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<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/lsm_audit.h, branch v3.4.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data'</title>
<updated>2012-04-03T16:49:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-02T22:48:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b61c37f57988567c84359645f8202a7c84bc798a'/>
<id>b61c37f57988567c84359645f8202a7c84bc798a</id>
<content type='text'>
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.

So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.

So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union</title>
<updated>2012-04-03T16:49:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-02T17:15:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=48c62af68a403ef1655546bd3e021070c8508573'/>
<id>48c62af68a403ef1655546bd3e021070c8508573</id>
<content type='text'>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union.  To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack.  Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures.  I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path.  We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union.  To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack.  Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures.  I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path.  We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data</title>
<updated>2012-04-03T16:48:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-03T16:37:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b3b0e4fc15efa507b902d90cea39e496a523c3b'/>
<id>3b3b0e4fc15efa507b902d90cea39e496a523c3b</id>
<content type='text'>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h</title>
<updated>2012-03-28T17:30:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-28T17:30:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9ffc93f203c18a70623f21950f1dd473c9ec48cd'/>
<id>9ffc93f203c18a70623f21950f1dd473c9ec48cd</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it.  Performed with the following command:

perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*&lt;asm/system[.]h&gt;.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*&lt;asm/system[.]h&gt;' *`

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it.  Performed with the following command:

perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*&lt;asm/system[.]h&gt;.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*&lt;asm/system[.]h&gt;' *`

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH</title>
<updated>2011-04-25T22:14:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-25T17:10:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a269434d2fb48a4d66c1d7bf821b7874b59c5b41'/>
<id>a269434d2fb48a4d66c1d7bf821b7874b59c5b41</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path.  This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path.  This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE</title>
<updated>2011-04-25T22:13:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-25T16:54:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f48b7399840b453e7282b523f535561fe9638a2d'/>
<id>f48b7399840b453e7282b523f535561fe9638a2d</id>
<content type='text'>
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode.  Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode.  Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.</title>
<updated>2010-08-02T05:35:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-29T21:47:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=67012e8209df95a8290d135753ff5145431a666e'/>
<id>67012e8209df95a8290d135753ff5145431a666e</id>
<content type='text'>
Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for
AppArmor uses for auditing.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for
AppArmor uses for auditing.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: special dontaudit for access checks</title>
<updated>2010-08-02T05:35:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-23T15:44:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b782e0a68d17894d9a618ffea55b33639faa6bb4'/>
<id>b782e0a68d17894d9a618ffea55b33639faa6bb4</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which
calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed.  It
is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable
or if they are really read/write-able.  access() should return the real
permission.  SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots
of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows.  Currently
SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in
order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.)  But dontaudit rules
like that can hide real attacks.  This patch addes a new common file
permission audit_access.  This permission is special in that it is meaningless
and should never show up in an allow rule.  Instead the only place this
permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:

dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access

With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and
thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial.
If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions
(rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial.
This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a
method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen D. Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which
calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed.  It
is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable
or if they are really read/write-able.  access() should return the real
permission.  SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots
of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows.  Currently
SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in
order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.)  But dontaudit rules
like that can hide real attacks.  This patch addes a new common file
permission audit_access.  This permission is special in that it is meaningless
and should never show up in an allow rule.  Instead the only place this
permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:

dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access

With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and
thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial.
If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions
(rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial.
This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a
method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen D. Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE</title>
<updated>2010-04-27T22:51:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-04-27T21:20:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cb84aa9b42b506299e5aea1ba4da26c03ab12877'/>
<id>cb84aa9b42b506299e5aea1ba4da26c03ab12877</id>
<content type='text'>
Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming.
This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer
cannot be used.  This patch just renames the flag so the generic
initializer can be used.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming.
This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer
cannot be used.  This patch just renames the flag so the generic
initializer can be used.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: report the module name to security_module_request</title>
<updated>2009-11-09T22:33:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-03T05:35:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555'/>
<id>dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555</id>
<content type='text'>
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.

Example output:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc:  denied  { module_request } for  pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.

Example output:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc:  denied  { module_request } for  pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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