<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/kasan.h, branch v4.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kasan: report only the first error by default</title>
<updated>2017-04-01T00:13:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-31T22:12:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b0845ce58379d11dcad4cdb6824a6410de260216'/>
<id>b0845ce58379d11dcad4cdb6824a6410de260216</id>
<content type='text'>
Disable kasan after the first report.  There are several reasons for
this:

 - Single bug quite often has multiple invalid memory accesses causing
   storm in the dmesg.

 - Write OOB access might corrupt metadata so the next report will print
   bogus alloc/free stacktraces.

 - Reports after the first easily could be not bugs by itself but just
   side effects of the first one.

Given that multiple reports usually only do harm, it makes sense to
disable kasan after the first one.  If user wants to see all the
reports, the boot-time parameter kasan_multi_shot must be used.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: wrote changelog and doc, added missing include]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170323154416.30257-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Disable kasan after the first report.  There are several reasons for
this:

 - Single bug quite often has multiple invalid memory accesses causing
   storm in the dmesg.

 - Write OOB access might corrupt metadata so the next report will print
   bogus alloc/free stacktraces.

 - Reports after the first easily could be not bugs by itself but just
   side effects of the first one.

Given that multiple reports usually only do harm, it makes sense to
disable kasan after the first one.  If user wants to see all the
reports, the boot-time parameter kasan_multi_shot must be used.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: wrote changelog and doc, added missing include]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170323154416.30257-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: add a prototype of task_struct to avoid warning</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T23:56:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-16T23:40:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5be9b730b09c45c358bbfe7f51d254e306cccc07'/>
<id>5be9b730b09c45c358bbfe7f51d254e306cccc07</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a prototype of task_struct to fix below warning on arm64.

  In file included from arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:19:0:
  include/linux/kasan.h:81:132: error: 'struct task_struct' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
   static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}

As same as other types (kmem_cache, page, and vm_struct) this adds a
prototype of task_struct data structure on top of kasan.h.

[arnd] A related warning was fixed before, but now appears in a
different line in the same file in v4.11-rc2.  The patch from Masami
Hiramatsu still seems appropriate, so let's take his version.

Fixes: 71af2ed5eeea ("kasan, sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/kasan.h&gt;")
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9569839/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170313141517.3397802-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a prototype of task_struct to fix below warning on arm64.

  In file included from arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:19:0:
  include/linux/kasan.h:81:132: error: 'struct task_struct' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
   static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}

As same as other types (kmem_cache, page, and vm_struct) this adds a
prototype of task_struct data structure on top of kasan.h.

[arnd] A related warning was fixed before, but now appears in a
different line in the same file in v4.11-rc2.  The patch from Masami
Hiramatsu still seems appropriate, so let's take his version.

Fixes: 71af2ed5eeea ("kasan, sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/kasan.h&gt;")
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9569839/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170313141517.3397802-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: convert generic code to 5-level paging</title>
<updated>2017-03-09T19:48:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-09T14:24:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c2febafc67734a62196c1b9dfba926412d4077ba'/>
<id>c2febafc67734a62196c1b9dfba926412d4077ba</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert all non-architecture-specific code to 5-level paging.

It's mostly mechanical adding handling one more page table level in
places where we deal with pud_t.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Convert all non-architecture-specific code to 5-level paging.

It's mostly mechanical adding handling one more page table level in
places where we deal with pud_t.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan, sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/kasan.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-03T00:45:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-03T08:57:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=71af2ed5eeea639339e3a1497a0196bab7de4b57'/>
<id>71af2ed5eeea639339e3a1497a0196bab7de4b57</id>
<content type='text'>
&lt;linux/kasan.h&gt; is a low level header that is included early
in affected kernel headers. But it includes &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
which complicates the cleanup of sched.h dependencies.

Remove it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
&lt;linux/kasan.h&gt; is a low level header that is included early
in affected kernel headers. But it includes &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
which complicates the cleanup of sched.h dependencies.

Remove it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan, sched/headers: Uninline kasan_enable/disable_current()</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-03T08:57:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af8601ad420f6afa6445c927ad9f36d9700d96d6'/>
<id>af8601ad420f6afa6445c927ad9f36d9700d96d6</id>
<content type='text'>
&lt;linux/kasan.h&gt; is a low level header that is included early
in affected kernel headers. But it includes &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
which complicates the cleanup of sched.h dependencies.

But kasan.h has almost no need for sched.h: its only use of
scheduler functionality is in two inline functions which are
not used very frequently - so uninline kasan_enable_current()
and kasan_disable_current().

Also add a &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; dependency to a .c file that depended
on kasan.h including it.

This paves the way to remove the &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; include from kasan.h.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
&lt;linux/kasan.h&gt; is a low level header that is included early
in affected kernel headers. But it includes &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
which complicates the cleanup of sched.h dependencies.

But kasan.h has almost no need for sched.h: its only use of
scheduler functionality is in two inline functions which are
not used very frequently - so uninline kasan_enable_current()
and kasan_disable_current().

Also add a &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; dependency to a .c file that depended
on kasan.h including it.

This paves the way to remove the &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; include from kasan.h.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: drain quarantine of memcg slab objects</title>
<updated>2017-02-25T01:46:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Thelen</name>
<email>gthelen@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T23:00:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f9fa1d919c696e90c887d8742198023e7639d139'/>
<id>f9fa1d919c696e90c887d8742198023e7639d139</id>
<content type='text'>
Per memcg slab accounting and kasan have a problem with kmem_cache
destruction.
 - kmem_cache_create() allocates a kmem_cache, which is used for
   allocations from processes running in root (top) memcg.
 - Processes running in non root memcg and allocating with either
   __GFP_ACCOUNT or from a SLAB_ACCOUNT cache use a per memcg
   kmem_cache.
 - Kasan catches use-after-free by having kfree() and kmem_cache_free()
   defer freeing of objects. Objects are placed in a quarantine.
 - kmem_cache_destroy() destroys root and non root kmem_caches. It takes
   care to drain the quarantine of objects from the root memcg's
   kmem_cache, but ignores objects associated with non root memcg. This
   causes leaks because quarantined per memcg objects refer to per memcg
   kmem cache being destroyed.

To see the problem:

 1) create a slab cache with kmem_cache_create(,,,SLAB_ACCOUNT,)
 2) from non root memcg, allocate and free a few objects from cache
 3) dispose of the cache with kmem_cache_destroy() kmem_cache_destroy()
    will trigger a "Slab cache still has objects" warning indicating
    that the per memcg kmem_cache structure was leaked.

Fix the leak by draining kasan quarantined objects allocated from non
root memcg.

Racing memcg deletion is tricky, but handled.  kmem_cache_destroy() =&gt;
shutdown_memcg_caches() =&gt; __shutdown_memcg_cache() =&gt; shutdown_cache()
flushes per memcg quarantined objects, even if that memcg has been
rmdir'd and gone through memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches().

This leak only affects destroyed SLAB_ACCOUNT kmem caches when kasan is
enabled.  So I don't think it's worth patching stable kernels.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482257462-36948-1-git-send-email-gthelen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Per memcg slab accounting and kasan have a problem with kmem_cache
destruction.
 - kmem_cache_create() allocates a kmem_cache, which is used for
   allocations from processes running in root (top) memcg.
 - Processes running in non root memcg and allocating with either
   __GFP_ACCOUNT or from a SLAB_ACCOUNT cache use a per memcg
   kmem_cache.
 - Kasan catches use-after-free by having kfree() and kmem_cache_free()
   defer freeing of objects. Objects are placed in a quarantine.
 - kmem_cache_destroy() destroys root and non root kmem_caches. It takes
   care to drain the quarantine of objects from the root memcg's
   kmem_cache, but ignores objects associated with non root memcg. This
   causes leaks because quarantined per memcg objects refer to per memcg
   kmem cache being destroyed.

To see the problem:

 1) create a slab cache with kmem_cache_create(,,,SLAB_ACCOUNT,)
 2) from non root memcg, allocate and free a few objects from cache
 3) dispose of the cache with kmem_cache_destroy() kmem_cache_destroy()
    will trigger a "Slab cache still has objects" warning indicating
    that the per memcg kmem_cache structure was leaked.

Fix the leak by draining kasan quarantined objects allocated from non
root memcg.

Racing memcg deletion is tricky, but handled.  kmem_cache_destroy() =&gt;
shutdown_memcg_caches() =&gt; __shutdown_memcg_cache() =&gt; shutdown_cache()
flushes per memcg quarantined objects, even if that memcg has been
rmdir'd and gone through memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches().

This leak only affects destroyed SLAB_ACCOUNT kmem caches when kasan is
enabled.  So I don't think it's worth patching stable kernels.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482257462-36948-1-git-send-email-gthelen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes: Unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN</title>
<updated>2016-10-16T09:02:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Vyukov</name>
<email>dvyukov@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-14T14:07:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f7d416c36124667c406978bcb39746589c35d7f'/>
<id>9f7d416c36124667c406978bcb39746589c35d7f</id>
<content type='text'>
I observed false KSAN positives in the sctp code, when
sctp uses jprobe_return() in jsctp_sf_eat_sack().

The stray 0xf4 in shadow memory are stack redzones:

[     ] ==================================================================
[     ] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xe9/0x150 at addr ffff88005e48f480
[     ] Read of size 1 by task syz-executor/18535
[     ] page:ffffea00017923c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
[     ] flags: 0x1fffc0000000000()
[     ] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[     ] CPU: 1 PID: 18535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #28
[     ] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
[     ]  ffff88005e48f2d0 ffffffff82d2b849 ffffffff0bc91e90 fffffbfff10971e8
[     ]  ffffed000bc91e90 ffffed000bc91e90 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[     ]  ffff88005e48f480 ffff88005e48f350 ffffffff817d3169 ffff88005e48f370
[     ] Call Trace:
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff82d2b849&gt;] dump_stack+0x12e/0x185
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d3169&gt;] kasan_report+0x489/0x4b0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d31a9&gt;] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff82d49529&gt;] memcmp+0xe9/0x150
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff82df7486&gt;] depot_save_stack+0x176/0x5c0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d2031&gt;] save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d27f2&gt;] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d05b8&gt;] kfree+0xc8/0x2a0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b03f19&gt;] skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b0900a&gt;] skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b090ff&gt;] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b11348&gt;] consume_skb+0x138/0x370
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8676ad7b&gt;] sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8676ae88&gt;] sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8677fa5f&gt;] sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8675ee36&gt;] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8677f2c1&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff867bad69&gt;] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20
[ ... ]
[     ] Memory state around the buggy address:
[     ]  ffff88005e48f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]  ffff88005e48f400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ] &gt;ffff88005e48f480: f4 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]                    ^
[     ]  ffff88005e48f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]  ffff88005e48f580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ] ==================================================================

KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry
and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally
(e.g. with a longjmp like jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left
poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.

Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over
before doing actual longjmp in jprobe_return().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli &lt;ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: surovegin@google.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476454043-101898-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I observed false KSAN positives in the sctp code, when
sctp uses jprobe_return() in jsctp_sf_eat_sack().

The stray 0xf4 in shadow memory are stack redzones:

[     ] ==================================================================
[     ] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xe9/0x150 at addr ffff88005e48f480
[     ] Read of size 1 by task syz-executor/18535
[     ] page:ffffea00017923c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
[     ] flags: 0x1fffc0000000000()
[     ] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[     ] CPU: 1 PID: 18535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #28
[     ] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
[     ]  ffff88005e48f2d0 ffffffff82d2b849 ffffffff0bc91e90 fffffbfff10971e8
[     ]  ffffed000bc91e90 ffffed000bc91e90 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[     ]  ffff88005e48f480 ffff88005e48f350 ffffffff817d3169 ffff88005e48f370
[     ] Call Trace:
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff82d2b849&gt;] dump_stack+0x12e/0x185
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d3169&gt;] kasan_report+0x489/0x4b0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d31a9&gt;] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff82d49529&gt;] memcmp+0xe9/0x150
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff82df7486&gt;] depot_save_stack+0x176/0x5c0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d2031&gt;] save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d27f2&gt;] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff817d05b8&gt;] kfree+0xc8/0x2a0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b03f19&gt;] skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b0900a&gt;] skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b090ff&gt;] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff85b11348&gt;] consume_skb+0x138/0x370
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8676ad7b&gt;] sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8676ae88&gt;] sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8677fa5f&gt;] sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8675ee36&gt;] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff8677f2c1&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190
[     ]  [&lt;ffffffff867bad69&gt;] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20
[ ... ]
[     ] Memory state around the buggy address:
[     ]  ffff88005e48f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]  ffff88005e48f400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ] &gt;ffff88005e48f480: f4 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]                    ^
[     ]  ffff88005e48f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]  ffff88005e48f580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ] ==================================================================

KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry
and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally
(e.g. with a longjmp like jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left
poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.

Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over
before doing actual longjmp in jprobe_return().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli &lt;ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: surovegin@google.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476454043-101898-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/kasan: get rid of -&gt;state in struct kasan_alloc_meta</title>
<updated>2016-08-02T21:31:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-02T21:02:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b3cbd9bf77cd1888114dbee1653e79aa23fd4068'/>
<id>b3cbd9bf77cd1888114dbee1653e79aa23fd4068</id>
<content type='text'>
The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and
the -&gt;state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta.  We can get rid of the
latter.  The will save us a little bit of memory.  Also, this allow us
to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing
memory consumption.  So now we should always know when the last time the
object was freed.  This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free
bugs.

As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning:
	UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13
	member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node'
	which requires 8 byte alignment

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;xiaolong.ye@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and
the -&gt;state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta.  We can get rid of the
latter.  The will save us a little bit of memory.  Also, this allow us
to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing
memory consumption.  So now we should always know when the last time the
object was freed.  This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free
bugs.

As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning:
	UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13
	member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node'
	which requires 8 byte alignment

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;xiaolong.ye@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, kasan: switch SLUB to stackdepot, enable memory quarantine for SLUB</title>
<updated>2016-07-28T23:07:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-28T22:49:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=80a9201a5965f4715d5c09790862e0df84ce0614'/>
<id>80a9201a5965f4715d5c09790862e0df84ce0614</id>
<content type='text'>
For KASAN builds:
 - switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
   allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
 - change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
   into the quarantine.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;adech.fo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo &lt;kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For KASAN builds:
 - switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
   allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
 - change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
   into the quarantine.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;adech.fo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo &lt;kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: mempool: kasan: don't poot mempool objects in quarantine</title>
<updated>2016-06-25T00:23:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-24T21:49:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9b75a867cc9ddbafcaf35029358ac500f2635ff3'/>
<id>9b75a867cc9ddbafcaf35029358ac500f2635ff3</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently we may put reserved by mempool elements into quarantine via
kasan_kfree().  This is totally wrong since quarantine may really free
these objects.  So when mempool will try to use such element,
use-after-free will happen.  Or mempool may decide that it no longer
need that element and double-free it.

So don't put object into quarantine in kasan_kfree(), just poison it.
Rename kasan_kfree() to kasan_poison_kfree() to respect that.

Also, we shouldn't use kasan_slab_alloc()/kasan_krealloc() in
kasan_unpoison_element() because those functions may update allocation
stacktrace.  This would be wrong for the most of the remove_element call
sites.

(The only call site where we may want to update alloc stacktrace is
 in mempool_alloc(). Kmemleak solves this by calling
 kmemleak_update_trace(), so we could make something like that too.
 But this is out of scope of this patch).

Fixes: 55834c59098d ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/575977C3.1010905@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reported-by: Kuthonuzo Luruo &lt;kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently we may put reserved by mempool elements into quarantine via
kasan_kfree().  This is totally wrong since quarantine may really free
these objects.  So when mempool will try to use such element,
use-after-free will happen.  Or mempool may decide that it no longer
need that element and double-free it.

So don't put object into quarantine in kasan_kfree(), just poison it.
Rename kasan_kfree() to kasan_poison_kfree() to respect that.

Also, we shouldn't use kasan_slab_alloc()/kasan_krealloc() in
kasan_unpoison_element() because those functions may update allocation
stacktrace.  This would be wrong for the most of the remove_element call
sites.

(The only call site where we may want to update alloc stacktrace is
 in mempool_alloc(). Kmemleak solves this by calling
 kmemleak_update_trace(), so we could make something like that too.
 But this is out of scope of this patch).

Fixes: 55834c59098d ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/575977C3.1010905@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reported-by: Kuthonuzo Luruo &lt;kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
