Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
 "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
  Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

  CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
  indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
  part of this feature, and just for userspace.

  The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
  return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
  secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
  protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
  the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
  to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
  the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.

  For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
  versions of this patch set"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/

* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
  x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
  x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
  x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
  x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
  x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
  x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
  selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
  x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
  x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
  x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
  x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
  x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
  x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
  x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
  x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  ...

Pull core entry code update from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single update to the core entry code, which removes the empty user
  address limit check which is a leftover of the removed TIF_FSCHECK"

* tag 'core-entry-2023-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  entry: Remove empty addr_limit_user_check()

Back when set_fs() was a generic API for altering the address limit,
addr_limit_user_check() was a safety measure to prevent userspace being
able to issue syscalls with an unbound limit.

With the the removal of set_fs() as a generic API, the last user of
addr_limit_user_check() was removed in commit:

  b5a5a01d8e9a44ec ("arm64: uaccess: remove addr_limit_user_check()")

... as since that commit, no architecture defines TIF_FSCHECK, and hence
addr_limit_user_check() always expands to nothing.

Remove addr_limit_user_check(), updating the comment in
exit_to_user_mode_prepare() to no longer refer to it. At the same time,
the comment is reworded to be a little more generic so as to cover
kmap_assert_nomap() in addition to lockdep_sys_exit().

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821163526.2319443-1-mark.rutland@arm.com

When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically
allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace
will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the
ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and
pivoting to userspace managed stacks.

Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be
provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup
with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP
instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they
should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a
problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special
data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable.

Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be
mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was
found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the
shadow stack during the writable window.

The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to
userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped
as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable
in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token.

First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the
PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides:
1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from
   ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent
   restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks.
   It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary
   locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been
   written to.
3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct
   action than a hint at future desired behavior.

So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't
quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow
userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext
is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to
setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this
provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the
common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the
kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.

The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with
map_shadow_stack:
void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

On the userspace side fchmodat(3) is implemented as a wrapper
function which implements the POSIX-specified interface. This
interface differs from the underlying kernel system call, which does not
have a flags argument. Most implementations require procfs [1][2].

There doesn't appear to be a good userspace workaround for this issue
but the implementation in the kernel is pretty straight-forward.

The new fchmodat2() syscall allows to pass the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag,
unlike existing fchmodat.

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c;h=17eca54051ee28ba1ec3f9aed170a62630959143;hb=a492b1e5ef7ab50c6fdd4e4e9879ea5569ab0a6c#l35
[2] https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/stat/fchmodat.c?id=718f363bc2067b6487900eddc9180c84e7739f80#n28

Co-developed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Message-Id: <f2a846ef495943c5d101011eebcf01179d0c7b61.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
[brauner: pre reviews, do flag conversion in do_fchmodat() directly]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

The next patch defines a very similar interface, which I copied from
this definition.  Since I'm touching it anyway I don't see any reason
not to just go fix this one up.

Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Message-Id: <ef644540cfd8717f30bcc5e4c32f06c80b6c156e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Pull asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
 "These are cleanups for architecture specific header files:

   - the comments in include/linux/syscalls.h have gone out of sync and
     are really pointless, so these get removed

   - The asm/bitsperlong.h header no longer needs to be architecture
     specific on modern compilers, so use a generic version for newer
     architectures that use new enough userspace compilers

   - A cleanup for virt_to_pfn/virt_to_bus to have proper type checking,
     forcing the use of pointers"

* tag 'asm-generic-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
  syscalls: Remove file path comments from headers
  tools arch: Remove uapi bitsperlong.h of hexagon and microblaze
  asm-generic: Unify uapi bitsperlong.h for arm64, riscv and loongarch
  m68k/mm: Make pfn accessors static inlines
  arm64: memory: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
  ARM: mm: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
  asm-generic/page.h: Make pfn accessors static inlines
  xen/netback: Pass (void *) to virt_to_page()
  netfs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
  cifs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page() in cifsglob
  cifs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
  riscv: mm: init: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
  ARC: init: Pass a pointer to virt_to_pfn() in init
  m68k: Pass a pointer to virt_to_pfn() virt_to_page()
  fs/proc/kcore.c: Pass a pointer to virt_addr_valid()

Pull mm updates from Andrew Morton:

 - Yosry Ahmed brought back some cgroup v1 stats in OOM logs

 - Yosry has also eliminated cgroup's atomic rstat flushing

 - Nhat Pham adds the new cachestat() syscall. It provides userspace
   with the ability to query pagecache status - a similar concept to
   mincore() but more powerful and with improved usability

 - Mel Gorman provides more optimizations for compaction, reducing the
   prevalence of page rescanning

 - Lorenzo Stoakes has done some maintanance work on the
   get_user_pages() interface

 - Liam Howlett continues with cleanups and maintenance work to the
   maple tree code. Peng Zhang also does some work on maple tree

 - Johannes Weiner has done some cleanup work on the compaction code

 - David Hildenbrand has contributed additional selftests for
   get_user_pages()

 - Thomas Gleixner has contributed some maintenance and optimization
   work for the vmalloc code

 - Baolin Wang has provided some compaction cleanups,

 - SeongJae Park continues maintenance work on the DAMON code

 - Huang Ying has done some maintenance on the swap code's usage of
   device refcounting

 - Christoph Hellwig has some cleanups for the filemap/directio code

 - Ryan Roberts provides two patch series which yield some
   rationalization of the kernel's access to pte entries - use the
   provided APIs rather than open-coding accesses

 - Lorenzo Stoakes has some fixes to the interaction between pagecache
   and directio access to file mappings

 - John Hubbard has a series of fixes to the MM selftesting code

 - ZhangPeng continues the folio conversion campaign

 - Hugh Dickins has been working on the pagetable handling code, mainly
   with a view to reducing the load on the mmap_lock

 - Catalin Marinas has reduced the arm64 kmalloc() minimum alignment
   from 128 to 8

 - Domenico Cerasuolo has improved the zswap reclaim mechanism by
   reorganizing the LRU management

 - Matthew Wilcox provides some fixups to make gfs2 work better with the
   buffer_head code

 - Vishal Moola also has done some folio conversion work

 - Matthew Wilcox has removed the remnants of the pagevec code - their
   functionality is migrated over to struct folio_batch

* tag 'mm-stable-2023-06-24-19-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (380 commits)
  mm/hugetlb: remove hugetlb_set_page_subpool()
  mm: nommu: correct the range of mmap_sem_read_lock in task_mem()
  hugetlb: revert use of page_cache_next_miss()
  Revert "page cache: fix page_cache_next/prev_miss off by one"
  mm/vmscan: fix root proactive reclaim unthrottling unbalanced node
  mm: memcg: rename and document global_reclaim()
  mm: kill [add|del]_page_to_lru_list()
  mm: compaction: convert to use a folio in isolate_migratepages_block()
  mm: zswap: fix double invalidate with exclusive loads
  mm: remove unnecessary pagevec includes
  mm: remove references to pagevec
  mm: rename invalidate_mapping_pagevec to mapping_try_invalidate
  mm: remove struct pagevec
  net: convert sunrpc from pagevec to folio_batch
  i915: convert i915_gpu_error to use a folio_batch
  pagevec: rename fbatch_count()
  mm: remove check_move_unevictable_pages()
  drm: convert drm_gem_put_pages() to use a folio_batch
  i915: convert shmem_sg_free_table() to use a folio_batch
  scatterlist: add sg_set_folio()
  ...

Source file locations for syscall definitions can change over a period
of time. File paths in comments get stale and are hard to maintain long
term. Also, their usefulness is questionable since it would be easier to
locate a syscall definition using the SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macro.

Remove all source file path comments from the syscall headers. Also,
equalize the uneven line spacing (some of which is introduced due to the
deletions).

Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The sys_ni_posix_timers() definition causes a warning when the declaration
is missing, so this needs to be added along with the normal syscalls,
outside of the #ifdef.

kernel/time/posix-stubs.c:26:17: error: no previous prototype for 'sys_ni_posix_timers' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230607142925.3126422-1-arnd@kernel.org