linux-toradex.git/include/linux, branch v3.10.72

usb: core: buffer: smallest buffer should start at ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN

2015-03-06T22:40:51+00:00

commit 5efd2ea8c9f4f12916ffc8ba636792ce052f6911 upstream.

the following error pops up during "testusb -a -t 10"
| musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: dma_pool_free buffer-128,	f134e000/be842000 (bad dma)
hcd_buffer_create() creates a few buffers, the smallest has 32 bytes of
size. ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN is set to 64 bytes. This combo results in
hcd_buffer_alloc() returning memory which is 32 bytes aligned and it
might by identified by buffer_offset() as another buffer. This means the
buffer which is on a 32 byte boundary will not get freed, instead it
tries to free another buffer with the error message.

This patch fixes the issue by creating the smallest DMA buffer with the
size of ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN (or 32 in case ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN is
smaller). This might be 32, 64 or even 128 bytes. The next three pools
will have the size 128, 512 and 2048.
In case the smallest pool is 128 bytes then we have only three pools
instead of four (and zero the first entry in the array).
The last pool size is always 2048 bytes which is the assumed PAGE_SIZE /
2 of 4096. I doubt it makes sense to continue using PAGE_SIZE / 2 where
we would end up with 8KiB buffer in case we have 16KiB pages.
Instead I think it makes sense to have a common size(s) and extend them
if there is need to.
There is a BUILD_BUG_ON() now in case someone has a minalign of more than
128 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Acked-by: Alan Stern 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fsnotify: fix handling of renames in audit

2015-03-06T22:40:48+00:00

commit 6ee8e25fc3e916193bce4ebb43d5439e1e2144ab upstream.

Commit e9fd702a58c4 ("audit: convert audit watches to use fsnotify
instead of inotify") broke handling of renames in audit.  Audit code
wants to update inode number of an inode corresponding to watched name
in a directory.  When something gets renamed into a directory to a
watched name, inotify previously passed moved inode to audit code
however new fsnotify code passes directory inode where the change
happened.  That confuses audit and it starts watching parent directory
instead of a file in a directory.

This can be observed for example by doing:

  cd /tmp
  touch foo bar
  auditctl -w /tmp/foo
  touch foo
  mv bar foo
  touch foo

In audit log we see events like:

  type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1423563584.155:90): auid=1000 ses=2 op="updated rules" path="/tmp/foo" key=(null) list=4 res=1
  ...
  type=PATH msg=audit(1423563584.155:91): item=2 name="bar" inode=1046884 dev=08:0 2 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=DELETE
  type=PATH msg=audit(1423563584.155:91): item=3 name="foo" inode=1046842 dev=08:0 2 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=DELETE
  type=PATH msg=audit(1423563584.155:91): item=4 name="foo" inode=1046884 dev=08:0 2 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=CREATE
  ...

and that's it - we see event for the first touch after creating the
audit rule, we see events for rename but we don't see any event for the
last touch.  However we start seeing events for unrelated stuff
happening in /tmp.

Fix the problem by passing moved inode as data in the FS_MOVED_FROM and
FS_MOVED_TO events instead of the directory where the change happens.
This doesn't introduce any new problems because noone besides
audit_watch.c cares about the passed value:

  fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c cares only about FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH events.
  fs/notify/dnotify/dnotify.c doesn't care about passed 'data' value at all.
  fs/notify/inotify/inotify_fsnotify.c uses 'data' only for FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH.
  kernel/audit_tree.c doesn't care about passed 'data' at all.
  kernel/audit_watch.c expects moved inode as 'data'.

Fixes: e9fd702a58c49db ("audit: convert audit watches to use fsnotify instead of inotify")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Cc: Paul Moore 
Cc: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

quota: provide interface for readding allocated space into reserved space

2015-01-30T01:40:57+00:00

commit 1c8924eb106c1ac755d5d35ce9b3ff42e89e2511 upstream.

ext4 needs to convert allocated (metadata) blocks back into blocks
reserved for delayed allocation. Add functions into quota code for
supporting such operation.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Cc: Josh Hunt 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"

2015-01-30T01:40:57+00:00

commit 5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b upstream.

This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: settimeofday: Validate the values of tv from user

2015-01-30T01:40:56+00:00

commit 6ada1fc0e1c4775de0e043e1bd3ae9d065491aa5 upstream.

An unvalidated user input is multiplied by a constant, which can result in
an undefined behaviour for large values. While this is validated later,
we should avoid triggering undefined behaviour.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
[jstultz: include trivial milisecond->microsecond correction noticed
by Andy]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page

2015-01-16T14:59:03+00:00

commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

pstore-ram: Allow optional mapping with pgprot_noncached

2015-01-16T14:59:00+00:00

commit 027bc8b08242c59e19356b4b2c189f2d849ab660 upstream.

On some ARMs the memory can be mapped pgprot_noncached() and still
be working for atomic operations. As pointed out by Colin Cross
, in some cases you do want to use
pgprot_noncached() if the SoC supports it to see a debug printk
just before a write hanging the system.

On ARMs, the atomic operations on strongly ordered memory are
implementation defined. So let's provide an optional kernel parameter
for configuring pgprot_noncached(), and use pgprot_writecombine() by
default.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Rob Herring 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: Anton Vorontsov 
Cc: Colin Cross 
Cc: Olof Johansson 
Cc: Russell King 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren 
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis

2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00

commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc//setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished

2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00

commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established.  Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks

2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00

commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.

Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged.  Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.

This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.

A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman