<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux/xattr.h, branch v2.6.39-rc7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment</title>
<updated>2011-01-17T16:05:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-17T16:05:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7898e1f8e9eb1bee88c92d636e0ab93f2cbe31c6'/>
<id>7898e1f8e9eb1bee88c92d636e0ab93f2cbe31c6</id>
<content type='text'>
  In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
  In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories</title>
<updated>2010-12-07T22:04:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarkko Sakkinen</name>
<email>ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-07T11:34:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5c6d1125f8dbd1bfef39e38fbc2837003be78a59'/>
<id>5c6d1125f8dbd1bfef39e38fbc2837003be78a59</id>
<content type='text'>
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.

This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.

A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.

Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.

This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.

A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.

Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called</title>
<updated>2010-12-02T14:43:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-02T14:43:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=676dac4b1bee0469d6932f698aeb77e8489f5861'/>
<id>676dac4b1bee0469d6932f698aeb77e8489f5861</id>
<content type='text'>
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.

Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.

Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
  SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
  SMACK64EXEC
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.

Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.

Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
  SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
  SMACK64EXEC
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h</title>
<updated>2010-08-02T05:34:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-01T19:07:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af4f136056c984b0aa67feed7d3170b958370b2f'/>
<id>af4f136056c984b0aa67feed7d3170b958370b2f</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move
the remaining Smack xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move
the remaining Smack xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: xattr_handler table should be const</title>
<updated>2010-05-21T22:31:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Hemminger</name>
<email>shemminger@vyatta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-14T00:53:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bb4354538eb7b92f32cfedbad68c7be266c0b467'/>
<id>bb4354538eb7b92f32cfedbad68c7be266c0b467</id>
<content type='text'>
The entries in xattr handler table should be immutable (ie const)
like other operation tables.

Later patches convert common filesystems. Uncoverted filesystems
will still work, but will generate a compiler warning.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The entries in xattr handler table should be immutable (ie const)
like other operation tables.

Later patches convert common filesystems. Uncoverted filesystems
will still work, but will generate a compiler warning.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sanitize xattr handler prototypes</title>
<updated>2009-12-16T17:16:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-13T09:52:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=431547b3c4533b8c7fd150ab36980b9a3147797b'/>
<id>431547b3c4533b8c7fd150ab36980b9a3147797b</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a flags argument to struct xattr_handler and pass it to all xattr
handler methods.  This allows using the same methods for multiple
handlers, e.g. for the ACL methods which perform exactly the same action
for the access and default ACLs, just using a different underlying
attribute.  With a little more groundwork it'll also allow sharing the
methods for the regular user/trusted/secure handlers in extN, ocfs2 and
jffs2 like it's already done for xfs in this patch.

Also change the inode argument to the handlers to a dentry to allow
using the handlers mechnism for filesystems that require it later,
e.g. cifs.

[with GFS2 bits updated by Steven Whitehouse &lt;swhiteho@redhat.com&gt;]

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Joel Becker &lt;joel.becker@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a flags argument to struct xattr_handler and pass it to all xattr
handler methods.  This allows using the same methods for multiple
handlers, e.g. for the ACL methods which perform exactly the same action
for the access and default ACLs, just using a different underlying
attribute.  With a little more groundwork it'll also allow sharing the
methods for the regular user/trusted/secure handlers in extN, ocfs2 and
jffs2 like it's already done for xfs in this patch.

Also change the inode argument to the handlers to a dentry to allow
using the handlers mechnism for filesystems that require it later,
e.g. cifs.

[with GFS2 bits updated by Steven Whitehouse &lt;swhiteho@redhat.com&gt;]

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Joel Becker &lt;joel.becker@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS: Factor out part of vfs_setxattr so it can be called from the SELinux hook for inode_setsecctx.</title>
<updated>2009-09-10T00:11:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David P. Quigley</name>
<email>dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-03T18:25:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b1ab7e4b2a88d3ac13771463be8f302ce1616cfc'/>
<id>b1ab7e4b2a88d3ac13771463be8f302ce1616cfc</id>
<content type='text'>
This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the
setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux
implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while
maintaining the proper separation of layers.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley &lt;dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the
setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux
implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while
maintaining the proper separation of layers.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley &lt;dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xattr: add missing consts to function arguments</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T07:59:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8f0cfa52a1d4ffacd8e7de906d19662f5da58d58'/>
<id>8f0cfa52a1d4ffacd8e7de906d19662f5da58d58</id>
<content type='text'>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting buffer</title>
<updated>2008-02-05T17:44:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David P. Quigley</name>
<email>dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-05T06:29:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=42492594043d621a7910ff5877c3eb9202870b45'/>
<id>42492594043d621a7910ff5877c3eb9202870b45</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.

Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.

The patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley &lt;dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.

Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.

The patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley &lt;dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] cleanup include/linux/xattr.h</title>
<updated>2007-02-11T19:18:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Adrian Bunk</name>
<email>bunk@stusta.de</email>
</author>
<published>2007-02-10T09:46:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5b0a2075adb04846870a7fc1e62b08a532054ba6'/>
<id>5b0a2075adb04846870a7fc1e62b08a532054ba6</id>
<content type='text'>
- reduce the userspace visible part
- fix the in-kernel compilation

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@stusta.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
- reduce the userspace visible part
- fix the in-kernel compilation

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@stusta.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
