security_netlink_send() is a networking hook, so it fits better under
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
 "For this merge window we're splitting BPF pull request into three for
  higher visibility: main changes, res_spin_lock, try_alloc_pages.

  These are the main BPF changes:

   - Add DFA-based live registers analysis to improve verification of
     programs with loops (Eduard Zingerman)

   - Introduce load_acquire and store_release BPF instructions and add
     x86, arm64 JIT support (Peilin Ye)

   - Fix loop detection logic in the verifier (Eduard Zingerman)

   - Drop unnecesary lock in bpf_map_inc_not_zero() (Eric Dumazet)

   - Add kfunc for populating cpumask bits (Emil Tsalapatis)

   - Convert various shell based tests to selftests/bpf/test_progs
     format (Bastien Curutchet)

   - Allow passing referenced kptrs into struct_ops callbacks (Amery
     Hung)

   - Add a flag to LSM bpf hook to facilitate bpf program signing
     (Blaise Boscaccy)

   - Track arena arguments in kfuncs (Ihor Solodrai)

   - Add copy_remote_vm_str() helper for reading strings from remote VM
     and bpf_copy_from_user_task_str() kfunc (Jordan Rome)

   - Add support for timed may_goto instruction (Kumar Kartikeya
     Dwivedi)

   - Allow bpf_get_netns_cookie() int cgroup_skb programs (Mahe Tardy)

   - Reduce bpf_cgrp_storage_busy false positives when accessing cgroup
     local storage (Martin KaFai Lau)

   - Introduce bpf_dynptr_copy() kfunc (Mykyta Yatsenko)

   - Allow retrieving BTF data with BTF token (Mykyta Yatsenko)

   - Add BPF kfuncs to set and get xattrs with 'security.bpf.' prefix
     (Song Liu)

   - Reject attaching programs to noreturn functions (Yafang Shao)

   - Introduce pre-order traversal of cgroup bpf programs (Yonghong
     Song)"

* tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (186 commits)
  selftests/bpf: Add selftests for load-acquire/store-release when register number is invalid
  bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read in check_atomic_load/store()
  libbpf: Add namespace for errstr making it libbpf_errstr
  bpf: Add struct_ops context information to struct bpf_prog_aux
  selftests/bpf: Sanitize pointer prior fclose()
  selftests/bpf: Migrate test_xdp_vlan.sh into test_progs
  selftests/bpf: test_xdp_vlan: Rename BPF sections
  bpf: clarify a misleading verifier error message
  selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching fexit to __noreturn functions
  bpf: Reject attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions
  bpf: Only fails the busy counter check in bpf_cgrp_storage_get if it creates storage
  bpf: Make perf_event_read_output accessible in all program types.
  bpftool: Using the right format specifiers
  bpftool: Add -Wformat-signedness flag to detect format errors
  selftests/bpf: Test freplace from user namespace
  libbpf: Pass BPF token from find_prog_btf_id to BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID
  bpf: Return prog btf_id without capable check
  bpf: BPF token support for BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID
  bpf, x86: Fix objtool warning for timed may_goto
  bpf: Check map->record at the beginning of check_and_free_fields()
  ...

Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.

Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.

Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310221737.821889-2-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security
checks since it was first introduced by:

commit da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")

so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

The !CONFIG_SECURITY dummy function was declared as an "extern int"
instead of "static inline" (likely a copy-n-paste error), which was
was causing the compiler to complain about a missing prototype.  This
patch converts the dummy definition over to a "static inline" to resolve
the compiler problems.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202502081912.TeokpAAe-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: c6ad9fdbd44b ("io_uring,lsm,selinux: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[PM: merge fuzz due to changes in preceding patches, subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context
pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context
and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how
to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.

Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsm_context
structure instead of data and length pointers.  This provides
the information about which LSM created the context so that
security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook.

Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.

security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx()
will now return the length value on success instead of 0.

Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a
"security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated
the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have
different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux
allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer
to an entry in a list that never goes away.

Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a
(char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise.  The LSMs
supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer
that there is more work to be done.

The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to
be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts,
the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is
potential for multiple frees in that case.

Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>