Introduce a new option abort_on_full, default to false. Then
we can get -ENOSPC when the pool is full, or reaches quota.

[ Don't show abort_on_full in /proc/mounts. ]

Signed-off-by: Dongsheng Yang <dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

No one is running pre-argonaut.  In addition one of the argonaut
features (NOSRCADDR) has been required since day one (and a half,
2.6.34 vs 2.6.35) of the kernel client.

Allow for the possibility of reusing these feature bits later.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Add support for performing remote object copies using the 'copy-from'
operation.

[ Add COPY_FROM to get_num_data_items(). ]

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Currently message data items are allocated with ceph_msg_data_create()
in setup_request_data() inside send_request().  send_request() has never
been allowed to fail, so each allocation is followed by a BUG_ON:

  data = ceph_msg_data_create(...);
  BUG_ON(!data);

It's been this way since support for multiple message data items was
added in commit 6644ed7b7e04 ("libceph: make message data be a pointer")
in 3.10.

There is no reason to delay the allocation of message data items until
the last possible moment and we certainly don't need a linked list of
them as they are only ever appended to the end and never erased.  Make
ceph_msg_new2() take max_data_items and adapt the rest of the code.

Reported-by: Jerry Lee <leisurelysw24@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

struct ceph_pagelist cannot be embedded into anything else because it
has its own refcount.  Merge allocation and initialization together.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

If the read is large enough, we end up spinning in the messenger:

  libceph: osd0 192.168.122.1:6801 io error
  libceph: osd0 192.168.122.1:6801 io error
  libceph: osd0 192.168.122.1:6801 io error

This is a receive side limit, so only reads were affected.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks)
instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out
data_crc entirely.

This addresses CVE-2018-1129.

Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with
a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds
with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply).  This lets the
client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect
against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse
the same authorizer to authenticate themselves.

Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random
challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge).  The client then has to respond
with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the
service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this
specific connection instance.

The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit.

This addresses CVE-2018-1128.

Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

We already copy authorizer_reply_buf and authorizer_reply_buf_len into
ceph_connection.  Factoring out __prepare_write_connect() requires two
more: authorizer_buf and authorizer_buf_len.  Store the pointer to the
handshake in con->auth rather than piling on.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>