linux-toradex.git/include/linux/xattr.h, branch T20_LinuxImageV2.0Beta1_20121218

xattr.h: expose string defines to userspace

2011-05-25T15:39:45+00:00

af4f136056c9 ("security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h") moved the
XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX define from capability.h to xattr.h.  This makes sense
except it was previously exports to userspace but xattr.h does not export
it to userspace.  This patch exports these headers to userspace to fix the
ABI regression.

There is some slight possibility that this will cause problems in other
applications which used these #defines differently (wrongly) and I could
JUST export the capabilities xattr name that we broke.  Does anyonehave an
idea how exposing these headers could cause a problem?

Below is what is being exposed to userspace, included here since it isn't
clear exactly what is going to be made available from the patch.

/* Namespaces */
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2."
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1)

#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX   "security."
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)

#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system."
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1)

#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted."
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)

#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)

/* Security namespace */
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX

#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN    XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT   XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT

#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX

Reported-by: Ozan Çaglayan 
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Cc: Mimi Zohar 
Cc: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment

2011-01-17T16:05:27+00:00

  In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories

2010-12-07T22:04:02+00:00

In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.

This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.

A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.

Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called

2010-12-02T14:43:39+00:00

SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.

Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.

Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
  SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
  SMACK64EXEC

security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h

2010-08-02T05:34:57+00:00

Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move
the remaining Smack xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

fs: xattr_handler table should be const

2010-05-21T22:31:18+00:00

The entries in xattr handler table should be immutable (ie const)
like other operation tables.

Later patches convert common filesystems. Uncoverted filesystems
will still work, but will generate a compiler warning.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

sanitize xattr handler prototypes

2009-12-16T17:16:49+00:00

Add a flags argument to struct xattr_handler and pass it to all xattr
handler methods.  This allows using the same methods for multiple
handlers, e.g. for the ACL methods which perform exactly the same action
for the access and default ACLs, just using a different underlying
attribute.  With a little more groundwork it'll also allow sharing the
methods for the regular user/trusted/secure handlers in extN, ocfs2 and
jffs2 like it's already done for xfs in this patch.

Also change the inode argument to the handlers to a dentry to allow
using the handlers mechnism for filesystems that require it later,
e.g. cifs.

[with GFS2 bits updated by Steven Whitehouse ]

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: James Morris 
Acked-by: Joel Becker 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

VFS: Factor out part of vfs_setxattr so it can be called from the SELinux hook for inode_setsecctx.

2009-09-10T00:11:22+00:00

This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the
setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux
implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while
maintaining the proper separation of layers.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

xattr: add missing consts to function arguments

2008-04-29T15:06:06+00:00

Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting buffer

2008-02-05T17:44:20+00:00

This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.

Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.

The patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley 
Cc: Stephen Smalley 
Cc: Chris Wright 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds