linux-toradex.git/include/linux/kexec.h, branch v5.12-rc5

Merge tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

2021-02-26T18:19:03+00:00

Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "The big one is a fix for the VHE enabling path during early boot,
  where the code enabling the MMU wasn't necessarily in the identity map
  of the new page-tables, resulting in a consistent crash with 64k
  pages. In fixing that, we noticed some missing barriers too, so we
  added those for the sake of architectural compliance.

  Other than that, just the usual merge window trickle. There'll be more
  to come, too.

  Summary:

   - Fix lockdep false alarm on resume-from-cpuidle path

   - Fix memory leak in kexec_file

   - Fix module linker script to work with GDB

   - Fix error code when trying to use uprobes with AArch32 instructions

   - Fix late VHE enabling with 64k pages

   - Add missing ISBs after TLB invalidation

   - Fix seccomp when tracing syscall -1

   - Fix stacktrace return code at end of stack

   - Fix inconsistent whitespace for pointer return values

   - Fix compiler warnings when building with W=1"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: stacktrace: Report when we reach the end of the stack
  arm64: ptrace: Fix seccomp of traced syscall -1 (NO_SYSCALL)
  arm64: Add missing ISB after invalidating TLB in enter_vhe
  arm64: Add missing ISB after invalidating TLB in __primary_switch
  arm64: VHE: Enable EL2 MMU from the idmap
  KVM: arm64: make the hyp vector table entries local
  arm64/mm: Fixed some coding style issues
  arm64: uprobe: Return EOPNOTSUPP for AARCH32 instruction probing
  kexec: move machine_kexec_post_load() to public interface
  arm64 module: set plt* section addresses to 0x0
  arm64: kexec_file: fix memory leakage in create_dtb() when fdt_open_into() fails
  arm64: spectre: Prevent lockdep splat on v4 mitigation enable path

kexec: move machine_kexec_post_load() to public interface

2021-02-22T12:33:26+00:00

The kernel test robot reports the following compiler warning:

  | arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c:62:5: warning: no previous prototype for
  | function 'machine_kexec_post_load' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
  |    int machine_kexec_post_load(struct kimage *kimage)

Fix it by moving the declaration of machine_kexec_post_load() from
kexec_internal.h to the public header instead.

Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/202102030727.gqTokACH-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210219195142.13571-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Fixes: 4c3c31230c91 ("arm64: kexec: move relocation function setup")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon

ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall

2021-02-10T20:49:38+00:00

IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.  This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.

Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks 
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann 
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks 
Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

kexec_file: Allow archs to handle special regions while locating memory hole

2020-07-29T13:47:53+00:00

Some architectures may have special memory regions, within the given
memory range, which can't be used for the buffer in a kexec segment.
Implement weak arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole() definition which arch code
may override, to take care of special regions, while trying to locate
a memory hole.

Also, add the missing declarations for arch overridable functions and
and drop the __weak descriptors in the declarations to avoid non-weak
definitions from becoming weak.

Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini 
Tested-by: Pingfan Liu 
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann 
Acked-by: Dave Young 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159602273603.575379.17665852963340380839.stgit@hbathini

kexec: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array

2020-06-16T04:08:31+00:00

There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva

Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-09-28T15:14:15+00:00

Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

From the original description:

This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.

There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.

The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.

New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.

The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...

kexec: restore arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe declaration

2019-09-26T00:51:40+00:00

arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe function declaration has been removed by
commit 9ec4ecef0af7 ("kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops
functions").  Still this function is overridden by couple of architectures
and proper prototype declaration is therefore important, so bring it back.
This fixes the following sparse warning on s390:
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c:333:5: warning: symbol
'arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe' was not declared.  Should it be static?

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/patch.git-ff1c9045ebdc.your-ad-here.call-01564402297-ext-5690@work.hours
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik 
Acked-by: Dave Young 
Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma 
Cc: Eric Biederman 
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kexec_elf: remove parsing of section headers

2019-09-06T21:58:43+00:00

We're not using them, so we can drop the parsing.

Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle 
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann 
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller

kexec: add KEXEC_ELF

2019-09-06T21:58:43+00:00

Right now powerpc provides an implementation to read elf files
with the kexec_file_load() syscall. Make that available as a public
kexec interface so it can be re-used on other architectures.

Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle 
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann 
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller

kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE

2019-08-20T04:54:15+00:00

This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown.  A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load().  Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.

This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded.  KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett 
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris