linux-toradex.git/include/linux/binfmts.h, branch v3.2.66

exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests

2014-01-03T04:33:21+00:00

commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream.

The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: "Luck, Tony" 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

exec: use -ELOOP for max recursion depth

2013-03-06T03:24:28+00:00

commit d740269867021faf4ce38a449353d2b986c34a67 upstream.

To avoid an explosion of request_module calls on a chain of abusive
scripts, fail maximum recursion with -ELOOP instead of -ENOEXEC. As soon
as maximum recursion depth is hit, the error will fail all the way back
up the chain, aborting immediately.

This also has the side-effect of stopping the user's shell from attempting
to reexecute the top-level file as a shell script. As seen in the
dash source:

        if (cmd != path_bshell && errno == ENOEXEC) {
                *argv-- = cmd;
                *argv = cmd = path_bshell;
                goto repeat;
        }

The above logic was designed for running scripts automatically that lacked
the "#!" header, not to re-try failed recursion. On a legitimate -ENOEXEC,
things continue to behave as the shell expects.

Additionally, when tracking recursion, the binfmt handlers should not be
involved. The recursion being tracked is the depth of calls through
search_binary_handler(), so that function should be exclusively responsible
for tracking the depth.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: halfdog 
Cc: P J P 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack

2013-01-03T03:33:45+00:00

commit b66c5984017533316fd1951770302649baf1aa33 upstream.

If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.

Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules.  Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted.  They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack.  This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.

After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules.  As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.

This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp.  To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is.  Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.

For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:

   http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: halfdog 
Cc: P J P 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

consolidate BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP handling

2011-07-20T05:43:10+00:00

new helper: would_dump(bprm, file).  Checks if we are allowed to
read the file and if we are not - sets ENFORCE_NODUMP.  Exported,
used in places that previously open-coded the same logics.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

exec: unify do_execve/compat_do_execve code

2011-04-09T13:53:56+00:00

Add the appropriate members into struct user_arg_ptr and teach
get_user_arg_ptr() to handle is_compat = T case correctly.

This allows us to remove the compat_do_execve() code from fs/compat.c
and reimplement compat_do_execve() as the trivial wrapper on top of
do_execve_common(is_compat => true).

In fact, this fixes another (minor) bug. "compat_uptr_t str" can
overflow after "str += len" in compat_copy_strings() if a 64bit
application execs via sys32_execve().

Unexport acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), fs/compat.c doesn't
need them any longer.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Tested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro

binfmt_elf: cleanups

2011-01-13T16:03:12+00:00

This cleans up a few bits in binfmt_elf.c and binfmts.h:

- the hasvdso field in struct linux_binfmt is unused, so remove it and
  the only initialization of it

- the elf_map CPP symbol is not defined anywhere in the kernel, so
  remove an unnecessary #ifndef elf_map

- reduce excessive indentation in elf_format's initializer

- add missing spaces, remove extraneous spaces

No functional changes, but tested on x86 (32 and 64 bit), powerpc (32 and
64 bit), sparc64, arm, and alpha.

Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: copy-and-paste the fixes into compat_do_execve() paths

2010-12-01T01:56:38+00:00

Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible.
That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and
uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later.

compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm->vma/mm directly and thus has
two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory
is not visible to oom killer.

Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings()
to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0)
as do_execve() does.

Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and
compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly
makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: make argv/envp memory visible to oom-killer

2010-12-01T01:56:37+00:00

Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that
evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT):
http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c

execve()->copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but
this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent
bprm->mm and take it into account.

With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES
counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When
do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back.

Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new
page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but
I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct
once exec changes ->mm or fails.

Reported-by: Brad Spengler 
Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer

2010-08-18T01:07:43+00:00

Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles
correctly on ARM:

arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type

This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for
the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to.  This is
because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to
copy_strings_kernel().  A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename
pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel().

do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv
or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as
const should be fine.

Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match.

This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Tested-by: Ralf Baechle 
Acked-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

coredump: pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency

2010-03-06T19:26:46+00:00

Pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency.

 ---
1787         if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) {  <- (1)
1788                 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1789                 put_cred(cred);
1790                 goto fail;
1791         }
1792
[...]
1798         if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) {    /* Setuid core dump mode */ <-(2)
1799                 flag = O_EXCL;          /* Stop rewrite attacks */
1800                 cred->fsuid = 0;        /* Dump root private */
1801         }
 ---

Since dumpable bits are not protected by lock, there is a chance to change
these bits between (1) and (2).

To solve this issue, this patch copies mm->flags to
coredump_params.mm_flags at the beginning of do_coredump() and uses it
instead of get_dumpable() while dumping core.

This copy is also passed to binfmt->core_dump, since elf*_core_dump() uses
dump_filter bits in mm->flags.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge]
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Acked-by: Roland McGrath 
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds