linux-toradex.git/include/linux/shmem_fs.h, branch v4.9.16

shmem: split huge pages beyond i_size under memory pressure

2016-07-26T23:19:19+00:00

Even if user asked to allocate huge pages always (huge=always), we
should be able to free up some memory by splitting pages which are
partly byound i_size if memory presure comes or once we hit limit on
filesystem size (-o size=).

In order to do this we maintain per-superblock list of inodes, which
potentially have huge pages on the border of file size.

Per-fs shrinker can reclaim memory by splitting such pages.

If we hit -ENOSPC during shmem_getpage_gfp(), we try to split a page to
free up space on the filesystem and retry allocation if it succeed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-37-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

thp: introduce CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGE_PAGECACHE

2016-07-26T23:19:19+00:00

For file mappings, we don't deposit page tables on THP allocation
because it's not strictly required to implement split_huge_pmd(): we can
just clear pmd and let following page faults to reconstruct the page
table.

But Power makes use of deposited page table to address MMU quirk.

Let's hide THP page cache, including huge tmpfs, under separate config
option, so it can be forbidden on Power.

We can revert the patch later once solution for Power found.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-36-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages

2016-07-26T23:19:19+00:00

This patch extends khugepaged to support collapse of tmpfs/shmem pages.
We share fair amount of infrastructure with anon-THP collapse.

Few design points:

  - First we are looking for VMA which can be suitable for mapping huge
    page;

  - If the VMA maps shmem file, the rest scan/collapse operations
    operates on page cache, not on page tables as in anon VMA case.

  - khugepaged_scan_shmem() finds a range which is suitable for huge
    page. The scan is lockless and shouldn't disturb system too much.

  - once the candidate for collapse is found, collapse_shmem() attempts
    to create a huge page:

      + scan over radix tree, making the range point to new huge page;

      + new huge page is not-uptodate, locked and freezed (refcount
        is 0), so nobody can touch them until we say so.

      + we swap in pages during the scan. khugepaged_scan_shmem()
        filters out ranges with more than khugepaged_max_ptes_swap
	swapped out pages. It's HPAGE_PMD_NR/8 by default.

      + old pages are isolated, unmapped and put to local list in case
        to be restored back if collapse failed.

  - if collapse succeed, we retract pte page tables from VMAs where huge
    pages mapping is possible. The huge page will be mapped as PMD on
    next minor fault into the range.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-35-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shmem: add huge pages support

2016-07-26T23:19:19+00:00

Here's basic implementation of huge pages support for shmem/tmpfs.

It's all pretty streight-forward:

  - shmem_getpage() allcoates huge page if it can and try to inserd into
    radix tree with shmem_add_to_page_cache();

  - shmem_add_to_page_cache() puts the page onto radix-tree if there's
    space for it;

  - shmem_undo_range() removes huge pages, if it fully within range.
    Partial truncate of huge pages zero out this part of THP.

    This have visible effect on fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
    behaviour. As we don't really create hole in this case,
    lseek(SEEK_HOLE) may have inconsistent results depending what
    pages happened to be allocated.

  - no need to change shmem_fault: core-mm will map an compound page as
    huge if VMA is suitable;

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-30-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shmem: get_unmapped_area align huge page

2016-07-26T23:19:19+00:00

Provide a shmem_get_unmapped_area method in file_operations, called at
mmap time to decide the mapping address.  It could be conditional on
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, but save #ifdefs in other places by making
it unconditional.

shmem_get_unmapped_area() first calls the usual mm->get_unmapped_area
(which we treat as a black box, highly dependent on architecture and
config and executable layout).  Lots of conditions, and in most cases it
just goes with the address that chose; but when our huge stars are
rightly aligned, yet that did not provide a suitable address, go back to
ask for a larger arena, within which to align the mapping suitably.

There have to be some direct calls to shmem_get_unmapped_area(), not via
the file_operations: because of the way shmem_zero_setup() is called to
create a shmem object late in the mmap sequence, when MAP_SHARED is
requested with MAP_ANONYMOUS or /dev/zero.  Though this only matters
when /proc/sys/vm/shmem_huge has been set.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-29-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shmem: prepare huge= mount option and sysfs knob

2016-07-26T23:19:19+00:00

This patch adds new mount option "huge=". It can have following values:

- "always":
Attempt to allocate huge pages every time we need a new page;

- "never":
Do not allocate huge pages;

- "within_size":
Only allocate huge page if it will be fully within i_size.
Also respect fadvise()/madvise() hints;

- "advise:
Only allocate huge pages if requested with fadvise()/madvise();

Default is "never" for now.

"mount -o remount,huge= /mountpoint" works fine after mount: remounting
huge=never will not attempt to break up huge pages at all, just stop
more from being allocated.

No new config option: put this under CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, which
is the appropriate option to protect those who don't want the new bloat,
and with which we shall share some pmd code.

Prohibit the option when !CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, just as mpol is
invalid without CONFIG_NUMA (was hidden in mpol_parse_str(): make it
explicit).

Allow enabling THP only if the machine has_transparent_hugepage().

But what about Shmem with no user-visible mount? SysV SHM, memfds,
shared anonymous mmaps (of /dev/zero or MAP_ANONYMOUS), GPU drivers' DRM
objects, Ashmem. Though unlikely to suit all usages, provide sysfs knob
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled to experiment with
huge on those.

And allow shmem_enabled two further values:

- "deny":
For use in emergencies, to force the huge option off from
all mounts;
- "force":
Force the huge option on for all - very useful for testing;

Based on patch by Hugh Dickins.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-28-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

make sure that freeing shmem fast symlinks is RCU-delayed

2016-01-22T23:08:52+00:00

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

mm, proc: reduce cost of /proc/pid/smaps for unpopulated shmem mappings

2016-01-15T00:00:49+00:00

Following the previous patch, further reduction of /proc/pid/smaps cost
is possible for private writable shmem mappings with unpopulated areas
where the page walk invokes the .pte_hole function.  We can use radix
tree iterator for each such area instead of calling find_get_entry() in
a loop.  This is possible at the extra maintenance cost of introducing
another shmem function shmem_partial_swap_usage().

To demonstrate the diference, I have measured this on a process that
creates a private writable 2GB mapping of a partially swapped out
/dev/shm/file (which cannot employ the optimizations from the prvious
patch) and doesn't populate it at all.  I time how long does it take to
cat /proc/pid/smaps of this process 100 times.

Before this patch:

real    0m3.831s
user    0m0.180s
sys     0m3.212s

After this patch:

real    0m1.176s
user    0m0.180s
sys     0m0.684s

The time is similar to the case where a radix tree iterator is employed
on the whole mapping.

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, proc: reduce cost of /proc/pid/smaps for shmem mappings

2016-01-15T00:00:49+00:00

The previous patch has improved swap accounting for shmem mapping, which
however made /proc/pid/smaps more expensive for shmem mappings, as we
consult the radix tree for each pte_none entry, so the overal complexity
is O(n*log(n)).

We can reduce this significantly for mappings that cannot contain COWed
pages, because then we can either use the statistics tha shmem object
itself tracks (if the mapping contains the whole object, or the swap
usage of the whole object is zero), or use the radix tree iterator,
which is much more effective than repeated find_get_entry() calls.

This patch therefore introduces a function shmem_swap_usage(vma) and
makes /proc/pid/smaps use it when possible.  Only for writable private
mappings of shmem objects (i.e.  tmpfs files) with the shmem object
itself (partially) swapped outwe have to resort to the find_get_entry()
approach.

Hopefully such mappings are relatively uncommon.

To demonstrate the diference, I have measured this on a process that
creates a 2GB mapping and dirties single pages with a stride of 2MB, and
time how long does it take to cat /proc/pid/smaps of this process 100
times.

Private writable mapping of a /dev/shm/file (the most complex case):

real    0m3.831s
user    0m0.180s
sys     0m3.212s

Shared mapping of an almost full mapping of a partially swapped /dev/shm/file
(which needs to employ the radix tree iterator).

real    0m1.351s
user    0m0.096s
sys     0m0.768s

Same, but with /dev/shm/file not swapped (so no radix tree walk needed)

real    0m0.935s
user    0m0.128s
sys     0m0.344s

Private anonymous mapping:

real    0m0.949s
user    0m0.116s
sys     0m0.348s

The cost is now much closer to the private anonymous mapping case, unless
the shmem mapping is private and writable.

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shm: add sealing API

2014-08-08T22:57:31+00:00

If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
  - one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
  - one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
  - one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries

If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement.  However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies.  Look at the following two
use-cases:

  1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
     graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
     read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
     scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
     the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
     cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
  2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
     bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
     assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
     want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
     source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
     copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
     local copy.

While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.

This patch introduces the concept of SEALING.  If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever.  Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed.  Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.

An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
  - SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
            in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
  - GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
          in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
  - WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
           are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
           write().
  - SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
          This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
          can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
          don't want.

The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:

  1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
     SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
     allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
     Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
  2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
     SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
     process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
     Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
     peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
     process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).

The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
  F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
               can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
               sealing.
  F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
               access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
               Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
               there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
               Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
               The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
               on the file. You cannot remove seals again.

The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Ryan Lortie 
Cc: Lennart Poettering 
Cc: Daniel Mack 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds