<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/cred.h, branch v5.1-rc1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: Remove unused selinux_is_enabled</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-22T00:17:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3d252529480c68bfd6a6774652df7c8968b28e41'/>
<id>3d252529480c68bfd6a6774652df7c8968b28e41</id>
<content type='text'>
There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled().
Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason
for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled().
Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason
for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: allow get_cred() and put_cred() to be given NULL.</title>
<updated>2018-12-19T18:52:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-03T00:30:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f06bc03339ad4c1baa964a5f0606247ac1c3c50b'/>
<id>f06bc03339ad4c1baa964a5f0606247ac1c3c50b</id>
<content type='text'>
It is common practice for helpers like this to silently,
accept a NULL pointer.
get_rpccred() and put_rpccred() used by NFS act this way
and using the same interface will ease the conversion
for NFS, and simplify the resulting code.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It is common practice for helpers like this to silently,
accept a NULL pointer.
get_rpccred() and put_rpccred() used by NFS act this way
and using the same interface will ease the conversion
for NFS, and simplify the resulting code.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: add get_cred_rcu()</title>
<updated>2018-12-19T18:52:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-03T00:30:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=97d0fb239c041f5f99655af74812c3ab75cc4346'/>
<id>97d0fb239c041f5f99655af74812c3ab75cc4346</id>
<content type='text'>
Sometimes we want to opportunistically get a
ref to a cred in an rcu_read_lock protected section.
get_task_cred() does this, and NFS does as similar thing
with its own credential structures.
To prepare for NFS converting to use 'struct cred' more
uniformly, define get_cred_rcu(), and use it in
get_task_cred().

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sometimes we want to opportunistically get a
ref to a cred in an rcu_read_lock protected section.
get_task_cred() does this, and NFS does as similar thing
with its own credential structures.
To prepare for NFS converting to use 'struct cred' more
uniformly, define get_cred_rcu(), and use it in
get_task_cred().

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: add cred_fscmp() for comparing creds.</title>
<updated>2018-12-19T18:52:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-03T00:30:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d89b22d46a40da3a1630ecea111beaf3ef10bc21'/>
<id>d89b22d46a40da3a1630ecea111beaf3ef10bc21</id>
<content type='text'>
NFS needs to compare to credentials, to see if they can
be treated the same w.r.t. filesystem access.  Sometimes
an ordering is needed when credentials are used as a key
to an rbtree.
NFS currently has its own private credential management from
before 'struct cred' existed.  To move it over to more consistent
use of 'struct cred' we need a comparison function.
This patch adds that function.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
NFS needs to compare to credentials, to see if they can
be treated the same w.r.t. filesystem access.  Sometimes
an ordering is needed when credentials are used as a key
to an rbtree.
NFS currently has its own private credential management from
before 'struct cred' existed.  To move it over to more consistent
use of 'struct cred' we need a comparison function.
This patch adds that function.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: conditionally declare groups-related functions</title>
<updated>2018-06-28T15:02:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnáček</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-26T11:04:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4b09791ba059cc5a5ec7d69049f5d05da65b6418'/>
<id>4b09791ba059cc5a5ec7d69049f5d05da65b6418</id>
<content type='text'>
The groups-related functions declared in include/linux/cred.h are
defined in kernel/groups.c, which is compiled only when
CONFIG_MULTIUSER=y. Move all these function declarations under #ifdef
CONFIG_MULTIUSER to help avoid accidental usage in contexts where
CONFIG_MULTIUSER might be disabled.

This patch also adds a fallback for groups_search(). Currently this
function is only called from kernel/groups.c itself and
security/keys/permissions.c, where the call is (by coincidence)
optimized away in case CONFIG_MULTIUSER=n. However, the audit subsystem
(which does not depend on CONFIG_MULTIUSER) calls this function in
-next, so the fallback will be needed to avoid compilation errors or
ugly workarounds.

See also:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/6/20/670
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git/commit/?h=next&amp;id=af85d1772e31fed34165a1b3decef340cf4080c0

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The groups-related functions declared in include/linux/cred.h are
defined in kernel/groups.c, which is compiled only when
CONFIG_MULTIUSER=y. Move all these function declarations under #ifdef
CONFIG_MULTIUSER to help avoid accidental usage in contexts where
CONFIG_MULTIUSER might be disabled.

This patch also adds a fallback for groups_search(). Currently this
function is only called from kernel/groups.c itself and
security/keys/permissions.c, where the call is (by coincidence)
optimized away in case CONFIG_MULTIUSER=n. However, the audit subsystem
(which does not depend on CONFIG_MULTIUSER) calls this function in
-next, so the fallback will be needed to avoid compilation errors or
ugly workarounds.

See also:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/6/20/670
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git/commit/?h=next&amp;id=af85d1772e31fed34165a1b3decef340cf4080c0

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocators</title>
<updated>2017-12-15T00:00:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thiago Rafael Becker</name>
<email>thiago.becker@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-14T23:33:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bdcf0a423ea1c40bbb40e7ee483b50fc8aa3d758'/>
<id>bdcf0a423ea1c40bbb40e7ee483b50fc8aa3d758</id>
<content type='text'>
In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.

This patch:
 - Make groups_sort globally visible.
 - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
 - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker &lt;thiago.becker@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.

This patch:
 - Make groups_sort globally visible.
 - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
 - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker &lt;thiago.becker@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2017-07-19T15:55:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-19T15:55:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070'/>
<id>e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization</title>
<updated>2017-06-30T19:00:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-28T08:22:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9'/>
<id>3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9</id>
<content type='text'>
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>doc: ReSTify credentials.txt</title>
<updated>2017-05-18T16:30:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-13T11:51:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af777cd1b83e95138e7285fde87c795ef0ae7c4d'/>
<id>af777cd1b83e95138e7285fde87c795ef0ae7c4d</id>
<content type='text'>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to remove &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; inclusion from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T16:54:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5'/>
<id>5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add #include &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add #include &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
