<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/sched.h, branch v4.0.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86: kvm: Revert "remove sched notifier for cross-cpu migrations"</title>
<updated>2015-05-06T20:03:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Tosatti</name>
<email>mtosatti@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-23T23:21:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3fbb83fdcd2be33c3091f2c1094c37b5054da9f8'/>
<id>3fbb83fdcd2be33c3091f2c1094c37b5054da9f8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a4e6be9ca17c54817cf814b4b5aa60478c6df27 upstream.

The following point:

    2. per-CPU pvclock time info is updated if the
       underlying CPU changes.

Is not true anymore since "KVM: x86: update pvclock area conditionally,
on cpu migration".

Add task migration notification back.

Problem noticed by Andy Lutomirski.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti &lt;mtosatti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a4e6be9ca17c54817cf814b4b5aa60478c6df27 upstream.

The following point:

    2. per-CPU pvclock time info is updated if the
       underlying CPU changes.

Is not true anymore since "KVM: x86: update pvclock area conditionally,
on cpu migration".

Add task migration notification back.

Problem noticed by Andy Lutomirski.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti &lt;mtosatti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: numa: slow PTE scan rate if migration failures occur</title>
<updated>2015-03-25T23:20:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-25T22:55:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=074c238177a75f5e79af3b2cb6a84e54823ef950'/>
<id>074c238177a75f5e79af3b2cb6a84e54823ef950</id>
<content type='text'>
Dave Chinner reported the following on https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/1/226

  Across the board the 4.0-rc1 numbers are much slower, and the degradation
  is far worse when using the large memory footprint configs. Perf points
  straight at the cause - this is from 4.0-rc1 on the "-o bhash=101073" config:

   -   56.07%    56.07%  [kernel]            [k] default_send_IPI_mask_sequence_phys
      - default_send_IPI_mask_sequence_phys
         - 99.99% physflat_send_IPI_mask
            - 99.37% native_send_call_func_ipi
                 smp_call_function_many
               - native_flush_tlb_others
                  - 99.85% flush_tlb_page
                       ptep_clear_flush
                       try_to_unmap_one
                       rmap_walk
                       try_to_unmap
                       migrate_pages
                       migrate_misplaced_page
                     - handle_mm_fault
                        - 99.73% __do_page_fault
                             trace_do_page_fault
                             do_async_page_fault
                           + async_page_fault
              0.63% native_send_call_func_single_ipi
                 generic_exec_single
                 smp_call_function_single

This is showing excessive migration activity even though excessive
migrations are meant to get throttled.  Normally, the scan rate is tuned
on a per-task basis depending on the locality of faults.  However, if
migrations fail for any reason then the PTE scanner may scan faster if
the faults continue to be remote.  This means there is higher system CPU
overhead and fault trapping at exactly the time we know that migrations
cannot happen.  This patch tracks when migration failures occur and
slows the PTE scanner.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Aneesh Kumar &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Dave Chinner reported the following on https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/1/226

  Across the board the 4.0-rc1 numbers are much slower, and the degradation
  is far worse when using the large memory footprint configs. Perf points
  straight at the cause - this is from 4.0-rc1 on the "-o bhash=101073" config:

   -   56.07%    56.07%  [kernel]            [k] default_send_IPI_mask_sequence_phys
      - default_send_IPI_mask_sequence_phys
         - 99.99% physflat_send_IPI_mask
            - 99.37% native_send_call_func_ipi
                 smp_call_function_many
               - native_flush_tlb_others
                  - 99.85% flush_tlb_page
                       ptep_clear_flush
                       try_to_unmap_one
                       rmap_walk
                       try_to_unmap
                       migrate_pages
                       migrate_misplaced_page
                     - handle_mm_fault
                        - 99.73% __do_page_fault
                             trace_do_page_fault
                             do_async_page_fault
                           + async_page_fault
              0.63% native_send_call_func_single_ipi
                 generic_exec_single
                 smp_call_function_single

This is showing excessive migration activity even though excessive
migrations are meant to get throttled.  Normally, the scan rate is tuned
on a per-task basis depending on the locality of faults.  However, if
migrations fail for any reason then the PTE scanner may scan faster if
the faults continue to be remote.  This means there is higher system CPU
overhead and fault trapping at exactly the time we know that migrations
cannot happen.  This patch tracks when migration failures occur and
slows the PTE scanner.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Aneesh Kumar &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2015-02-21T18:40:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-21T18:40:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e2defd02717ebc54ae2f4862271a3093665b426a'/>
<id>e2defd02717ebc54ae2f4862271a3093665b426a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Thiscontains misc fixes: preempt_schedule_common() and io_schedule()
  recursion fixes, sched/dl fixes, a completion_done() revert, two
  sched/rt fixes and a comment update patch"

* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/rt: Avoid obvious configuration fail
  sched/autogroup: Fix failure to set cpu.rt_runtime_us
  sched/dl: Do update_rq_clock() in yield_task_dl()
  sched: Prevent recursion in io_schedule()
  sched/completion: Serialize completion_done() with complete()
  sched: Fix preempt_schedule_common() triggering tracing recursion
  sched/dl: Prevent enqueue of a sleeping task in dl_task_timer()
  sched: Make dl_task_time() use task_rq_lock()
  sched: Clarify ordering between task_rq_lock() and move_queued_task()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Thiscontains misc fixes: preempt_schedule_common() and io_schedule()
  recursion fixes, sched/dl fixes, a completion_done() revert, two
  sched/rt fixes and a comment update patch"

* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/rt: Avoid obvious configuration fail
  sched/autogroup: Fix failure to set cpu.rt_runtime_us
  sched/dl: Do update_rq_clock() in yield_task_dl()
  sched: Prevent recursion in io_schedule()
  sched/completion: Serialize completion_done() with complete()
  sched: Fix preempt_schedule_common() triggering tracing recursion
  sched/dl: Prevent enqueue of a sleeping task in dl_task_timer()
  sched: Make dl_task_time() use task_rq_lock()
  sched: Clarify ordering between task_rq_lock() and move_queued_task()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Prevent recursion in io_schedule()</title>
<updated>2015-02-18T13:27:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-13T04:49:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9cff8adeaa34b5d2802f03f89803da57856b3b72'/>
<id>9cff8adeaa34b5d2802f03f89803da57856b3b72</id>
<content type='text'>
io_schedule() calls blk_flush_plug() which, depending on the
contents of current-&gt;plug, can initiate arbitrary blk-io requests.

Note that this contrasts with blk_schedule_flush_plug() which requires
all non-trivial work to be handed off to a separate thread.

This makes it possible for io_schedule() to recurse, and initiating
block requests could possibly call mempool_alloc() which, in times of
memory pressure, uses io_schedule().

Apart from any stack usage issues, io_schedule() will not behave
correctly when called recursively as delayacct_blkio_start() does
not allow for repeated calls.

So:
 - use -&gt;in_iowait to detect recursion.  Set it earlier, and restore
   it to the old value.
 - move the call to "raw_rq" after the call to blk_flush_plug().
   As this is some sort of per-cpu thing, we want some chance that
   we are on the right CPU
 - When io_schedule() is called recurively, use blk_schedule_flush_plug()
   which cannot further recurse.
 - as this makes io_schedule() a lot more complex and as io_schedule()
   must match io_schedule_timeout(), but all the changes in io_schedule_timeout()
   and make io_schedule a simple wrapper for that.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
[ Moved the now rudimentary io_schedule() into sched.h. ]
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tony Battersby &lt;tonyb@cybernetics.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150213162600.059fffb2@notabene.brown
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
io_schedule() calls blk_flush_plug() which, depending on the
contents of current-&gt;plug, can initiate arbitrary blk-io requests.

Note that this contrasts with blk_schedule_flush_plug() which requires
all non-trivial work to be handed off to a separate thread.

This makes it possible for io_schedule() to recurse, and initiating
block requests could possibly call mempool_alloc() which, in times of
memory pressure, uses io_schedule().

Apart from any stack usage issues, io_schedule() will not behave
correctly when called recursively as delayacct_blkio_start() does
not allow for repeated calls.

So:
 - use -&gt;in_iowait to detect recursion.  Set it earlier, and restore
   it to the old value.
 - move the call to "raw_rq" after the call to blk_flush_plug().
   As this is some sort of per-cpu thing, we want some chance that
   we are on the right CPU
 - When io_schedule() is called recurively, use blk_schedule_flush_plug()
   which cannot further recurse.
 - as this makes io_schedule() a lot more complex and as io_schedule()
   must match io_schedule_timeout(), but all the changes in io_schedule_timeout()
   and make io_schedule a simple wrapper for that.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
[ Moved the now rudimentary io_schedule() into sched.h. ]
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tony Battersby &lt;tonyb@cybernetics.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150213162600.059fffb2@notabene.brown
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure</title>
<updated>2015-02-14T05:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>a.ryabinin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-13T22:39:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0b24becc810dc3be6e3f94103a866f214c282394'/>
<id>0b24becc810dc3be6e3f94103a866f214c282394</id>
<content type='text'>
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.

KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC &gt; v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.

This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].

Basic idea:

The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.

Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.

Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:

     unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
     {
                return (addr &gt;&gt; KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
     }

where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.

So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 &lt;= k &lt;= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).

To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.

These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
printed.

Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:

	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.

	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.

	[...]

	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
	finish all tuning).

	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.

	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
	relatively easy to port."

Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================

KMEMCHECK:

  - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
    compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
    kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
    uninitialized memory reads.

    Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
    x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:

$ netperf -l 30
		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
		Recv   Send    Send
		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec

no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72

kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54

kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39

kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23

  - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
    number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.

SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.

	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.

	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
	  place of first bad read/write.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies

Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;a.ryabinin@samsung.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;adech.fo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov &lt;dmitryc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuri Gribov &lt;tetra2005@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.

KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC &gt; v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.

This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].

Basic idea:

The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.

Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.

Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:

     unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
     {
                return (addr &gt;&gt; KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
     }

where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.

So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 &lt;= k &lt;= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).

To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.

These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
printed.

Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:

	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.

	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.

	[...]

	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
	finish all tuning).

	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.

	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
	relatively easy to port."

Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================

KMEMCHECK:

  - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
    compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
    kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
    uninitialized memory reads.

    Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
    x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:

$ netperf -l 30
		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
		Recv   Send    Send
		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec

no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72

kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54

kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39

kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23

  - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
    number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.

SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.

	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.

	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
	  place of first bad read/write.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies

Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;a.ryabinin@samsung.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;adech.fo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov &lt;dmitryc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuri Gribov &lt;tetra2005@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sched/clock.c: add another clock for use with the soft lockup watchdog</title>
<updated>2015-02-13T02:54:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyril Bur</name>
<email>cyrilbur@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-12T23:01:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=545a2bf742fb41f17d03486dd8a8c74ad511dec2'/>
<id>545a2bf742fb41f17d03486dd8a8c74ad511dec2</id>
<content type='text'>
When the hypervisor pauses a virtualised kernel the kernel will observe a
jump in timebase, this can cause spurious messages from the softlockup
detector.

Whilst these messages are harmless, they are accompanied with a stack
trace which causes undue concern and more problematically the stack trace
in the guest has nothing to do with the observed problem and can only be
misleading.

Futhermore, on POWER8 this is completely avoidable with the introduction
of the Virtual Time Base (VTB) register.

This patch (of 2):

This permits the use of arch specific clocks for which virtualised kernels
can use their notion of 'running' time, not the elpased wall time which
will include host execution time.

Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur &lt;cyrilbur@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell &lt;uobergfe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: chai wen &lt;chaiw.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Zhang &lt;benzh@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the hypervisor pauses a virtualised kernel the kernel will observe a
jump in timebase, this can cause spurious messages from the softlockup
detector.

Whilst these messages are harmless, they are accompanied with a stack
trace which causes undue concern and more problematically the stack trace
in the guest has nothing to do with the observed problem and can only be
misleading.

Futhermore, on POWER8 this is completely avoidable with the introduction
of the Virtual Time Base (VTB) register.

This patch (of 2):

This permits the use of arch specific clocks for which virtualised kernels
can use their notion of 'running' time, not the elpased wall time which
will include host execution time.

Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur &lt;cyrilbur@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell &lt;uobergfe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: chai wen &lt;chaiw.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Zhang &lt;benzh@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>all arches, signal: move restart_block to struct task_struct</title>
<updated>2015-02-13T02:54:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-12T23:01:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f56141e3e2d9aabf7e6b89680ab572c2cdbb2a24'/>
<id>f56141e3e2d9aabf7e6b89680ab572c2cdbb2a24</id>
<content type='text'>
If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting
the restart block is a very juicy exploit target.  This is because the
restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack.

Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by
making the restart_block harder to locate.

Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy
targets, at least on some architectures.

It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less
identical on all architectures.

[james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Richard Henderson &lt;rth@twiddle.net&gt;
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky &lt;ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen &lt;hskinnemoen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt &lt;egtvedt@samfundet.no&gt;
Cc: Steven Miao &lt;realmz6@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot &lt;a-jacquiot@ti.com&gt;
Cc: Mikael Starvik &lt;starvik@axis.com&gt;
Cc: Jesper Nilsson &lt;jesper.nilsson@axis.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Kuo &lt;rkuo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: "Luck, Tony" &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Chen Liqin &lt;liqin.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Lennox Wu &lt;lennox.wu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@ezchip.com&gt;
Cc: Guan Xuetao &lt;gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting
the restart block is a very juicy exploit target.  This is because the
restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack.

Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by
making the restart_block harder to locate.

Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy
targets, at least on some architectures.

It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less
identical on all architectures.

[james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Richard Henderson &lt;rth@twiddle.net&gt;
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky &lt;ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen &lt;hskinnemoen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt &lt;egtvedt@samfundet.no&gt;
Cc: Steven Miao &lt;realmz6@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot &lt;a-jacquiot@ti.com&gt;
Cc: Mikael Starvik &lt;starvik@axis.com&gt;
Cc: Jesper Nilsson &lt;jesper.nilsson@axis.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Kuo &lt;rkuo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: "Luck, Tony" &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Chen Liqin &lt;liqin.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Lennox Wu &lt;lennox.wu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@ezchip.com&gt;
Cc: Guan Xuetao &lt;gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>syscalls: implement execveat() system call</title>
<updated>2014-12-13T20:42:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Drysdale</name>
<email>drysdale@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-13T00:57:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=51f39a1f0cea1cacf8c787f652f26dfee9611874'/>
<id>51f39a1f0cea1cacf8c787f652f26dfee9611874</id>
<content type='text'>
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).

The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts).  The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.

Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.

Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns.  The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).

Related history:
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
   realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
 - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
   documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
   "prevent other people from wasting their time".
 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
   problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
   because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
   been fixed.

This patch (of 4):

Add a new execveat(2) system call.  execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.

In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers.  This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/&lt;fd&gt;" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).

The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;/&lt;filename&gt;", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found.  This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).

Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Meredydd Luff &lt;meredydd@senatehouse.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah.kh@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@aerifal.cx&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).

The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts).  The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.

Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.

Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns.  The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).

Related history:
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
   realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
 - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
   documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
   "prevent other people from wasting their time".
 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
   problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
   because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
   been fixed.

This patch (of 4):

Add a new execveat(2) system call.  execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.

In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers.  This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/&lt;fd&gt;" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).

The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;/&lt;filename&gt;", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found.  This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).

Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Meredydd Luff &lt;meredydd@senatehouse.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah.kh@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@aerifal.cx&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memcg: turn memcg_kmem_skip_account into a bit field</title>
<updated>2014-12-13T20:42:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Davydov</name>
<email>vdavydov@parallels.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-13T00:55:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f185c290edec576a2cccd6670e5b8e02e6f04db'/>
<id>6f185c290edec576a2cccd6670e5b8e02e6f04db</id>
<content type='text'>
It isn't supposed to stack, so turn it into a bit-field to save 4 bytes on
the task_struct.

Also, remove the memcg_stop/resume_kmem_account helpers - it is clearer to
set/clear the flag inline.  Regarding the overwhelming comment to the
helpers, which is removed by this patch too, we already have a compact yet
accurate explanation in memcg_schedule_cache_create, no need in yet
another one.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It isn't supposed to stack, so turn it into a bit-field to save 4 bytes on
the task_struct.

Also, remove the memcg_stop/resume_kmem_account helpers - it is clearer to
set/clear the flag inline.  Regarding the overwhelming comment to the
helpers, which is removed by this patch too, we already have a compact yet
accurate explanation in memcg_schedule_cache_create, no need in yet
another one.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2014-12-10T05:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-10T05:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=86c6a2fddf0b89b494c7616f2c06cf915c4bff01'/>
<id>86c6a2fddf0b89b494c7616f2c06cf915c4bff01</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle are:

   - 'Nested Sleep Debugging', activated when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y.

     This instruments might_sleep() checks to catch places that nest
     blocking primitives - such as mutex usage in a wait loop.  Such
     bugs can result in hard to debug races/hangs.

     Another category of invalid nesting that this facility will detect
     is the calling of blocking functions from within schedule() -&gt;
     sched_submit_work() -&gt; blk_schedule_flush_plug().

     There's some potential for false positives (if secondary blocking
     primitives themselves are not ready yet for this facility), but the
     kernel will warn once about such bugs per bootup, so the warning
     isn't much of a nuisance.

     This feature comes with a number of fixes, for problems uncovered
     with it, so no messages are expected normally.

   - Another round of sched/numa optimizations and refinements, for
     CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y.

   - Another round of sched/dl fixes and refinements.

  Plus various smaller fixes and cleanups"

* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits)
  sched: Add missing rcu protection to wake_up_all_idle_cpus
  sched/deadline: Introduce start_hrtick_dl() for !CONFIG_SCHED_HRTICK
  sched/numa: Init numa balancing fields of init_task
  sched/deadline: Remove unnecessary definitions in cpudeadline.h
  sched/cpupri: Remove unnecessary definitions in cpupri.h
  sched/deadline: Fix rq-&gt;dl.pushable_tasks bug in push_dl_task()
  sched/fair: Fix stale overloaded status in the busiest group finding logic
  sched: Move p-&gt;nr_cpus_allowed check to select_task_rq()
  sched/completion: Document when to use wait_for_completion_io_*()
  sched: Update comments about CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC
  sched/fair: Kill task_struct::numa_entry and numa_group::task_list
  sched: Refactor task_struct to use numa_faults instead of numa_* pointers
  sched/deadline: Don't check CONFIG_SMP in switched_from_dl()
  sched/deadline: Reschedule from switched_from_dl() after a successful pull
  sched/deadline: Push task away if the deadline is equal to curr during wakeup
  sched/deadline: Add deadline rq status print
  sched/deadline: Fix artificial overrun introduced by yield_task_dl()
  sched/rt: Clean up check_preempt_equal_prio()
  sched/core: Use dl_bw_of() under rcu_read_lock_sched()
  sched: Check if we got a shallowest_idle_cpu before searching for least_loaded_cpu
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle are:

   - 'Nested Sleep Debugging', activated when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y.

     This instruments might_sleep() checks to catch places that nest
     blocking primitives - such as mutex usage in a wait loop.  Such
     bugs can result in hard to debug races/hangs.

     Another category of invalid nesting that this facility will detect
     is the calling of blocking functions from within schedule() -&gt;
     sched_submit_work() -&gt; blk_schedule_flush_plug().

     There's some potential for false positives (if secondary blocking
     primitives themselves are not ready yet for this facility), but the
     kernel will warn once about such bugs per bootup, so the warning
     isn't much of a nuisance.

     This feature comes with a number of fixes, for problems uncovered
     with it, so no messages are expected normally.

   - Another round of sched/numa optimizations and refinements, for
     CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y.

   - Another round of sched/dl fixes and refinements.

  Plus various smaller fixes and cleanups"

* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits)
  sched: Add missing rcu protection to wake_up_all_idle_cpus
  sched/deadline: Introduce start_hrtick_dl() for !CONFIG_SCHED_HRTICK
  sched/numa: Init numa balancing fields of init_task
  sched/deadline: Remove unnecessary definitions in cpudeadline.h
  sched/cpupri: Remove unnecessary definitions in cpupri.h
  sched/deadline: Fix rq-&gt;dl.pushable_tasks bug in push_dl_task()
  sched/fair: Fix stale overloaded status in the busiest group finding logic
  sched: Move p-&gt;nr_cpus_allowed check to select_task_rq()
  sched/completion: Document when to use wait_for_completion_io_*()
  sched: Update comments about CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC
  sched/fair: Kill task_struct::numa_entry and numa_group::task_list
  sched: Refactor task_struct to use numa_faults instead of numa_* pointers
  sched/deadline: Don't check CONFIG_SMP in switched_from_dl()
  sched/deadline: Reschedule from switched_from_dl() after a successful pull
  sched/deadline: Push task away if the deadline is equal to curr during wakeup
  sched/deadline: Add deadline rq status print
  sched/deadline: Fix artificial overrun introduced by yield_task_dl()
  sched/rt: Clean up check_preempt_equal_prio()
  sched/core: Use dl_bw_of() under rcu_read_lock_sched()
  sched: Check if we got a shallowest_idle_cpu before searching for least_loaded_cpu
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
