<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/thread_info.h, branch v5.10-rc3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: disallow &gt; INT_MAX copy sizes</title>
<updated>2019-12-05T03:44:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-05T00:52:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6d13de1489b6bf539695f96d945de3860e6d5e17'/>
<id>6d13de1489b6bf539695f96d945de3860e6d5e17</id>
<content type='text'>
As we've done with VFS, string operations, etc, reject usercopy sizes
larger than INT_MAX, which would be nice to have for catching bugs
related to size calculation overflows[1].

This adds 10 bytes to x86_64 defconfig text and 1980 bytes to the data
section:

     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  19691167        5134320 1646664 26472151        193eed7 vmlinux.before
  19691177        5136300 1646664 26474141        193f69d vmlinux.after

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-s390&amp;m=156631939010493&amp;w=2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251612.F9902D7A@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As we've done with VFS, string operations, etc, reject usercopy sizes
larger than INT_MAX, which would be nice to have for catching bugs
related to size calculation overflows[1].

This adds 10 bytes to x86_64 defconfig text and 1980 bytes to the data
section:

     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  19691167        5134320 1646664 26472151        193eed7 vmlinux.before
  19691177        5136300 1646664 26474141        193f69d vmlinux.after

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-s390&amp;m=156631939010493&amp;w=2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251612.F9902D7A@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: add missing __must_check attributes</title>
<updated>2019-09-26T00:51:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-25T23:47:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9dd819a15162f8f82a6001b090caa38c18297b39'/>
<id>9dd819a15162f8f82a6001b090caa38c18297b39</id>
<content type='text'>
The usercopy implementation comments describe that callers of the
copy_*_user() family of functions must always have their return values
checked.  This can be enforced at compile time with __must_check, so add
it where needed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251609.ADAD5CAAC1@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The usercopy implementation comments describe that callers of the
copy_*_user() family of functions must always have their return values
checked.  This can be enforced at compile time with __must_check, so add
it where needed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251609.ADAD5CAAC1@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>thread_info: Add update_thread_flag() helpers</title>
<updated>2018-05-25T11:27:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Martin</name>
<email>Dave.Martin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-11T16:54:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=93ee37c2a6a97e5d358af2d8f0510817b6e75679'/>
<id>93ee37c2a6a97e5d358af2d8f0510817b6e75679</id>
<content type='text'>
There are a number of bits of code sprinkled around the kernel to
set a thread flag if a certain condition is true, and clear it
otherwise.

To help make those call sites terser and less cumbersome, this
patch adds a new family of thread flag manipulators

	update*_thread_flag([...,] flag, cond)

which do the equivalent of:

	if (cond)
		set*_thread_flag([...,] flag);
	else
		clear*_thread_flag([...,] flag);

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are a number of bits of code sprinkled around the kernel to
set a thread flag if a certain condition is true, and clear it
otherwise.

To help make those call sites terser and less cumbersome, this
patch adds a new family of thread flag manipulators

	update*_thread_flag([...,] flag, cond)

which do the equivalent of:

	if (cond)
		set*_thread_flag([...,] flag);
	else
		clear*_thread_flag([...,] flag);

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork</title>
<updated>2018-04-21T00:18:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T21:55:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957'/>
<id>e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957</id>
<content type='text'>
One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACK</title>
<updated>2017-11-16T02:21:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)</name>
<email>alexander.levin@verizon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-16T01:35:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=75f296d93bcebcfe375884ddac79e30263a31766'/>
<id>75f296d93bcebcfe375884ddac79e30263a31766</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tim Hansen &lt;devtimhansen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegardno@ifi.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tim Hansen &lt;devtimhansen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegardno@ifi.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemleak: clear stale pointers from task stacks</title>
<updated>2017-10-13T23:18:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-13T22:58:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ca182551857cc2c1e6a2b7f1e72090a137a15008'/>
<id>ca182551857cc2c1e6a2b7f1e72090a137a15008</id>
<content type='text'>
Kmemleak considers any pointers on task stacks as references.  This
patch clears newly allocated and reused vmap stacks.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150728990124.744199.8403409836394318684.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Kmemleak considers any pointers on task stacks as references.  This
patch clears newly allocated and reused vmap stacks.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150728990124.744199.8403409836394318684.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fork: allow arch-override of VMAP stack alignment</title>
<updated>2017-08-15T17:34:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-14T11:23:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=48ac3c18cc62d4a23d5dc5c59f8720589d0de14b'/>
<id>48ac3c18cc62d4a23d5dc5c59f8720589d0de14b</id>
<content type='text'>
In some cases, an architecture might wish its stacks to be aligned to a
boundary larger than THREAD_SIZE. For example, using an alignment of
double THREAD_SIZE can allow for stack overflows smaller than
THREAD_SIZE to be detected by checking a single bit of the stack
pointer.

This patch allows architectures to override the alignment of VMAP'd
stacks, by defining THREAD_ALIGN. Where not defined, this defaults to
THREAD_SIZE, as is the case today.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In some cases, an architecture might wish its stacks to be aligned to a
boundary larger than THREAD_SIZE. For example, using an alignment of
double THREAD_SIZE can allow for stack overflows smaller than
THREAD_SIZE to be detected by checking a single bit of the stack
pointer.

This patch allows architectures to override the alignment of VMAP'd
stacks, by defining THREAD_ALIGN. Where not defined, this defaults to
THREAD_SIZE, as is the case today.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>copy_{to,from}_user(): consolidate object size checks</title>
<updated>2017-06-30T02:21:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-30T01:42:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b0377fedb6528087ed319b0d054d6ed82240372c'/>
<id>b0377fedb6528087ed319b0d054d6ed82240372c</id>
<content type='text'>
... and move them into thread_info.h, next to check_object_size()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
... and move them into thread_info.h, next to check_object_size()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2017-05-02T17:45:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-02T17:45:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5958cc49ed2961a059d92ae55afeeaba64a783a0'/>
<id>5958cc49ed2961a059d92ae55afeeaba64a783a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook:
 "A couple hardened usercopy changes:

   - drop now unneeded is_vmalloc_or_module() check (Laura Abbott)

   - use enum instead of literals for stack frame API (Sahara)"

* tag 'usercopy-v4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  mm/usercopy: Drop extra is_vmalloc_or_module() check
  usercopy: Move enum for arch_within_stack_frames()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook:
 "A couple hardened usercopy changes:

   - drop now unneeded is_vmalloc_or_module() check (Laura Abbott)

   - use enum instead of literals for stack frame API (Sahara)"

* tag 'usercopy-v4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  mm/usercopy: Drop extra is_vmalloc_or_module() check
  usercopy: Move enum for arch_within_stack_frames()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
