<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/ima.h, branch v5.12-rc5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T21:39:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-23T21:39:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290'/>
<id>7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: handle idmapped mounts</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a2d2329e30e224ea68d575d2525b866df9805ea0'/>
<id>a2d2329e30e224ea68d575d2525b866df9805ea0</id>
<content type='text'>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label</title>
<updated>2021-01-15T04:41:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tushar Sugandhi</name>
<email>tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-08T04:07:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f5d7d23cc5ec61a92076b73665fcb9aaa5bb5a0'/>
<id>9f5d7d23cc5ec61a92076b73665fcb9aaa5bb5a0</id>
<content type='text'>
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to
specify the source of the critical data provider.  Thus, the data
measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label
in the IMA policy.

Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing
the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can
be used to limit the measurements based on the label.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi &lt;tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to
specify the source of the critical data provider.  Thus, the data
measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label
in the IMA policy.

Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing
the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can
be used to limit the measurements based on the label.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi &lt;tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data</title>
<updated>2021-01-15T04:41:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tushar Sugandhi</name>
<email>tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-08T04:07:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d6e645012d97164609260ac567b304681734c5e2'/>
<id>d6e645012d97164609260ac567b304681734c5e2</id>
<content type='text'>
IMA provides capabilities to measure file and buffer data.  However,
various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory
also impact the integrity of the system.  Several kernel subsystems
contain such integrity critical data.  These kernel subsystems help
protect the integrity of the system.  Currently, IMA does not provide a
generic function for measuring kernel integrity critical data.

Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to measure kernel
integrity critical data.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi &lt;tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
IMA provides capabilities to measure file and buffer data.  However,
various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory
also impact the integrity of the system.  Several kernel subsystems
contain such integrity critical data.  These kernel subsystems help
protect the integrity of the system.  Currently, IMA does not provide a
generic function for measuring kernel integrity critical data.

Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to measure kernel
integrity critical data.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi &lt;tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2020-12-16T19:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-16T19:06:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e20a9b92ddbfe662807622dbb28e1fbb6e0011aa'/>
<id>e20a9b92ddbfe662807622dbb28e1fbb6e0011aa</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
  via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
  BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).

  The three patches included here:

   - bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
     read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.

   - defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
     avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
     boot flag is available on arm.

   - defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
     preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"

* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
  ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
  ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
  via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
  BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).

  The three patches included here:

   - bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
     read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.

   - defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
     avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
     boot flag is available on arm.

   - defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
     preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"

* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
  ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
  ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Implement ima_inode_hash</title>
<updated>2020-11-25T23:04:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>KP Singh</name>
<email>kpsingh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-24T15:12:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=403319be5de51167cd70ddf594b76c95e6d26844'/>
<id>403319be5de51167cd70ddf594b76c95e6d26844</id>
<content type='text'>
This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.

An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.

Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.

An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.

Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time</title>
<updated>2020-11-02T19:19:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-13T08:18:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b000d5cb954fe25ac1ea929ae6da321033ace927'/>
<id>b000d5cb954fe25ac1ea929ae6da321033ace927</id>
<content type='text'>
Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.

However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.

So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.

Cc: Chester Lin &lt;clin@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt; [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin &lt;clin@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.

However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.

So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.

Cc: Chester Lin &lt;clin@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt; [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin &lt;clin@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook</title>
<updated>2020-10-05T11:37:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T17:38:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2039bda1fa8dad3f4275b29eeaffef545bcbc85d'/>
<id>2039bda1fa8dad3f4275b29eeaffef545bcbc85d</id>
<content type='text'>
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.

For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.

For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook</title>
<updated>2020-10-05T11:37:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T17:38:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b64fcae74b6d6940d14243c963ab0089e8f0d82d'/>
<id>b64fcae74b6d6940d14243c963ab0089e8f0d82d</id>
<content type='text'>
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().

Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)

Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.

With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.

Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().

Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)

Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.

With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.

Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file</title>
<updated>2020-10-05T11:34:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Scott Branden</name>
<email>scott.branden@broadcom.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T17:38:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b89999d004931ab2e5123611ace7dab77328f8d6'/>
<id>b89999d004931ab2e5123611ace7dab77328f8d6</id>
<content type='text'>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden &lt;scott.branden@broadcom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden &lt;scott.branden@broadcom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
