linux-toradex.git/include/asm-generic, branch v4.9.121

ioremap: Update pgtable free interfaces with addr

2018-08-17T18:59:29+00:00

commit 785a19f9d1dd8a4ab2d0633be4656653bd3de1fc upstream.

The following kernel panic was observed on ARM64 platform due to a stale
TLB entry.

 1. ioremap with 4K size, a valid pte page table is set.
 2. iounmap it, its pte entry is set to 0.
 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, update its pmd entry with
    a new value.
 4. CPU may hit an exception because the old pmd entry is still in TLB,
    which leads to a kernel panic.

Commit b6bdb7517c3d ("mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page
table") has addressed this panic by falling to pte mappings in the above
case on ARM64.

To support pmd mappings in all cases, TLB purge needs to be performed
in this case on ARM64.

Add a new arg, 'addr', to pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page()
so that TLB purge can be added later in seprate patches.

[toshi.kani@hpe.com: merge changes, rewrite patch description]
Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Chintan Pandya 
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Joerg Roedel 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-3-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures

2018-08-15T16:14:55+00:00

commit 6c26fcd2abfe0a56bbd95271fce02df2896cfd24 upstream.

pfn_modify_allowed() and arch_has_pfn_modify_check() are outside of the
!__ASSEMBLY__ section in include/asm-generic/pgtable.h, which confuses
assembler on archs that don't have __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED (e.g.
ia64) and breaks build:

    include/asm-generic/pgtable.h: Assembler messages:
    include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:538: Error: Unknown opcode `static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn,pgprot_t prot)'
    include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:540: Error: Unknown opcode `return true'
    include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:543: Error: Unknown opcode `static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)'
    include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:545: Error: Unknown opcode `return false'
    arch/ia64/kernel/entry.S:69: Error: `mov' does not fit into bundle

Move those two static inlines into the !__ASSEMBLY__ section so that they
don't confuse the asm build pass.

Fixes: 42e4089c7890 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
[groeck: Context changes]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings

2018-08-15T16:14:45+00:00

commit 42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921 upstream

For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.

Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.

To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.

Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.

It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.

For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().

For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.

[dwmw2: Backport to 4.9]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Acked-by: Dave Hansen 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

asm-generic: provide generic_pmdp_establish()

2018-05-30T05:50:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit c58f0bb77ed8bf93dfdde762b01cb67eebbdfc29 ]

Patch series "Do not lose dirty bit on THP pages", v4.

Vlastimil noted that pmdp_invalidate() is not atomic and we can lose
dirty and access bits if CPU sets them after pmdp dereference, but
before set_pmd_at().

The bug can lead to data loss, but the race window is tiny and I haven't
seen any reports that suggested that it happens in reality.  So I don't
think it worth sending it to stable.

Unfortunately, there's no way to address the issue in a generic way.  We
need to fix all architectures that support THP one-by-one.

All architectures that have THP supported have to provide atomic
pmdp_invalidate() that returns previous value.

If generic implementation of pmdp_invalidate() is used, architecture
needs to provide atomic pmdp_estabish().

pmdp_estabish() is not used out-side generic implementation of
pmdp_invalidate() so far, but I think this can change in the future.

This patch (of 12):

This is an implementation of pmdp_establish() that is only suitable for
an architecture that doesn't have hardware dirty/accessed bits.  In this
case we can't race with CPU which sets these bits and non-atomic
approach is fine.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213105756.69879-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: David Daney 
Cc: David Miller 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Nitin Gupta 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour

2018-05-19T08:27:00+00:00

commit 30d6e0a4190d37740e9447e4e4815f06992dd8c3 upstream.

There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for
futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr,
and comparison of the result.

Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed
assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser.

This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined
behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in
commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with
FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump.

And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was
also reported to cause undefined behaviour report.

Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess:
remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true.
We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets
optimized away anyway).

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Russell King 
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman  (powerpc)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens  [s390]
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf  [for tile]
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) 
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon  [core/arm64]
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Max Filippov 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonas Bonn 
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yoshinori Sato 
Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Fenghua Yu 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson 
Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky 
Cc: Stafford Horne 
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Richard Henderson 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

earlycon: Use a pointer table to fix __earlycon_table stride

2018-05-01T22:13:09+00:00

commit dd709e72cb934eefd44de8d9969097173fbf45dc upstream.

Commit 99492c39f39f ("earlycon: Fix __earlycon_table stride") tried to fix
__earlycon_table stride by forcing the earlycon_id struct alignment to 32
and asking the linker to 32-byte align the __earlycon_table symbol.  This
fix was based on commit 07fca0e57fca92 ("tracing: Properly align linker
defined symbols") which tried a similar fix for the tracing subsystem.

However, this fix doesn't quite work because there is no guarantee that
gcc will place structures packed into an array format.  In fact, gcc 4.9
chooses to 64-byte align these structs by inserting additional padding
between the entries because it has no clue that they are supposed to be in
an array.  If we are unlucky, the linker will assign symbol
"__earlycon_table" to a 32-byte aligned address which does not correspond
to the 64-byte aligned contents of section "__earlycon_table".

To address this same problem, the fix to the tracing system was
subsequently re-implemented using a more robust table of pointers approach
by commits:
 3d56e331b653 ("tracing: Replace syscall_meta_data struct array with pointer array")
 654986462939 ("tracepoints: Fix section alignment using pointer array")
 e4a9ea5ee7c8 ("tracing: Replace trace_event struct array with pointer array")

Let's use this same "array of pointers to structs" approach for
EARLYCON_TABLE.

Fixes: 99492c39f39f ("earlycon: Fix __earlycon_table stride")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kurtz 
Suggested-by: Aaron Durbin 
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring 
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck 
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck 
Cc: stable 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page table

2018-03-28T16:39:21+00:00

commit b6bdb7517c3d3f41f20e5c2948d6bc3f8897394e upstream.

On architectures with CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP set, ioremap() may
create pud/pmd mappings.  A kernel panic was observed on arm64 systems
with Cortex-A75 in the following steps as described by Hanjun Guo.

 1. ioremap a 4K size, valid page table will build,
 2. iounmap it, pte0 will set to 0;
 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, pgd/pmd is unchanged,
    then set the a new value for pmd;
 4. pte0 is leaked;
 5. CPU may meet exception because the old pmd is still in TLB,
    which will lead to kernel panic.

This panic is not reproducible on x86.  INVLPG, called from iounmap,
purges all levels of entries associated with purged address on x86.  x86
still has memory leak.

The patch changes the ioremap path to free unmapped page table(s) since
doing so in the unmap path has the following issues:

 - The iounmap() path is shared with vunmap(). Since vmap() only
   supports pte mappings, making vunmap() to free a pte page is an
   overhead for regular vmap users as they do not need a pte page freed
   up.

 - Checking if all entries in a pte page are cleared in the unmap path
   is racy, and serializing this check is expensive.

 - The unmap path calls free_vmap_area_noflush() to do lazy TLB purges.
   Clearing a pud/pmd entry before the lazy TLB purges needs extra TLB
   purge.

Add two interfaces, pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page(), which
clear a given pud/pmd entry and free up a page for the lower level
entries.

This patch implements their stub functions on x86 and arm64, which work
as workaround.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo in pmd_free_pte_page() stub]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314180155.19492-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Fixes: e61ce6ade404e ("mm: change ioremap to set up huge I/O mappings")
Reported-by: Lei Li 
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Wang Xuefeng 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Hanjun Guo 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Chintan Pandya 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kaiser: cleanups while trying for gold link

2018-01-05T14:46:33+00:00

While trying to get our gold link to work, four cleanups:
matched the gdt_page declaration to its definition;
in fiddling unsuccessfully with PERCPU_INPUT(), lined up backslashes;
lined up the backslashes according to convention in percpu-defs.h;
deleted the unused irq_stack_pointer addition to irq_stack_union.

Sad to report that aligning backslashes does not appear to help gold
align to 8192: but while these did not help, they are worth keeping.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation

2018-01-05T14:46:32+00:00

This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner 
From: Daniel Gruss 
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149390087310405&w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: 
To: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: Michael Schwarz 
Cc: Richard Fellner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: 
Cc: 

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

[patch based also on
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IAIK/KAISER/master/KAISER/0001-KAISER-Kernel-Address-Isolation.patch]

Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner 
Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss 
Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz 
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

percpu: make this_cpu_generic_read() atomic w.r.t. interrupts

2017-10-12T09:51:23+00:00

commit e88d62cd4b2f0b1ae55e9008e79c2794b1fc914d upstream.

As raw_cpu_generic_read() is a plain read from a raw_cpu_ptr() address,
it's possible (albeit unlikely) that the compiler will split the access
across multiple instructions.

In this_cpu_generic_read() we disable preemption but not interrupts
before calling raw_cpu_generic_read(). Thus, an interrupt could be taken
in the middle of the split load instructions. If a this_cpu_write() or
RMW this_cpu_*() op is made to the same variable in the interrupt
handling path, this_cpu_read() will return a torn value.

For native word types, we can avoid tearing using READ_ONCE(), but this
won't work in all cases (e.g. 64-bit types on most 32-bit platforms).
This patch reworks this_cpu_generic_read() to use READ_ONCE() where
possible, otherwise falling back to disabling interrupts.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Pranith Kumar 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman