<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/audit.h, branch v2.6.23.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Renumber AUDIT_TTY_[GS]ET</title>
<updated>2007-08-24T04:37:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miloslav Trmac</name>
<email>mitr@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-08-23T09:19:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6dc2c1b7798ef645213afc82f6d5eac3d61bc18b'/>
<id>6dc2c1b7798ef645213afc82f6d5eac3d61bc18b</id>
<content type='text'>
Renumber AUDIT_TTY_[GS]ET to avoid a conflict with netlink message types
already used in the wild.

Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac &lt;mitr@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Renumber AUDIT_TTY_[GS]ET to avoid a conflict with netlink message types
already used in the wild.

Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac &lt;mitr@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] get rid of AVC_PATH postponed treatment</title>
<updated>2007-07-22T13:57:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2007-06-07T15:13:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4259fa01a2d2aa3e589b34ba7624080232d9c1ff'/>
<id>4259fa01a2d2aa3e589b34ba7624080232d9c1ff</id>
<content type='text'>
        Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled.  I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.

        Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab-&gt;gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem.  IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record.  It's trivial to do.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
        Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled.  I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.

        Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab-&gt;gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem.  IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record.  It's trivial to do.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] allow audit filtering on bit &amp; operations</title>
<updated>2007-07-22T13:57:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-06-04T21:00:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=74f2345b6be1410f824cb7dd638d2c10a9709379'/>
<id>74f2345b6be1410f824cb7dd638d2c10a9709379</id>
<content type='text'>
Right now the audit filter can match on = != &gt; &lt; &gt;= blah blah blah.
This allow the filter to also look at bitwise AND operations, &amp;

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Right now the audit filter can match on = != &gt; &lt; &gt;= blah blah blah.
This allow the filter to also look at bitwise AND operations, &amp;

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Audit: add TTY input auditing</title>
<updated>2007-07-16T16:05:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miloslav Trmac</name>
<email>mitr@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-07-16T06:40:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=522ed7767e800cff6c650ec64b0ee0677303119c'/>
<id>522ed7767e800cff6c650ec64b0ee0677303119c</id>
<content type='text'>
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions.  This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons.  These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.

Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g.  the console ioctls still
work).

TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.

Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork ().  Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).

Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g.  for sshd restarted within an audited session.  To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g.  after daemon startup) opens a TTY.

See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac &lt;mitr@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Paul Fulghum &lt;paulkf@microgate.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions.  This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons.  These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.

Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g.  the console ioctls still
work).

TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.

Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork ().  Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).

Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g.  for sshd restarted within an audited session.  To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g.  after daemon startup) opens a TTY.

See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac &lt;mitr@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Paul Fulghum &lt;paulkf@microgate.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Abnormal End of Processes</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>sgrubb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-04-19T14:28:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41'/>
<id>0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41</id>
<content type='text'>
Hi,

I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Hi,

I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] complete message queue auditing</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-02-13T19:15:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4fc03b9beb2314f3adb9e72b7935a80c577954d1'/>
<id>4fc03b9beb2314f3adb9e72b7935a80c577954d1</id>
<content type='text'>
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] audit signal recipients</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-29T22:01:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e54dc2431d740a79a6bd013babade99d71b1714f'/>
<id>e54dc2431d740a79a6bd013babade99d71b1714f</id>
<content type='text'>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] add SIGNAL syscall class (v3)</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-29T22:00:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7f13da40e36c84d0d046b7adbd060af7d3717250'/>
<id>7f13da40e36c84d0d046b7adbd060af7d3717250</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a syscall class for sending signals.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a syscall class for sending signals.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] auditing ptrace</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-20T17:58:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a5cb013da773a67ee48d1c19e96436c22a73a7eb'/>
<id>a5cb013da773a67ee48d1c19e96436c22a73a7eb</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] linux/audit.h needs linux/types.h</title>
<updated>2007-03-06T17:30:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Dike</name>
<email>jdike@addtoit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-06T09:42:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b46e650165f691a30ddede1a79d2df02f3459d7'/>
<id>3b46e650165f691a30ddede1a79d2df02f3459d7</id>
<content type='text'>
Include linux/types.h here because we need a definition of __u32.  This file
appears not be exported verbatim by libc, so I think this doesn't have any
userspace consequences.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso &lt;blaisorblade@yahoo.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Include linux/types.h here because we need a definition of __u32.  This file
appears not be exported verbatim by libc, so I think this doesn't have any
userspace consequences.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso &lt;blaisorblade@yahoo.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
