linux-toradex.git/include/linux, branch v3.2.55

sched/rt: Avoid updating RT entry timeout twice within one tick period

2014-02-15T19:20:18+00:00

commit 57d2aa00dcec67afa52478730f2b524521af14fb upstream.

The issue below was found in 2.6.34-rt rather than mainline rt
kernel, but the issue still exists upstream as well.

So please let me describe how it was noticed on 2.6.34-rt:

On this version, each softirq has its own thread, it means there
is at least one RT FIFO task per cpu. The priority of these
tasks is set to 49 by default. If user launches an RT FIFO task
with priority lower than 49 of softirq RT tasks, it's possible
there are two RT FIFO tasks enqueued one cpu runqueue at one
moment. By current strategy of balancing RT tasks, when it comes
to RT tasks, we really need to put them off to a CPU that they
can run on as soon as possible. Even if it means a bit of cache
line flushing, we want RT tasks to be run with the least latency.

When the user RT FIFO task which just launched before is
running, the sched timer tick of the current cpu happens. In this
tick period, the timeout value of the user RT task will be
updated once. Subsequently, we try to wake up one softirq RT
task on its local cpu. As the priority of current user RT task
is lower than the softirq RT task, the current task will be
preempted by the higher priority softirq RT task. Before
preemption, we check to see if current can readily move to a
different cpu. If so, we will reschedule to allow the RT push logic
to try to move current somewhere else. Whenever the woken
softirq RT task runs, it first tries to migrate the user FIFO RT
task over to a cpu that is running a task of lesser priority. If
migration is done, it will send a reschedule request to the found
cpu by IPI interrupt. Once the target cpu responds the IPI
interrupt, it will pick the migrated user RT task to preempt its
current task. When the user RT task is running on the new cpu,
the sched timer tick of the cpu fires. So it will tick the user
RT task again. This also means the RT task timeout value will be
updated again. As the migration may be done in one tick period,
it means the user RT task timeout value will be updated twice
within one tick.

If we set a limit on the amount of cpu time for the user RT task
by setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTTIME), the SIGXCPU signal should be posted
upon reaching the soft limit.

But exactly when the SIGXCPU signal should be sent depends on the
RT task timeout value. In fact the timeout mechanism of sending
the SIGXCPU signal assumes the RT task timeout is increased once
every tick.

However, currently the timeout value may be added twice per
tick. So it results in the SIGXCPU signal being sent earlier
than expected.

To solve this issue, we prevent the timeout value from increasing
twice within one tick time by remembering the jiffies value of
last updating the timeout. As long as the RT task's jiffies is
different with the global jiffies value, we allow its timeout to
be updated.

Signed-off-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: Fan Du 
Reviewed-by: Yong Zhang 
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1342508623-2887-1-git-send-email-ying.xue@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
[ lizf: backported to 3.4: adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

mm: hugetlbfs: fix hugetlbfs optimization

2014-02-15T19:20:17+00:00

commit 27c73ae759774e63313c1fbfeb17ba076cea64c5 upstream.

Commit 7cb2ef56e6a8 ("mm: fix aio performance regression for database
caused by THP") can cause dereference of a dangling pointer if
split_huge_page runs during PageHuge() if there are updates to the
tail_page->private field.

Also it is repeating compound_head twice for hugetlbfs and it is running
compound_head+compound_trans_head for THP when a single one is needed in
both cases.

The new code within the PageSlab() check doesn't need to verify that the
THP page size is never bigger than the smallest hugetlbfs page size, to
avoid memory corruption.

A longstanding theoretical race condition was found while fixing the
above (see the change right after the skip_unlock label, that is
relevant for the compound_lock path too).

By re-establishing the _mapcount tail refcounting for all compound
pages, this also fixes the below problem:

  echo 0 >/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages

  BUG: Bad page state in process bash  pfn:59a01
  page:ffffea000139b038 count:0 mapcount:10 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
  page flags: 0x1c00000000008000(tail)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 6 PID: 2018 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x55/0x76
    bad_page+0xd5/0x130
    free_pages_prepare+0x213/0x280
    __free_pages+0x36/0x80
    update_and_free_page+0xc1/0xd0
    free_pool_huge_page+0xc2/0xe0
    set_max_huge_pages.part.58+0x14c/0x220
    nr_hugepages_store_common.isra.60+0xd0/0xf0
    nr_hugepages_store+0x13/0x20
    kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20
    sysfs_write_file+0x189/0x1e0
    vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0
    SyS_write+0x55/0xb0
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz 
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli 
Tested-by: Khalid Aziz 
Cc: Pravin Shelar 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Minchan Kim 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[Khalid Aziz: Backported to 3.4]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

pci: Add PCI_DEVICE_SUB() macro

2014-02-15T19:20:16+00:00

This was added as part of commit 3d567e0e291c ('tg3: Set 10_100_ONLY
flag for additional 10/100 Mbps devices') upstream and is needed by
the following patch to ahci.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

vlan: Fix header ops passthru when doing TX VLAN offload.

2014-02-15T19:20:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2205369a314e12fcec4781cc73ac9c08fc2b47de ]

When the vlan code detects that the real device can do TX VLAN offloads
in hardware, it tries to arrange for the real device's header_ops to
be invoked directly.

But it does so illegally, by simply hooking the real device's
header_ops up to the VLAN device.

This doesn't work because we will end up invoking a set of header_ops
routines which expect a device type which matches the real device, but
will see a VLAN device instead.

Fix this by providing a pass-thru set of header_ops which will arrange
to pass the proper real device instead.

To facilitate this add a dev_rebuild_header().  There are
implementations which provide a ->cache and ->create but not a
->rebuild (f.e. PLIP).  So we need a helper function just like
dev_hard_header() to avoid crashes.

Use this helper in the one existing place where the
header_ops->rebuild was being invoked, the neighbour code.

With lots of help from Florian Westphal.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic

2014-01-03T04:33:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c ]

This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.

This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.

Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.

Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.

Changes since RFC:

Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.

With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
	msg->msg_name = NULL
".

This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.

Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.

Cc: David Miller 
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

random32: fix off-by-one in seeding requirement

2014-01-03T04:33:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit 51c37a70aaa3f95773af560e6db3073520513912 ]

For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have
a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15.

Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced
a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the
errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions.

However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as:
"return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1),
__seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15
would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually
be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise
an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect
that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured.

Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel.

 [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
 [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps

Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.

Fixes: 697f8d0348a6 ("random32: seeding improvement")
Cc: Stephen Hemminger 
Cc: Florian Weimer 
Cc: Theodore Ts'o 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

x86, build, icc: Remove uninitialized_var() from compiler-intel.h

2014-01-03T04:33:30+00:00

commit 503cf95c061a0551eb684da364509297efbe55d9 upstream.

When compiling with icc,  ends up included
because the icc environment defines __GNUC__.  Thus, we neither need
nor want to have this macro defined in both compiler-gcc.h and
compiler-intel.h, and the fact that they are inconsistent just makes
the compiler spew warnings.

Reported-by: Sunil K. Pandey 
Cc: Kevin B. Smith 
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-0mbwou1zt7pafij09b897lg3@git.kernel.org
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

PCI: Define macro for Marvell vendor ID

2014-01-03T04:33:24+00:00

commit 8e7ee6f5dfb56a32da760d990be908ed35b1c5bf upstream.

Define PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT macro for 0x1b4b vendor ID

Signed-off-by: Xiangliang Yu 
Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe 
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

ipc, msg: fix message length check for negative values

2014-01-03T04:33:21+00:00

commit 4e9b45a19241354daec281d7a785739829b52359 upstream.

On 64 bit systems the test for negative message sizes is bogus as the
size, which may be positive when evaluated as a long, will get truncated
to an int when passed to load_msg().  So a long might very well contain a
positive value but when truncated to an int it would become negative.

That in combination with a small negative value of msg_ctlmax (which will
be promoted to an unsigned type for the comparison against msgsz, making
it a big positive value and therefore make it pass the check) will lead to
two problems: 1/ The kmalloc() call in alloc_msg() will allocate a too
small buffer as the addition of alen is effectively a subtraction.  2/ The
copy_from_user() call in load_msg() will first overflow the buffer with
userland data and then, when the userland access generates an access
violation, the fixup handler copy_user_handle_tail() will try to fill the
remainder with zeros -- roughly 4GB.  That almost instantly results in a
system crash or reset.

  ,-[ Reproducer (needs to be run as root) ]--
  | #include 
  | #include 
  | #include 
  | #include 
  |
  | int main(void) {
  |     long msg = 1;
  |     int fd;
  |
  |     fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/msgmax", O_WRONLY);
  |     write(fd, "-1", 2);
  |     close(fd);
  |
  |     msgsnd(0, &msg, 0xfffffff0, IPC_NOWAIT);
  |
  |     return 0;
  | }
  '---

Fix the issue by preventing msgsz from getting truncated by consistently
using size_t for the message length.  This way the size checks in
do_msgsnd() could still be passed with a negative value for msg_ctlmax but
we would fail on the buffer allocation in that case and error out.

Also change the type of m_ts from int to size_t to avoid similar nastiness
in other code paths -- it is used in similar constructs, i.e.  signed vs.
unsigned checks.  It should never become negative under normal
circumstances, though.

Setting msg_ctlmax to a negative value is an odd configuration and should
be prevented.  As that might break existing userland, it will be handled
in a separate commit so it could easily be reverted and reworked without
reintroducing the above described bug.

Hardening mechanisms for user copy operations would have catched that bug
early -- e.g.  checking slab object sizes on user copy operations as the
usercopy feature of the PaX patch does.  Or, for that matter, detect the
long vs.  int sign change due to truncation, as the size overflow plugin
of the very same patch does.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Pax Team 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Brad Spengler 
Cc: Manfred Spraul 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Drop changes to alloc_msg() and copy_msg(), which don't exist]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests

2014-01-03T04:33:21+00:00

commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream.

The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: "Luck, Tony" 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings