linux-toradex.git/include/keys, branch master

keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths

2026-06-15T12:19:13+00:00

A: request_key()       B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================       =========================

create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
                       get auth key
                       load rka from auth key
                       copy user payload
                       sleep on #PF

helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key
                       wake up
                       use rka->target_key
                       **USE-AFTER-FREE**

Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount.  Take a payload reference while
authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state.  Hold that
reference across the instantiate and reject paths.  Drop the auth key
owning reference from revoke and destroy.

[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
 concurrency scenario.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Reported-by: Shaomin Chen 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519144403.436694-1-eeesssooo020@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shaomin Chen 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature

2026-06-15T12:19:12+00:00

TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a
feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for trusted
keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags.

Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden the
feature as follows:

1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
   used.
2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
3. Require trusted.debug=1 on the kernel command line (default: 0) to
   activate dumps at runtime, even when CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG=y.

Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing
trusted.dyndbg='+p' and trusted.debug=1 in the kernel command-line.

Reported-by: Nayna Jain 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain 
Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

keys/trusted_keys: establish PKWM as a trusted source

2026-01-30T03:57:26+00:00

The wrapping key does not exist by default and is generated by the
hypervisor as a part of PKWM initialization. This key is then persisted by
the hypervisor and is used to wrap trusted keys. These are variable length
symmetric keys, which in the case of PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) are
generated using the kernel RNG. PKWM can be used as a trust source through
the following example keyctl commands:

keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32" @u

Use the wrap_flags command option to set the secure boot requirement for
the wrapping request through the following keyctl commands

case1: no secure boot requirement. (default)
keyctl usage: keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32" @u
	      OR
	      keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32 wrap_flags=0x00" @u

case2: secure boot required to in either audit or enforce mode. set bit 0
keyctl usage: keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32 wrap_flags=0x01" @u

case3: secure boot required to be in enforce mode. set bit 1
keyctl usage: keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32 wrap_flags=0x02" @u

NOTE:
-> Setting the secure boot requirement is NOT a must.
-> Only either of the secure boot requirement options should be set. Not
both.
-> All the other bits are required to be not set.
-> Set the kernel parameter trusted.source=pkwm to choose PKWM as the
backend for trusted keys implementation.
-> CONFIG_PSERIES_PLPKS must be enabled to build PKWM.

Add PKWM, which is a combination of IBM PowerVM and Power LPAR Platform
KeyStore, as a new trust source for trusted keys.

Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan 
Tested-by: Nayna Jain 
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar 
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127145228.48320-6-ssrish@linux.ibm.com

keys: Annotate struct asymmetric_key_id with __counted_by

2025-10-31T09:43:56+00:00

Add the __counted_by() compiler attribute to the flexible array member
'data' to improve access bounds-checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.

Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum 
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header

2025-09-27T18:05:06+00:00

Move functionality used only by trusted_tpm1.c out of the public header
.  Specifically, change the exported functions into
static functions, since they are not used outside trusted_tpm1.c, and
move various other definitions and inline functions to trusted_tpm1.c.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class

2025-04-15T00:36:41+00:00

Add support for the YFS-variant RxGK security class to support
GSSAPI-derived authentication.  This also allows the use of better crypto
over the rxkad security class.

The key payload is XDR encoded of the form:

    typedef int64_t opr_time;

    const AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX = 12000; 	/* Matches entry in rxkad.h */

    struct token_rxkad {
	afs_int32 viceid;
	afs_int32 kvno;
	afs_int64 key;
	afs_int32 begintime;
	afs_int32 endtime;
	afs_int32 primary_flag;
	opaque ticket;
    };

    struct token_rxgk {
	opr_time begintime;
	opr_time endtime;
	afs_int64 level;
	afs_int64 lifetime;
	afs_int64 bytelife;
	afs_int64 enctype;
	opaque key<>;
	opaque ticket<>;
    };

    const AFSTOKEN_UNION_NOAUTH = 0;
    const AFSTOKEN_UNION_KAD = 2;
    const AFSTOKEN_UNION_YFSGK = 6;

    union ktc_tokenUnion switch (afs_int32 type) {
	case AFSTOKEN_UNION_KAD:
	    token_rxkad kad;
	case AFSTOKEN_UNION_YFSGK:
	    token_rxgk  gk;
    };

    const AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX = 16384;
    typedef opaque token_opaque;

    const AFSTOKEN_MAX = 8;
    const AFSTOKEN_CELL_MAX = 64;

    struct ktc_setTokenData {
	afs_int32 flags;
	string cell;
	token_opaque tokens;
    };

The parser for the basic token struct is already present, as is the rxkad
token type.  This adds a parser for the rxgk token type.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Herbert Xu 
cc: Chuck Lever 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250411095303.2316168-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

keys: drop shadowing dead prototype

2025-01-21T09:25:23+00:00

The global variable pkcs7 does not exist.
Drop the variable declaration, but keep the struct prototype needed for
is_key_on_revocation_list().

Reported by clang:

    ./include/keys/system_keyring.h:104:67: warning: declaration shadows a variable in the global scope [-Wshadow]
      104 | static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
          |                                                                   ^
    ./include/keys/system_keyring.h:76:30: note: previous declaration is here
       76 | extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
          |                              ^

Fixes: 56c5812623f9 ("certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: Remove unused declarations

2024-09-20T15:28:26+00:00

These declarations are never implemented, remove it.

Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

2024-05-13T17:40:15+00:00

Pull TPM updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
 "These are the changes for the TPM driver with a single major new
  feature: TPM bus encryption and integrity protection. The key pair on
  TPM side is generated from so called null random seed per power on of
  the machine [1]. This supports the TPM encryption of the hard drive by
  adding layer of protection against bus interposer attacks.

  Other than that, a few minor fixes and documentation for tpm_tis to
  clarify basics of TPM localities for future patch review discussions
  (will be extended and refined over times, just a seed)"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240429202811.13643-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com/ [1]

* tag 'tpmdd-next-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: (28 commits)
  Documentation: tpm: Add TPM security docs toctree entry
  tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes
  Documentation: add tpm-security.rst
  tpm: add the null key name as a sysfs export
  KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path
  tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random()
  tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend()
  tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API
  tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append
  tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions
  tpm: Add TCG mandated Key Derivation Functions (KDFs)
  tpm: Add NULL primary creation
  tpm: export the context save and load commands
  tpm: add buffer function to point to returned parameters
  crypto: lib - implement library version of AES in CFB mode
  KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffers
  tpm: Add tpm_buf_read_{u8,u16,u32}
  tpm: TPM2B formatted buffers
  tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately.
  tpm: Update struct tpm_buf documentation comments
  ...

tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately.

2024-05-09T19:30:51+00:00

TPM2B buffers, or sized buffers, have a two byte header, which contains the
length of the payload as a 16-bit big-endian number, without counting in
the space taken by the header. This differs from encoding in the TPM header
where the length includes also the bytes taken by the header.

Unbound the length of a tpm_buf from the value stored to the TPM command
header. A separate encoding and decoding step so that different buffer
types can be supported, with variant header format and length encoding.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley 
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen