linux-toradex.git/include/linux, branch v4.9.36

coredump: Ensure proper size of sparse core files

2017-07-05T12:40:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4d22c75d4c7b5c5f4bd31054f09103ee490878fd ]

If the last section of a core file ends with an unmapped or zero page,
the size of the file does not correspond with the last dump_skip() call.
gdb complains that the file is truncated and can be confusing to users.

After all of the vma sections are written, make sure that the file size
is no smaller than the current file position.

This problem can be demonstrated with gdb's bigcore testcase on the
sparc architecture.

Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc

2017-07-05T12:40:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit d407bd25a204bd66b7346dde24bd3d37ef0e0b05 ]

This patch adds two helpers, bpf_map_area_alloc() and bpf_map_area_free(),
that are to be used for map allocations. Using kmalloc() for very large
allocations can cause excessive work within the page allocator, so i) fall
back earlier to vmalloc() when the attempt is considered costly anyway,
and even more importantly ii) don't trigger OOM killer with any of the
allocators.

Since this is based on a user space request, for example, when creating
maps with element pre-allocation, we really want such requests to fail
instead of killing other user space processes.

Also, don't spam the kernel log with warnings should any of the allocations
fail under pressure. Given that, we can make backend selection in
bpf_map_area_alloc() generic, and convert all maps over to use this API
for spots with potentially large allocation requests.

Note, replacing the one kmalloc_array() is fine as overflow checks happen
earlier in htab_map_alloc(), since it must also protect the multiplication
for vmalloc() should kmalloc_array() fail.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: phy: add an option to disable EEE advertisement

2017-07-05T12:40:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit d853d145ea3e63387a2ac759aa41d5e43876e561 ]

This patch adds an option to disable EEE advertisement in the generic PHY
by providing a mask of prohibited modes corresponding to the value found in
the MDIO_AN_EEE_ADV register.

On some platforms, PHY Low power idle seems to be causing issues, even
breaking the link some cases. The patch provides a convenient way for these
platforms to disable EEE advertisement and work around the issue.

Signed-off-by: Jerome Brunet 
Tested-by: Yegor Yefremov 
Tested-by: Andreas Färber 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: Fix CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW sub-nanosecond accounting

2017-06-29T11:00:30+00:00

commit 3d88d56c5873f6eebe23e05c3da701960146b801 upstream.

Due to how the MONOTONIC_RAW accumulation logic was handled,
there is the potential for a 1ns discontinuity when we do
accumulations. This small discontinuity has for the most part
gone un-noticed, but since ARM64 enabled CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
in their vDSO clock_gettime implementation, we've seen failures
with the inconsistency-check test in kselftest.

This patch addresses the issue by using the same sub-ns
accumulation handling that CLOCK_MONOTONIC uses, which avoids
the issue for in-kernel users.

Since the ARM64 vDSO implementation has its own clock_gettime
calculation logic, this patch reduces the frequency of errors,
but failures are still seen. The ARM64 vDSO will need to be
updated to include the sub-nanosecond xtime_nsec values in its
calculation for this issue to be completely fixed.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Tested-by: Daniel Mentz 
Cc: Prarit Bhargava 
Cc: Kevin Brodsky 
Cc: Richard Cochran 
Cc: Stephen Boyd 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496965462-20003-3-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: Fix clock->read(clock) race around clocksource changes

2017-06-29T11:00:30+00:00

commit ceea5e3771ed2378668455fa21861bead7504df5 upstream.

In tests, which excercise switching of clocksources, a NULL
pointer dereference can be observed on AMR64 platforms in the
clocksource read() function:

u64 clocksource_mmio_readl_down(struct clocksource *c)
{
	return ~(u64)readl_relaxed(to_mmio_clksrc(c)->reg) & c->mask;
}

This is called from the core timekeeping code via:

	cycle_now = tkr->read(tkr->clock);

tkr->read is the cached tkr->clock->read() function pointer.
When the clocksource is changed then tkr->clock and tkr->read
are updated sequentially. The code above results in a sequential
load operation of tkr->read and tkr->clock as well.

If the store to tkr->clock hits between the loads of tkr->read
and tkr->clock, then the old read() function is called with the
new clock pointer. As a consequence the read() function
dereferences a different data structure and the resulting 'reg'
pointer can point anywhere including NULL.

This problem was introduced when the timekeeping code was
switched over to use struct tk_read_base. Before that, it was
theoretically possible as well when the compiler decided to
reload clock in the code sequence:

     now = tk->clock->read(tk->clock);

Add a helper function which avoids the issue by reading
tk_read_base->clock once into a local variable clk and then issue
the read function via clk->read(clk). This guarantees that the
read() function always gets the proper clocksource pointer handed
in.

Since there is now no use for the tkr.read pointer, this patch
also removes it, and to address stopping the fast timekeeper
during suspend/resume, it introduces a dummy clocksource to use
rather then just a dummy read function.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Prarit Bhargava 
Cc: Richard Cochran 
Cc: Stephen Boyd 
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar 
Cc: Daniel Mentz 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496965462-20003-2-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas

2017-06-24T05:11:18+00:00

commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Tested-by: Helge Deller  # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/watchdog: prevent false hardlockup on overloaded system

2017-06-17T04:41:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit b94f51183b0617e7b9b4fb4137d4cf1cab7547c2 ]

On an overloaded system, it is possible that a change in the watchdog
threshold can be delayed long enough to trigger a false positive.

This can easily be achieved by having a cpu spinning indefinitely on a
task, while another cpu updates watchdog threshold.

What happens is while trying to park the watchdog threads, the hrtimers
on the other cpus trigger and reprogram themselves with the new slower
watchdog threshold.  Meanwhile, the nmi watchdog is still programmed
with the old faster threshold.

Because the one cpu is blocked, it prevents the thread parking on the
other cpus from completing, which is needed to shutdown the nmi watchdog
and reprogram it correctly.  As a result, a false positive from the nmi
watchdog is reported.

Fix this by setting a park_in_progress flag to block all lockups until
the parking is complete.

Fix provided by Ulrich Obergfell.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/park_in_progress/watchdog_park_in_progress/]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481041033-192236-1-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus 
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin 
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/watchdog.c: move shared definitions to nmi.h

2017-06-17T04:41:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 249e52e35580fcfe5dad53a7dcd7c1252788749c ]

Patch series "Clean up watchdog handlers", v2.

This is an attempt to cleanup watchdog handlers.  Right now,
kernel/watchdog.c implements both softlockup and hardlockup detectors.
Softlockup code is generic.  Hardlockup code is arch specific.  Some
architectures don't use hardlockup detectors.  They use their own
watchdog detectors.  To make both these combination work, we have
numerous #ifdefs in kernel/watchdog.c.

We are trying here to make these handlers independent of each other.
Also provide an interface for architectures to implement their own
handlers.  watchdog_nmi_enable and watchdog_nmi_disable will be defined
as weak such that architectures can override its definitions.

Thanks to Don Zickus for his suggestions.
Here are our previous discussions
http://www.spinics.net/lists/sparclinux/msg16543.html
http://www.spinics.net/lists/sparclinux/msg16441.html

This patch (of 3):

Move shared macros and definitions to nmi.h so that watchdog.c, new file
watchdog_hld.c or any other architecture specific handler can use those
definitions.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478034826-43888-2-git-send-email-babu.moger@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger 
Acked-by: Don Zickus 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Yaowei Bai 
Cc: Aaron Tomlin 
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai 
Cc: Josh Hunt 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: phy: micrel: add support for KSZ8795

2017-06-17T04:41:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9d162ed69f51cbd9ee5a0c7e82aba7acc96362ff ]

This is adds support for the PHYs in the KSZ8795 5port managed switch.

It will allow to detect the link between the switch and the soc
and uses the same read_status functions as the KSZ8873MLL switch.

Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fscache: Fix dead object requeue

2017-06-17T04:41:52+00:00

[ Upstream commit e26bfebdfc0d212d366de9990a096665d5c0209a ]

Under some circumstances, an fscache object can become queued such that it
fscache_object_work_func() can be called once the object is in the
OBJECT_DEAD state.  This results in the kernel oopsing when it tries to
invoke the handler for the state (which is hard coded to 0x2).

The way this comes about is something like the following:

 (1) The object dispatcher is processing a work state for an object.  This
     is done in workqueue context.

 (2) An out-of-band event comes in that isn't masked, causing the object to
     be queued, say EV_KILL.

 (3) The object dispatcher finishes processing the current work state on
     that object and then sees there's another event to process, so,
     without returning to the workqueue core, it processes that event too.
     It then follows the chain of events that initiates until we reach
     OBJECT_DEAD without going through a wait state (such as
     WAIT_FOR_CLEARANCE).

     At this point, object->events may be 0, object->event_mask will be 0
     and oob_event_mask will be 0.

 (4) The object dispatcher returns to the workqueue processor, and in due
     course, this sees that the object's work item is still queued and
     invokes it again.

 (5) The current state is a work state (OBJECT_DEAD), so the dispatcher
     jumps to it - resulting in an OOPS.

When I'm seeing this, the work state in (1) appears to have been either
LOOK_UP_OBJECT or CREATE_OBJECT (object->oob_table is
fscache_osm_lookup_oob).

The window for (2) is very small:

 (A) object->event_mask is cleared whilst the event dispatch process is
     underway - though there's no memory barrier to force this to the top
     of the function.

     The window, therefore is from the time the object was selected by the
     workqueue processor and made requeueable to the time the mask was
     cleared.

 (B) fscache_raise_event() will only queue the object if it manages to set
     the event bit and the corresponding event_mask bit was set.

     The enqueuement is then deferred slightly whilst we get a ref on the
     object and get the per-CPU variable for workqueue congestion.  This
     slight deferral slightly increases the probability by allowing extra
     time for the workqueue to make the item requeueable.

Handle this by giving the dead state a processor function and checking the
for the dead state address rather than seeing if the processor function is
address 0x2.  The dead state processor function can then set a flag to
indicate that it's occurred and give a warning if it occurs more than once
per object.

If this race occurs, an oops similar to the following is seen (note the RIP
value):

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002
IP: [<0000000000000002>] 0x1
PGD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 17 PID: 16077 Comm: kworker/u48:9 Not tainted 3.10.0-327.18.2.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
Workqueue: fscache_object fscache_object_work_func [fscache]
task: ffff880302b63980 ti: ffff880717544000 task.ti: ffff880717544000
RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000002>]  [<0000000000000002>] 0x1
RSP: 0018:ffff880717547df8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa0368640 RBX: ffff880edf7a4480 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff880edf7a4480
RBP: ffff880717547e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dfc40a25cb3a4510
R10: dfc40a25cb3a4510 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880edf7a4510 R14: ffff8817f6153400 R15: 0000000000000600
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88181f420000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 000000000194a000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffffffffa0363695 ffff880edf7a4510 ffff88093f16f900 ffff8817faa4ec00
 ffff880717547e60 ffffffff8109d5db 00000000faa4ec18 0000000000000000
 ffff8817faa4ec18 ffff88093f16f930 ffff880302b63980 ffff88093f16f900
Call Trace:
 [] ? fscache_object_work_func+0xa5/0x200 [fscache]
 [] process_one_work+0x17b/0x470
 [] worker_thread+0x21c/0x400
 [] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400
 [] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
 [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140
 [] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
 [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Jeremy McNicoll 
Tested-by: Frank Sorenson 
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington 
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman