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<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/fs_struct.h, branch v4.6-rc3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vfs: move get_fs_root_and_pwd() to single caller</title>
<updated>2013-09-12T17:12:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-12T17:12:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5762482f5496cb1dd86acd2aace3ea25d1404e1f'/>
<id>5762482f5496cb1dd86acd2aace3ea25d1404e1f</id>
<content type='text'>
Let's not pollute the include files with inline functions that are only
used in a single place.  Especially not if we decide we might want to
change the semantics of said function to make it more efficient..

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
Let's not pollute the include files with inline functions that are only
used in a single place.  Especially not if we decide we might want to
change the semantics of said function to make it more efficient..

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns:  Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted</title>
<updated>2013-03-27T14:49:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-15T08:45:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d'/>
<id>3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d</id>
<content type='text'>
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.

Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.

For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace.  Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.

Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead.  With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
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<pre>
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.

Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.

For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace.  Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.

Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead.  With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>constify path_get/path_put and fs_struct.c stuff</title>
<updated>2013-03-02T04:51:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-02T04:51:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dcf787f39162ce32ca325b3e784aba2d2444619a'/>
<id>dcf787f39162ce32ca325b3e784aba2d2444619a</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kill daemonize()</title>
<updated>2012-11-29T02:49:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-02T20:34:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c4144670fd9b34d6eae22c9f83751745898e8243'/>
<id>c4144670fd9b34d6eae22c9f83751745898e8243</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: fs_struct use seqlock</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T06:50:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-07T06:49:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c28cc36469554dc55540f059fbdc7fa22a2c31fc'/>
<id>c28cc36469554dc55540f059fbdc7fa22a2c31fc</id>
<content type='text'>
Use a seqlock in the fs_struct to enable us to take an atomic copy of the
complete cwd and root paths. Use this in the RCU lookup path to avoid a
thread-shared spinlock in RCU lookup operations.

Multi-threaded apps may now perform path lookups with scalability matching
multi-process apps. Operations such as stat(2) become very scalable for
multi-threaded workload.

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@kernel.dk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Use a seqlock in the fs_struct to enable us to take an atomic copy of the
complete cwd and root paths. Use this in the RCU lookup path to avoid a
thread-shared spinlock in RCU lookup operations.

Multi-threaded apps may now perform path lookups with scalability matching
multi-process apps. Operations such as stat(2) become very scalable for
multi-threaded workload.

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@kernel.dk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock</title>
<updated>2010-08-18T12:35:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-17T18:37:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2a4419b5b2a77f3f4537c14f7ad7df95770655dd'/>
<id>2a4419b5b2a77f3f4537c14f7ad7df95770655dd</id>
<content type='text'>
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock

struct fs_struct.lock is an rwlock with the read-side used to protect root and
pwd members while taking references to them. Taking a reference to a path
typically requires just 2 atomic ops, so the critical section is very small.
Parallel read-side operations would have cacheline contention on the lock, the
dentry, and the vfsmount cachelines, so the rwlock is unlikely to ever give a
real parallelism increase.

Replace it with a spinlock to avoid one or two atomic operations in typical
path lookup fastpath.

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock

struct fs_struct.lock is an rwlock with the read-side used to protect root and
pwd members while taking references to them. Taking a reference to a path
typically requires just 2 atomic ops, so the critical section is very small.
Parallel read-side operations would have cacheline contention on the lock, the
dentry, and the vfsmount cachelines, so the rwlock is unlikely to ever give a
real parallelism increase.

Replace it with a spinlock to avoid one or two atomic operations in typical
path lookup fastpath.

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: add helpers to get root and pwd</title>
<updated>2010-08-11T04:28:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-10T09:41:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f7ad3c6be90809b53b7f0ae9d4eaa45ce2564a79'/>
<id>f7ad3c6be90809b53b7f0ae9d4eaa45ce2564a79</id>
<content type='text'>
Add three helpers that retrieve a refcounted copy of the root and cwd
from the supplied fs_struct.

 get_fs_root()
 get_fs_pwd()
 get_fs_root_and_pwd()

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
Add three helpers that retrieve a refcounted copy of the root and cwd
from the supplied fs_struct.

 get_fs_root()
 get_fs_pwd()
 get_fs_root_and_pwd()

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>New locking/refcounting for fs_struct</title>
<updated>2009-04-01T03:00:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-30T11:20:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=498052bba55ecaff58db6a1436b0e25bfd75a7ff'/>
<id>498052bba55ecaff58db6a1436b0e25bfd75a7ff</id>
<content type='text'>
* all changes of current-&gt;fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of
  old fs-&gt;lock
* refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection)
* its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the
  same time we decide whether to free it.
* put_fs_struct() is gone
* new field - -&gt;in_exec.  Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do
  execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct.  Cleared when finishing exec
  (success and failure alike).  Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set.
* check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread
  is in progress.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
* all changes of current-&gt;fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of
  old fs-&gt;lock
* refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection)
* its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the
  same time we decide whether to free it.
* put_fs_struct() is gone
* new field - -&gt;in_exec.  Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do
  execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct.  Cleared when finishing exec
  (success and failure alike).  Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set.
* check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread
  is in progress.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c)</title>
<updated>2009-04-01T03:00:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-29T23:00:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3e93cd671813e204c258f1e6c797959920cf7772'/>
<id>3e93cd671813e204c258f1e6c797959920cf7772</id>
<content type='text'>
Pure code move; two new helper functions for nfsd and daemonize
(unshare_fs_struct() and daemonize_fs_struct() resp.; for now -
the same code as used to be in callers).  unshare_fs_struct()
exported (for nfsd, as copy_fs_struct()/exit_fs() used to be),
copy_fs_struct() and exit_fs() don't need exports anymore.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Pure code move; two new helper functions for nfsd and daemonize
(unshare_fs_struct() and daemonize_fs_struct() resp.; for now -
the same code as used to be in callers).  unshare_fs_struct()
exported (for nfsd, as copy_fs_struct()/exit_fs() used to be),
copy_fs_struct() and exit_fs() don't need exports anymore.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction</title>
<updated>2009-03-29T00:30:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-28T23:23:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=795e2fe0a3b69dbc040d7efcf517e0cbad6901d0'/>
<id>795e2fe0a3b69dbc040d7efcf517e0cbad6901d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count to indicate the restrictions upon it.
It may not be incremented, except by clone(CLONE_FS), as this affects the
check in check_unsafe_exec() in fs/exec.c.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hugh@veritas.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count to indicate the restrictions upon it.
It may not be incremented, except by clone(CLONE_FS), as this affects the
check in check_unsafe_exec() in fs/exec.c.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hugh@veritas.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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