<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/linux, branch v3.12.29</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T14:55:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-23T19:36:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ace57c92048721f447c4e9baffaf560ebaccef5b'/>
<id>ace57c92048721f447c4e9baffaf560ebaccef5b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad upstream.

This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
plus fixing it a different way...

We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits.  This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.

Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets.  We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.

The BSET gets cleared differently.  Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time.  The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read.  So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.

So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh:	0000000000000000
CapPrm:	0000000000000000
CapEff:	0000000000000000
CapBnd:	ffffffc000000000

All of this 'should' be fine.  Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions.  But they do...

So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel).  We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets.  If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset.  The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.  So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent.  These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.

The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits!  So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable.  Given it is 'more priv' than its parent.  It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.

The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
	This makes debugging easier!

2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits.  it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
	This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
	made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
	things)

3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
	This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.

4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
	This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Walsh &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad upstream.

This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
plus fixing it a different way...

We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits.  This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.

Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets.  We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.

The BSET gets cleared differently.  Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time.  The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read.  So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.

So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh:	0000000000000000
CapPrm:	0000000000000000
CapEff:	0000000000000000
CapBnd:	ffffffc000000000

All of this 'should' be fine.  Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions.  But they do...

So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel).  We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets.  If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset.  The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.  So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent.  These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.

The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits!  So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable.  Given it is 'more priv' than its parent.  It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.

The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
	This makes debugging easier!

2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits.  it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
	This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
	made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
	things)

3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
	This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.

4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
	This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Walsh &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>svcrdma: Select NFSv4.1 backchannel transport based on forward channel</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T13:12:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chuck Lever</name>
<email>chuck.lever@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-16T19:38:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=849f67c7e1843fbad81a6e0dbbbb1614acbe9c11'/>
<id>849f67c7e1843fbad81a6e0dbbbb1614acbe9c11</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c45ddf823d679a820adddd53b52c6699c9a05ac upstream.

The current code always selects XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_TCP for the back
channel, even when the forward channel was not TCP (eg, RDMA). When
a 4.1 mount is attempted with RDMA, the server panics in the TCP BC
code when trying to send CB_NULL.

Instead, construct the transport protocol number from the forward
channel transport or'd with XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC. Transports that do
not support bi-directional RPC will not have registered a "BC"
transport, causing create_backchannel_client() to fail immediately.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=265
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3c45ddf823d679a820adddd53b52c6699c9a05ac upstream.

The current code always selects XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_TCP for the back
channel, even when the forward channel was not TCP (eg, RDMA). When
a 4.1 mount is attempted with RDMA, the server panics in the TCP BC
code when trying to send CB_NULL.

Instead, construct the transport protocol number from the forward
channel transport or'd with XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC. Transports that do
not support bi-directional RPC will not have registered a "BC"
transport, causing create_backchannel_client() to fail immediately.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=265
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jbd2: fix descriptor block size handling errors with journal_csum</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T13:12:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-27T22:40:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e6d89e609fbfc9e46816bc303617af182abbb616'/>
<id>e6d89e609fbfc9e46816bc303617af182abbb616</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db9ee220361de03ee86388f9ea5e529eaad5323c upstream.

It turns out that there are some serious problems with the on-disk
format of journal checksum v2.  The foremost is that the function to
calculate descriptor tag size returns sizes that are too big.  This
causes alignment issues on some architectures and is compounded by the
fact that some parts of jbd2 use the structure size (incorrectly) to
determine the presence of a 64bit journal instead of checking the
feature flags.

Therefore, introduce journal checksum v3, which enlarges the
descriptor block tag format to allow for full 32-bit checksums of
journal blocks, fix the journal tag function to return the correct
sizes, and fix the jbd2 recovery code to use feature flags to
determine 64bitness.

Add a few function helpers so we don't have to open-code quite so
many pieces.

Switching to a 16-byte block size was found to increase journal size
overhead by a maximum of 0.1%, to convert a 32-bit journal with no
checksumming to a 32-bit journal with checksum v3 enabled.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reported-by: TR Reardon &lt;thomas_reardon@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit db9ee220361de03ee86388f9ea5e529eaad5323c upstream.

It turns out that there are some serious problems with the on-disk
format of journal checksum v2.  The foremost is that the function to
calculate descriptor tag size returns sizes that are too big.  This
causes alignment issues on some architectures and is compounded by the
fact that some parts of jbd2 use the structure size (incorrectly) to
determine the presence of a 64bit journal instead of checking the
feature flags.

Therefore, introduce journal checksum v3, which enlarges the
descriptor block tag format to allow for full 32-bit checksums of
journal blocks, fix the journal tag function to return the correct
sizes, and fix the jbd2 recovery code to use feature flags to
determine 64bitness.

Add a few function helpers so we don't have to open-code quite so
many pieces.

Switching to a 16-byte block size was found to increase journal size
overhead by a maximum of 0.1%, to convert a 32-bit journal with no
checksumming to a 32-bit journal with checksum v3 enabled.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reported-by: TR Reardon &lt;thomas_reardon@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Add pci_upstream_bridge()</title>
<updated>2014-09-03T08:54:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjorn Helgaas</name>
<email>bhelgaas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-06T17:11:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5d1ab637d00b258f7852c963771ed4f1fd0b2de3'/>
<id>5d1ab637d00b258f7852c963771ed4f1fd0b2de3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c6bde215acfd637708142ae671843b6f0eadbc6d upstream.

This adds a pci_upstream_bridge() interface to find the PCI-to-PCI bridge
upstream from a device.  This is typically just "dev-&gt;bus-&gt;self", but in
the case of a VF on a virtual bus, we have to start from the corresponding
PF.  Returns NULL if there is no upstream PCI bridge, i.e., if the device
is on a root bus.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu &lt;yinghai@kernel.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c6bde215acfd637708142ae671843b6f0eadbc6d upstream.

This adds a pci_upstream_bridge() interface to find the PCI-to-PCI bridge
upstream from a device.  This is typically just "dev-&gt;bus-&gt;self", but in
the case of a VF on a virtual bus, we have to start from the corresponding
PF.  Returns NULL if there is no upstream PCI bridge, i.e., if the device
is on a root bus.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu &lt;yinghai@kernel.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bio-integrity: add "bip_max_vcnt" into struct bio_integrity_payload</title>
<updated>2014-09-02T09:41:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gu Zheng</name>
<email>guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-01T16:36:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c27a4fe151abf351665639eef0ee2fef7e6fb4f9'/>
<id>c27a4fe151abf351665639eef0ee2fef7e6fb4f9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cbcd1054a1fd2aa980fc11ff28e436fc4aaa2d54 upstream.

Commit 08778795 ("block: Fix nr_vecs for inline integrity vectors") from
Martin introduces the function bip_integrity_vecs(get the useful vectors)
to fix the issue about nr_vecs for inline integrity vectors that reported
by David Milburn.

But it seems that bip_integrity_vecs() will return the wrong number if the
bio is not based on any bio_set for some reason(bio-&gt;bi_pool == NULL),
because in that case, the bip_inline_vecs[0] is malloced directly.  So
here we add the bip_max_vcnt to record the count of vector slots, and
cleanup the function bip_integrity_vecs().

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng &lt;guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;kmo@daterainc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cbcd1054a1fd2aa980fc11ff28e436fc4aaa2d54 upstream.

Commit 08778795 ("block: Fix nr_vecs for inline integrity vectors") from
Martin introduces the function bip_integrity_vecs(get the useful vectors)
to fix the issue about nr_vecs for inline integrity vectors that reported
by David Milburn.

But it seems that bip_integrity_vecs() will return the wrong number if the
bio is not based on any bio_set for some reason(bio-&gt;bi_pool == NULL),
because in that case, the bip_inline_vecs[0] is malloced directly.  So
here we add the bip_max_vcnt to record the count of vector slots, and
cleanup the function bip_integrity_vecs().

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng &lt;guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;kmo@daterainc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usb-core bInterval quirk</title>
<updated>2014-09-02T09:37:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James P Michels III</name>
<email>james.p.michels@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-27T17:28:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c877de31fe78ee82855a2c1049c7b755128f481c'/>
<id>c877de31fe78ee82855a2c1049c7b755128f481c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cd83ce9e6195aa3ea15ab4db92892802c20df5d0 upstream.

This patch adds a usb quirk to support devices with interupt endpoints
and bInterval values expressed as microframes. The quirk causes the
parse endpoint function to modify the reported bInterval to a standards
conforming value.

There is currently code in the endpoint parser that checks for
bIntervals that are outside of the valid range (1-16 for USB 2+ high
speed and super speed interupt endpoints). In this case, the code assumes
the bInterval is being reported in 1ms frames. As well, the correction
is only applied if the original bInterval value is out of the 1-16 range.

With this quirk applied to the device, the bInterval will be
accurately adjusted from microframes to an exponent.

Signed-off-by: James P Michels III &lt;james.p.michels@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cd83ce9e6195aa3ea15ab4db92892802c20df5d0 upstream.

This patch adds a usb quirk to support devices with interupt endpoints
and bInterval values expressed as microframes. The quirk causes the
parse endpoint function to modify the reported bInterval to a standards
conforming value.

There is currently code in the endpoint parser that checks for
bIntervals that are outside of the valid range (1-16 for USB 2+ high
speed and super speed interupt endpoints). In this case, the code assumes
the bInterval is being reported in 1ms frames. As well, the correction
is only applied if the original bInterval value is out of the 1-16 range.

With this quirk applied to the device, the bInterval will be
accurately adjusted from microframes to an exponent.

Signed-off-by: James P Michels III &lt;james.p.michels@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>DMA-API: provide a helper to set both DMA and coherent DMA masks</title>
<updated>2014-08-26T12:12:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-26T12:49:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8bac7a35e60ca70c8d12ddbfdf28a8df5a976b2b'/>
<id>8bac7a35e60ca70c8d12ddbfdf28a8df5a976b2b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4aa806b771d16b810771d86ce23c4c3160888db3 upstream.

Provide a helper to set both the DMA and coherent DMA masks to the
same value - this avoids duplicated code in a number of drivers,
sometimes with buggy error handling, and also allows us identify
which drivers do things differently.

Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4aa806b771d16b810771d86ce23c4c3160888db3 upstream.

Provide a helper to set both the DMA and coherent DMA masks to the
same value - this avoids duplicated code in a number of drivers,
sometimes with buggy error handling, and also allows us identify
which drivers do things differently.

Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount</title>
<updated>2014-08-26T12:12:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-29T00:26:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8b18c0adbc5d0cb1530692e72bcfb88fd7bb77bb'/>
<id>8b18c0adbc5d0cb1530692e72bcfb88fd7bb77bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705 upstream.

While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.

In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked.  These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.

The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev  may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.

The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled.  Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.

The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.

Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705 upstream.

While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.

In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked.  These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.

The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev  may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.

The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled.  Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.

The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.

Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount</title>
<updated>2014-08-26T12:12:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-28T23:26:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=25c1def33a2f74079f3062b7afdf98fcf9f34e6d'/>
<id>25c1def33a2f74079f3062b7afdf98fcf9f34e6d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd upstream.

Kenton Varda &lt;kenton@sandstorm.io&gt; discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.

Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others.   This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd upstream.

Kenton Varda &lt;kenton@sandstorm.io&gt; discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.

Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others.   This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>printk: rename printk_sched to printk_deferred</title>
<updated>2014-08-19T12:23:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Stultz</name>
<email>john.stultz@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T23:11:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d6a1cfb5f64485010bb0429a7bcb899b96ee92e9'/>
<id>d6a1cfb5f64485010bb0429a7bcb899b96ee92e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aac74dc495456412c4130a1167ce4beb6c1f0b38 upstream.

After learning we'll need some sort of deferred printk functionality in
the timekeeping core, Peter suggested we rename the printk_sched function
so it can be reused by needed subsystems.

This only changes the function name. No logic changes.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aac74dc495456412c4130a1167ce4beb6c1f0b38 upstream.

After learning we'll need some sort of deferred printk functionality in
the timekeeping core, Peter suggested we rename the printk_sched function
so it can be reused by needed subsystems.

This only changes the function name. No logic changes.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
