<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h, branch v4.14-rc5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2017-09-04T19:21:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-04T19:21:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b1b6f83ac938d176742c85757960dec2cf10e468'/>
<id>b1b6f83ac938d176742c85757960dec2cf10e468</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 mm changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "PCID support, 5-level paging support, Secure Memory Encryption support

  The main changes in this cycle are support for three new, complex
  hardware features of x86 CPUs:

   - Add 5-level paging support, which is a new hardware feature on
     upcoming Intel CPUs allowing up to 128 PB of virtual address space
     and 4 PB of physical RAM space - a 512-fold increase over the old
     limits. (Supercomputers of the future forecasting hurricanes on an
     ever warming planet can certainly make good use of more RAM.)

     Many of the necessary changes went upstream in previous cycles,
     v4.14 is the first kernel that can enable 5-level paging.

     This feature is activated via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y - disabled by
     default.

     (By Kirill A. Shutemov)

   - Add 'encrypted memory' support, which is a new hardware feature on
     upcoming AMD CPUs ('Secure Memory Encryption', SME) allowing system
     RAM to be encrypted and decrypted (mostly) transparently by the
     CPU, with a little help from the kernel to transition to/from
     encrypted RAM. Such RAM should be more secure against various
     attacks like RAM access via the memory bus and should make the
     radio signature of memory bus traffic harder to intercept (and
     decrypt) as well.

     This feature is activated via CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y - disabled
     by default.

     (By Tom Lendacky)

   - Enable PCID optimized TLB flushing on newer Intel CPUs: PCID is a
     hardware feature that attaches an address space tag to TLB entries
     and thus allows to skip TLB flushing in many cases, even if we
     switch mm's.

     (By Andy Lutomirski)

  All three of these features were in the works for a long time, and
  it's coincidence of the three independent development paths that they
  are all enabled in v4.14 at once"

* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (65 commits)
  x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y)
  x86/mm: Use pr_cont() in dump_pagetable()
  x86/mm: Fix SME encryption stack ptr handling
  kvm/x86: Avoid clearing the C-bit in rsvd_bits()
  x86/CPU: Align CR3 defines
  x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages
  acpi, x86/mm: Remove encryption mask from ACPI page protection type
  x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix typo in Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Speed up page tables dump for CONFIG_KASAN=y
  x86/mm: Implement PCID based optimization: try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID
  x86: Enable 5-level paging support via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
  x86/mm: Allow userspace have mappings above 47-bit
  x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace
  x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit
  x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit()
  x86/xen: Redefine XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M using PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix printout of p4d level
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Generalize address normalization
  x86/boot: Fix memremap() related build failure
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 mm changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "PCID support, 5-level paging support, Secure Memory Encryption support

  The main changes in this cycle are support for three new, complex
  hardware features of x86 CPUs:

   - Add 5-level paging support, which is a new hardware feature on
     upcoming Intel CPUs allowing up to 128 PB of virtual address space
     and 4 PB of physical RAM space - a 512-fold increase over the old
     limits. (Supercomputers of the future forecasting hurricanes on an
     ever warming planet can certainly make good use of more RAM.)

     Many of the necessary changes went upstream in previous cycles,
     v4.14 is the first kernel that can enable 5-level paging.

     This feature is activated via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y - disabled by
     default.

     (By Kirill A. Shutemov)

   - Add 'encrypted memory' support, which is a new hardware feature on
     upcoming AMD CPUs ('Secure Memory Encryption', SME) allowing system
     RAM to be encrypted and decrypted (mostly) transparently by the
     CPU, with a little help from the kernel to transition to/from
     encrypted RAM. Such RAM should be more secure against various
     attacks like RAM access via the memory bus and should make the
     radio signature of memory bus traffic harder to intercept (and
     decrypt) as well.

     This feature is activated via CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y - disabled
     by default.

     (By Tom Lendacky)

   - Enable PCID optimized TLB flushing on newer Intel CPUs: PCID is a
     hardware feature that attaches an address space tag to TLB entries
     and thus allows to skip TLB flushing in many cases, even if we
     switch mm's.

     (By Andy Lutomirski)

  All three of these features were in the works for a long time, and
  it's coincidence of the three independent development paths that they
  are all enabled in v4.14 at once"

* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (65 commits)
  x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y)
  x86/mm: Use pr_cont() in dump_pagetable()
  x86/mm: Fix SME encryption stack ptr handling
  kvm/x86: Avoid clearing the C-bit in rsvd_bits()
  x86/CPU: Align CR3 defines
  x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages
  acpi, x86/mm: Remove encryption mask from ACPI page protection type
  x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix typo in Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Speed up page tables dump for CONFIG_KASAN=y
  x86/mm: Implement PCID based optimization: try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID
  x86: Enable 5-level paging support via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
  x86/mm: Allow userspace have mappings above 47-bit
  x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace
  x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit
  x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit()
  x86/xen: Redefine XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M using PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix printout of p4d level
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Generalize address normalization
  x86/boot: Fix memremap() related build failure
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'linus' into x86/mm to pick up fixes and to fix conflicts</title>
<updated>2017-08-26T07:19:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-26T07:19:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=413d63d71b222108d19703f3fd5cf9108652a730'/>
<id>413d63d71b222108d19703f3fd5cf9108652a730</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
	arch/x86/mm/mmap.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
	arch/x86/mm/mmap.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/asm, to pick up fixes</title>
<updated>2017-08-10T11:14:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-10T11:14:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1d0f49e14007a5426eb7e9e5808168cdb77b3e7f'/>
<id>1d0f49e14007a5426eb7e9e5808168cdb77b3e7f</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>objtool: Assume unannotated UD2 instructions are dead ends</title>
<updated>2017-07-28T06:33:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-27T20:56:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=649ea4d5a624f061a111b1f1cb0e47cfdc3ac21b'/>
<id>649ea4d5a624f061a111b1f1cb0e47cfdc3ac21b</id>
<content type='text'>
Arnd reported some false positive warnings with GCC 7:

  drivers/hid/wacom_wac.o: warning: objtool: wacom_bpt3_touch()+0x2a5: stack state mismatch: cfa1=7+8 cfa2=6+16
  drivers/iio/adc/vf610_adc.o: warning: objtool: vf610_adc_calculate_rates() falls through to next function vf610_adc_sample_set()
  drivers/pwm/pwm-hibvt.o: warning: objtool: hibvt_pwm_get_state() falls through to next function hibvt_pwm_remove()
  drivers/pwm/pwm-mediatek.o: warning: objtool: mtk_pwm_config() falls through to next function mtk_pwm_enable()
  drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.o: warning: objtool: .text: unexpected end of section
  drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835aux.o: warning: objtool: .text: unexpected end of section
  drivers/watchdog/digicolor_wdt.o: warning: objtool: dc_wdt_get_timeleft() falls through to next function dc_wdt_restart()

When GCC 7 detects a potential divide-by-zero condition, it sometimes
inserts a UD2 instruction for the case where the divisor is zero,
instead of letting the hardware trap on the divide instruction.

Objtool doesn't consider UD2 to be fatal unless it's annotated with
unreachable().  So it considers the GCC-generated UD2 to be non-fatal,
and it tries to follow the control flow past the UD2 and gets
confused.

Previously, objtool *did* assume UD2 was always a dead end.  That
changed with the following commit:

  d1091c7fa3d5 ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")

The motivation behind that change was that Peter was planning on using
UD2 for __WARN(), which is *not* a dead end.  However, it turns out
that some emulators rely on UD2 being fatal, so he ended up using
'ud0' instead:

  9a93848fe787 ("x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0")

For GCC 4.5+, it should be safe to go back to the previous assumption
that UD2 is fatal, even when it's not annotated with unreachable().

But for pre-4.5 versions of GCC, the unreachable() macro isn't
supported, so such cases of UD2 need to be explicitly annotated as
reachable.

Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: d1091c7fa3d5 ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e57fa9dfede25f79487da8126ee9cdf7b856db65.1501188854.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Arnd reported some false positive warnings with GCC 7:

  drivers/hid/wacom_wac.o: warning: objtool: wacom_bpt3_touch()+0x2a5: stack state mismatch: cfa1=7+8 cfa2=6+16
  drivers/iio/adc/vf610_adc.o: warning: objtool: vf610_adc_calculate_rates() falls through to next function vf610_adc_sample_set()
  drivers/pwm/pwm-hibvt.o: warning: objtool: hibvt_pwm_get_state() falls through to next function hibvt_pwm_remove()
  drivers/pwm/pwm-mediatek.o: warning: objtool: mtk_pwm_config() falls through to next function mtk_pwm_enable()
  drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.o: warning: objtool: .text: unexpected end of section
  drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835aux.o: warning: objtool: .text: unexpected end of section
  drivers/watchdog/digicolor_wdt.o: warning: objtool: dc_wdt_get_timeleft() falls through to next function dc_wdt_restart()

When GCC 7 detects a potential divide-by-zero condition, it sometimes
inserts a UD2 instruction for the case where the divisor is zero,
instead of letting the hardware trap on the divide instruction.

Objtool doesn't consider UD2 to be fatal unless it's annotated with
unreachable().  So it considers the GCC-generated UD2 to be non-fatal,
and it tries to follow the control flow past the UD2 and gets
confused.

Previously, objtool *did* assume UD2 was always a dead end.  That
changed with the following commit:

  d1091c7fa3d5 ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")

The motivation behind that change was that Peter was planning on using
UD2 for __WARN(), which is *not* a dead end.  However, it turns out
that some emulators rely on UD2 being fatal, so he ended up using
'ud0' instead:

  9a93848fe787 ("x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0")

For GCC 4.5+, it should be safe to go back to the previous assumption
that UD2 is fatal, even when it's not annotated with unreachable().

But for pre-4.5 versions of GCC, the unreachable() macro isn't
supported, so such cases of UD2 need to be explicitly annotated as
reachable.

Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: d1091c7fa3d5 ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e57fa9dfede25f79487da8126ee9cdf7b856db65.1501188854.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/asm: Make objtool unreachable macros independent from GCC version</title>
<updated>2017-07-25T14:54:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-25T14:44:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1ee6f00d1164955b7bdadd36fc0f2736754784d9'/>
<id>1ee6f00d1164955b7bdadd36fc0f2736754784d9</id>
<content type='text'>
The ASM_UNREACHABLE macro isn't GCC version-specific, so move it outside
the GCC 4.5+ check.  Otherwise the 0-day robot will report objtool
warnings for uses of ASM_UNREACHABLE with GCC 4.4.

Also move the annotate_unreachable() macro so the related macros can
stay together.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: aa5d1b81500e ("x86/asm: Add ASM_UNREACHABLE")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fb18337dbf230fd36450d9faf19a2b2533dbcba1.1500993873.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ASM_UNREACHABLE macro isn't GCC version-specific, so move it outside
the GCC 4.5+ check.  Otherwise the 0-day robot will report objtool
warnings for uses of ASM_UNREACHABLE with GCC 4.4.

Also move the annotate_unreachable() macro so the related macros can
stay together.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: aa5d1b81500e ("x86/asm: Add ASM_UNREACHABLE")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fb18337dbf230fd36450d9faf19a2b2533dbcba1.1500993873.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/asm: Add ASM_UNREACHABLE</title>
<updated>2017-07-25T09:18:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-24T18:35:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=aa5d1b81500e6059190f18fe25a7617682321910'/>
<id>aa5d1b81500e6059190f18fe25a7617682321910</id>
<content type='text'>
This creates an unreachable annotation in asm for CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y.
While here, adjust earlier uses of \t\n into \n\t.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Elena Reshetova &lt;elena.reshetova@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Hans Liljestrand &lt;ishkamiel@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch &lt;linux-arch@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500921349-10803-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This creates an unreachable annotation in asm for CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y.
While here, adjust earlier uses of \t\n into \n\t.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Elena Reshetova &lt;elena.reshetova@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Hans Liljestrand &lt;ishkamiel@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch &lt;linux-arch@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500921349-10803-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2017-07-19T15:55:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-19T15:55:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070'/>
<id>e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackprotector function attribute</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T18:23:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-17T21:10:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7375ae3a0b79ea072f4c672039f08f5db633b9e1'/>
<id>7375ae3a0b79ea072f4c672039f08f5db633b9e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a new function attribute, __nostackprotector, that can used to turn off
stack protection on a per function basis.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Larry Woodman &lt;lwoodman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0576fd5c74440ad0250f16ac6609ecf587812456.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Create a new function attribute, __nostackprotector, that can used to turn off
stack protection on a per function basis.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Larry Woodman &lt;lwoodman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0576fd5c74440ad0250f16ac6609ecf587812456.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>compiler, clang: always inline when CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING is disabled</title>
<updated>2017-07-06T23:24:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-06T22:35:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9a04dbcfb33b4012d0ce8c0282f1e3ca694675b1'/>
<id>9a04dbcfb33b4012d0ce8c0282f1e3ca694675b1</id>
<content type='text'>
The motivation for commit abb2ea7dfd82 ("compiler, clang: suppress
warning for unused static inline functions") was to suppress clang's
warnings about unused static inline functions.

For configs without CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING enabled, such as any non-x86
architecture, `inline' in the kernel implies that
__attribute__((always_inline)) is used.

Some code depends on that behavior, see
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/6/13/918:

  net/built-in.o: In function `__xchg_mb':
  arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:99: undefined reference to `__compiletime_assert_99'
  arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:99: undefined reference to `__compiletime_assert_99

The full fix would be to identify these breakages and annotate the
functions with __always_inline instead of `inline'.  But since we are
late in the 4.12-rc cycle, simply carry forward the forced inlining
behavior and work toward moving arm64, and other architectures, toward
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING behavior.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1706261552200.1075@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sodagudi Prasad &lt;psodagud@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Sodagudi Prasad &lt;psodagud@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The motivation for commit abb2ea7dfd82 ("compiler, clang: suppress
warning for unused static inline functions") was to suppress clang's
warnings about unused static inline functions.

For configs without CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING enabled, such as any non-x86
architecture, `inline' in the kernel implies that
__attribute__((always_inline)) is used.

Some code depends on that behavior, see
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/6/13/918:

  net/built-in.o: In function `__xchg_mb':
  arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:99: undefined reference to `__compiletime_assert_99'
  arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:99: undefined reference to `__compiletime_assert_99

The full fix would be to identify these breakages and annotate the
functions with __always_inline instead of `inline'.  But since we are
late in the 4.12-rc cycle, simply carry forward the forced inlining
behavior and work toward moving arm64, and other architectures, toward
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING behavior.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1706261552200.1075@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sodagudi Prasad &lt;psodagud@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Sodagudi Prasad &lt;psodagud@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>task_struct: Allow randomized layout</title>
<updated>2017-06-30T19:00:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-06T05:43:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=29e48ce87f1eaaa4b1fe3d9af90c586ac2d1fb74'/>
<id>29e48ce87f1eaaa4b1fe3d9af90c586ac2d1fb74</id>
<content type='text'>
This marks most of the layout of task_struct as randomizable, but leaves
thread_info and scheduler state untouched at the start, and thread_struct
untouched at the end.

Other parts of the kernel use unnamed structures, but the 0-day builder
using gcc-4.4 blows up on static initializers. Officially, it's documented
as only working on gcc 4.6 and later, which further confuses me:
	https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/C11Status
The structure layout randomization already requires gcc 4.7, but instead
of depending on the plugin being enabled, just check the gcc versions
for wider build testing. At Linus's suggestion, the marking is hidden
in a macro to reduce how ugly it looks. Additionally, indenting is left
unchanged since it would make things harder to read.

Randomization of task_struct is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This marks most of the layout of task_struct as randomizable, but leaves
thread_info and scheduler state untouched at the start, and thread_struct
untouched at the end.

Other parts of the kernel use unnamed structures, but the 0-day builder
using gcc-4.4 blows up on static initializers. Officially, it's documented
as only working on gcc 4.6 and later, which further confuses me:
	https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/C11Status
The structure layout randomization already requires gcc 4.7, but instead
of depending on the plugin being enabled, just check the gcc versions
for wider build testing. At Linus's suggestion, the marking is hidden
in a macro to reduce how ugly it looks. Additionally, indenting is left
unchanged since it would make things harder to read.

Randomization of task_struct is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
