Some of the debug files ended up wrongly in sysfs, because at that point of time, debugfs didn't exist. Convert these files to use debugfs and also seq_file. This patch converts all of these files at once and then removes the exported symbol for the Bluetooth sysfs class. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
All usages of structure net_proto_ops should be declared const. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When L2CAP loses an I-frame we send a SREJ frame to the transmitter side requesting the lost packet. This patch implement all Recv I-frame events on SREJ_SENT state table except the ones that deal with SendRej (the REJ exception at receiver side is yet not implemented). Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
L2CAP uses retransmission and monitor timers to inquiry the other side about unacked I-frames. After sending each I-frame we (re)start the retransmission timer. If it expires, we start a monitor timer that send a S-frame with P bit set and wait for S-frame with F bit set. If monitor timer expires, try again, at a maximum of L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_TX. Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch adds support for ERTM transfers, without retransmission, with txWindow up to 63 and with acknowledgement of packets received. Now the packets are queued before call l2cap_do_send(), so packets couldn't be sent at the time we call l2cap_sock_sendmsg(). They will be sent in an asynchronous way on later calls of l2cap_ertm_send(). Besides if an error occurs on calling l2cap_do_send() we disconnect the channel. Initially based on a patch from Nathan Holstein <nathan@lampreynetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Furthermore, it twiddles with the details of SKB list handling directly, which we're trying to eliminate. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The Bluetooth source uses some endian conversion helpers, that in the end translate to kernel standard routines. So remove this obfuscation since it is fully pointless. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The L2CAP and RFCOMM applications require support for authorization and the ability of rejecting incoming connection requests. The socket interface is not really able to support this. This patch does the ground work for a socket option to defer connection setup. Setting this option allows calling of accept() and then the first read() will trigger the final connection setup. Calling close() would reject the connection. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>