #30
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0xb8/0x112
    handle_userfault+0x572/0x650
    handle_mm_fault+0x12cb/0x1520
    __do_page_fault+0x175/0x500
    trace_do_page_fault+0x61/0x270
    do_async_page_fault+0x19/0x90
    async_page_fault+0x25/0x30

This always happens when the main userfault selftest thread is running
clone() while glibc runs either mprotect or mmap (both taking mmap_sem
down_write()) to allocate the thread stack of the background threads,
while locking/userfault threads already run at full throttle and are
susceptible to false wakeups that may cause handle_userfault() to return
before than expected (which results in graceful SIGBUS at the next
attempt).

This was reproduced only with >=32 CPUs because the loop to start the
thread where clone() is too quick with fewer CPUs, while with 32 CPUs
there's already significant activity on ~32 locking and userfault
threads when the last background threads are started with clone().

This >=32 CPUs SMP race condition is likely reproducible only with the
selftest because of the much heavier userfault load it generates if
compared to real apps.

We'll have to allow "one more" VM_FAULT_RETRY for the WP support and a
patch floating around that provides it also hidden this problem but in
reality only is successfully at hiding the problem.

False wakeups could still happen again the second time
handle_userfault() is invoked, even if it's a so rare race condition
that getting false wakeups twice in a row is impossible to reproduce.
This full fix is needed for correctness, the only alternative would be
to allow VM_FAULT_RETRY to be returned infinitely.  With this fix the WP
support can stick to a strict "one more" VM_FAULT_RETRY logic (no need
of returning it infinite times to avoid the SIGBUS).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170111005535.13832-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli 
Reported-by: Shubham Kumar Sharma 
Tested-by: Mike Kravetz 
Acked-by: Hillf Danton 
Cc: Michael Rapoport 
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: add a schedule point in proc_pid_readdir()

2017-06-17T04:41:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3ba4bceef23206349d4130ddf140819b365de7c8 ]

We have seen proc_pid_readdir() invocations holding cpu for more than 50
ms.  Add a cond_resched() to be gentle with other tasks.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fix]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484238380.15816.42.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

romfs: use different way to generate fsid for BLOCK or MTD

2017-06-17T04:41:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit f598f82e204ec0b17797caaf1b0311c52d43fb9a ]

Commit 8a59f5d25265 ("fs/romfs: return f_fsid for statfs(2)") generates
a 64bit id from sb->s_bdev->bd_dev.  This is only correct when romfs is
defined with CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_BLOCK.  If romfs is only defined with
CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_MTD, sb->s_bdev is NULL, referencing sb->s_bdev->bd_dev
will triger an oops.

Richard Weinberger points out that when CONFIG_ROMFS_BACKED_BY_BOTH=y,
both CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_BLOCK and CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_MTD are defined.
Therefore when calling huge_encode_dev() to generate a 64bit id, I use
the follow order to choose parameter,

- CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_BLOCK defined
  use sb->s_bdev->bd_dev
- CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_BLOCK undefined and CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_MTD defined
  use sb->s_dev when,
- both CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_BLOCK and CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_MTD undefined
  leave id as 0

When CONFIG_ROMFS_ON_MTD is defined and sb->s_mtd is not NULL, sb->s_dev
is set to a device ID generated by MTD_BLOCK_MAJOR and mtd index,
otherwise sb->s_dev is 0.

This is a try-best effort to generate a uniq file system ID, if all the
above conditions are not meet, f_fsid of this romfs instance will be 0.
Generally only one romfs can be built on single MTD block device, this
method is enough to identify multiple romfs instances in a computer.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482928596-115155-1-git-send-email-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Coly Li 
Reported-by: Nong Li 
Tested-by: Nong Li 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

nfs: Fix "Don't increment lock sequence ID after NFS4ERR_MOVED"

2017-06-17T04:41:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit 406dab8450ec76eca88a1af2fc15d18a2b36ca49 ]

Lock sequence IDs are bumped in decode_lock by calling
nfs_increment_seqid(). nfs_increment_sequid() does not use the
seqid_mutating_err() function fixed in commit 059aa7348241 ("Don't
increment lock sequence ID after NFS4ERR_MOVED").

Fixes: 059aa7348241 ("Don't increment lock sequence ID after ...")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Tested-by: Xuan Qi 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

FS-Cache: Initialise stores_lock in netfs cookie

2017-06-17T04:41:52+00:00

[ Upstream commit 62deb8187d116581c88c69a2dd9b5c16588545d4 ]

Initialise the stores_lock in fscache netfs cookies.  Technically, it
shouldn't be necessary, since the netfs cookie is an index and stores no
data, but initialising it anyway adds insignificant overhead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Acked-by: Steve Dickson 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fscache: Clear outstanding writes when disabling a cookie

2017-06-17T04:41:52+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6bdded59c8933940ac7e5b416448276ac89d1144 ]

fscache_disable_cookie() needs to clear the outstanding writes on the
cookie it's disabling because they cannot be completed after.

Without this, fscache_nfs_open_file() gets stuck because it disables the
cookie when the file is opened for writing but can't uncache the pages till
afterwards - otherwise there's a race between the open routine and anyone
who already has it open R/O and is still reading from it.

Looking in /proc/pid/stack of the offending process shows:

[] __fscache_wait_on_page_write+0x82/0x9b [fscache]
[] __fscache_uncache_all_inode_pages+0x91/0xe1 [fscache]
[] nfs_fscache_open_file+0x59/0x9e [nfs]
[] nfs4_file_open+0x17f/0x1b8 [nfsv4]
[] do_dentry_open+0x16d/0x2b7
[] vfs_open+0x5c/0x65
[] path_openat+0x785/0x8fb
[] do_filp_open+0x48/0x9e
[] do_sys_open+0x13b/0x1cb
[] SyS_open+0x19/0x1b
[] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x17a
[] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
[] 0xffffffffffffffff

Reported-by: Jianhong Yin 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Jeff Layton 
Acked-by: Steve Dickson 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fscache: Fix dead object requeue

2017-06-17T04:41:52+00:00

[ Upstream commit e26bfebdfc0d212d366de9990a096665d5c0209a ]

Under some circumstances, an fscache object can become queued such that it
fscache_object_work_func() can be called once the object is in the
OBJECT_DEAD state.  This results in the kernel oopsing when it tries to
invoke the handler for the state (which is hard coded to 0x2).

The way this comes about is something like the following:

 (1) The object dispatcher is processing a work state for an object.  This
     is done in workqueue context.

 (2) An out-of-band event comes in that isn't masked, causing the object to
     be queued, say EV_KILL.

 (3) The object dispatcher finishes processing the current work state on
     that object and then sees there's another event to process, so,
     without returning to the workqueue core, it processes that event too.
     It then follows the chain of events that initiates until we reach
     OBJECT_DEAD without going through a wait state (such as
     WAIT_FOR_CLEARANCE).

     At this point, object->events may be 0, object->event_mask will be 0
     and oob_event_mask will be 0.

 (4) The object dispatcher returns to the workqueue processor, and in due
     course, this sees that the object's work item is still queued and
     invokes it again.

 (5) The current state is a work state (OBJECT_DEAD), so the dispatcher
     jumps to it - resulting in an OOPS.

When I'm seeing this, the work state in (1) appears to have been either
LOOK_UP_OBJECT or CREATE_OBJECT (object->oob_table is
fscache_osm_lookup_oob).

The window for (2) is very small:

 (A) object->event_mask is cleared whilst the event dispatch process is
     underway - though there's no memory barrier to force this to the top
     of the function.

     The window, therefore is from the time the object was selected by the
     workqueue processor and made requeueable to the time the mask was
     cleared.

 (B) fscache_raise_event() will only queue the object if it manages to set
     the event bit and the corresponding event_mask bit was set.

     The enqueuement is then deferred slightly whilst we get a ref on the
     object and get the per-CPU variable for workqueue congestion.  This
     slight deferral slightly increases the probability by allowing extra
     time for the workqueue to make the item requeueable.

Handle this by giving the dead state a processor function and checking the
for the dead state address rather than seeing if the processor function is
address 0x2.  The dead state processor function can then set a flag to
indicate that it's occurred and give a warning if it occurs more than once
per object.

If this race occurs, an oops similar to the following is seen (note the RIP
value):

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002
IP: [<0000000000000002>] 0x1
PGD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 17 PID: 16077 Comm: kworker/u48:9 Not tainted 3.10.0-327.18.2.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
Workqueue: fscache_object fscache_object_work_func [fscache]
task: ffff880302b63980 ti: ffff880717544000 task.ti: ffff880717544000
RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000002>]  [<0000000000000002>] 0x1
RSP: 0018:ffff880717547df8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa0368640 RBX: ffff880edf7a4480 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff880edf7a4480
RBP: ffff880717547e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dfc40a25cb3a4510
R10: dfc40a25cb3a4510 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880edf7a4510 R14: ffff8817f6153400 R15: 0000000000000600
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88181f420000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 000000000194a000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffffffffa0363695 ffff880edf7a4510 ffff88093f16f900 ffff8817faa4ec00
 ffff880717547e60 ffffffff8109d5db 00000000faa4ec18 0000000000000000
 ffff8817faa4ec18 ffff88093f16f930 ffff880302b63980 ffff88093f16f900
Call Trace:
 [] ? fscache_object_work_func+0xa5/0x200 [fscache]
 [] process_one_work+0x17b/0x470
 [] worker_thread+0x21c/0x400
 [] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400
 [] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
 [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140
 [] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
 [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Jeremy McNicoll 
Tested-by: Frank Sorenson 
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington 
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gfs2: Use rhashtable walk interface in glock_hash_walk

2017-06-17T04:41:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6a25478077d987edc5e2f880590a2bc5fcab4441 ]

The function glock_hash_walk walks the rhashtable by hand.  This
is broken because if it catches the hash table in the middle of
a rehash, then it will miss entries.

This patch replaces the manual walk by using the rhashtable walk
interface.

Fixes: 88ffbf3e037e ("GFS2: Use resizable hash table for glocks")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

btrfs: fix memory leak in update_space_info failure path

2017-06-14T13:06:02+00:00

commit 896533a7da929136d0432713f02a3edffece2826 upstream.

If we fail to add the space_info kobject, we'll leak the memory
for the percpu counter.

Fixes: 6ab0a2029c (btrfs: publish allocation data in sysfs)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney 
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo 
Signed-off-by: David Sterba 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

btrfs: use correct types for page indices in btrfs_page_exists_in_range

2017-06-14T13:06:02+00:00

commit cc2b702c52094b637a351d7491ac5200331d0445 upstream.

Variables start_idx and end_idx are supposed to hold a page index
derived from the file offsets. The int type is not the right one though,
offsets larger than 1 << 44 will get silently trimmed off the high bits.
(1 << 44 is 16TiB)

What can go wrong, if start is below the boundary and end gets trimmed:
- if there's a page after start, we'll find it (radix_tree_gang_lookup_slot)
- the final check "if (page->index <= end_idx)" will unexpectedly fail

The function will return false, ie. "there's no page in the range",
although there is at least one.

btrfs_page_exists_in_range is used to prevent races in:

* in hole punching, where we make sure there are not pages in the
  truncated range, otherwise we'll wait for them to finish and redo
  truncation, but we're going to replace the pages with holes anyway so
  the only problem is the intermediate state

* lock_extent_direct: we want to make sure there are no pages before we
  lock and start DIO, to prevent stale data reads

For practical occurence of the bug, there are several constaints.  The
file must be quite large, the affected range must cross the 16TiB
boundary and the internal state of the file pages and pending operations
must match.  Also, we must not have started any ordered data in the
range, otherwise we don't even reach the buggy function check.

DIO locking tries hard in several places to avoid deadlocks with
buffered IO and avoids waiting for ranges. The worst consequence seems
to be stale data read.

CC: Liu Bo 
Fixes: fc4adbff823f7 ("btrfs: Drop EXTENT_UPTODATE check in hole punching and direct locking")
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo 
Signed-off-by: David Sterba 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman