<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include/uapi/asm-generic, branch v5.9-rc7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next</title>
<updated>2020-08-06T03:13:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-06T03:13:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=47ec5303d73ea344e84f46660fff693c57641386'/>
<id>47ec5303d73ea344e84f46660fff693c57641386</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) Support 6Ghz band in ath11k driver, from Rajkumar Manoharan.

 2) Support UDP segmentation in code TSO code, from Eric Dumazet.

 3) Allow flashing different flash images in cxgb4 driver, from Vishal
    Kulkarni.

 4) Add drop frames counter and flow status to tc flower offloading,
    from Po Liu.

 5) Support n-tuple filters in cxgb4, from Vishal Kulkarni.

 6) Various new indirect call avoidance, from Eric Dumazet and Brian
    Vazquez.

 7) Fix BPF verifier failures on 32-bit pointer arithmetic, from
    Yonghong Song.

 8) Support querying and setting hardware address of a port function via
    devlink, use this in mlx5, from Parav Pandit.

 9) Support hw ipsec offload on bonding slaves, from Jarod Wilson.

10) Switch qca8k driver over to phylink, from Jonathan McDowell.

11) In bpftool, show list of processes holding BPF FD references to
    maps, programs, links, and btf objects. From Andrii Nakryiko.

12) Several conversions over to generic power management, from Vaibhav
    Gupta.

13) Add support for SO_KEEPALIVE et al. to bpf_setsockopt(), from Dmitry
    Yakunin.

14) Various https url conversions, from Alexander A. Klimov.

15) Timestamping and PHC support for mscc PHY driver, from Antoine
    Tenart.

16) Support bpf iterating over tcp and udp sockets, from Yonghong Song.

17) Support 5GBASE-T i40e NICs, from Aleksandr Loktionov.

18) Add kTLS RX HW offload support to mlx5e, from Tariq Toukan.

19) Fix the -&gt;ndo_start_xmit() return type to be netdev_tx_t in several
    drivers. From Luc Van Oostenryck.

20) XDP support for xen-netfront, from Denis Kirjanov.

21) Support receive buffer autotuning in MPTCP, from Florian Westphal.

22) Support EF100 chip in sfc driver, from Edward Cree.

23) Add XDP support to mvpp2 driver, from Matteo Croce.

24) Support MPTCP in sock_diag, from Paolo Abeni.

25) Commonize UDP tunnel offloading code by creating udp_tunnel_nic
    infrastructure, from Jakub Kicinski.

26) Several pci_ --&gt; dma_ API conversions, from Christophe JAILLET.

27) Add FLOW_ACTION_POLICE support to mlxsw, from Ido Schimmel.

28) Add SK_LOOKUP bpf program type, from Jakub Sitnicki.

29) Refactor a lot of networking socket option handling code in order to
    avoid set_fs() calls, from Christoph Hellwig.

30) Add rfc4884 support to icmp code, from Willem de Bruijn.

31) Support TBF offload in dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciornei.

32) Support XDP_REDIRECT in qede driver, from Alexander Lobakin.

33) Support PCI relaxed ordering in mlx5 driver, from Aya Levin.

34) Support TCP syncookies in MPTCP, from Flowian Westphal.

35) Fix several tricky cases of PMTU handling wrt. briding, from Stefano
    Brivio.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2056 commits)
  net: thunderx: initialize VF's mailbox mutex before first usage
  usb: hso: remove bogus check for EINPROGRESS
  usb: hso: no complaint about kmalloc failure
  hso: fix bailout in error case of probe
  ip_tunnel_core: Fix build for archs without _HAVE_ARCH_IPV6_CSUM
  selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test
  mptcp: be careful on subflow creation
  selftests: rtnetlink: make kci_test_encap() return sub-test result
  selftests: rtnetlink: correct the final return value for the test
  net: dsa: sja1105: use detected device id instead of DT one on mismatch
  tipc: set ub-&gt;ifindex for local ipv6 address
  ipv6: add ipv6_dev_find()
  net: openvswitch: silence suspicious RCU usage warning
  Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit"
  ptp: only allow phase values lower than 1 period
  farsync: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
  wan: wanxl: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
  hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down
  dpaa2-eth: Fix passing zero to 'PTR_ERR' warning
  net: macb: Properly handle phylink on at91sam9x
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) Support 6Ghz band in ath11k driver, from Rajkumar Manoharan.

 2) Support UDP segmentation in code TSO code, from Eric Dumazet.

 3) Allow flashing different flash images in cxgb4 driver, from Vishal
    Kulkarni.

 4) Add drop frames counter and flow status to tc flower offloading,
    from Po Liu.

 5) Support n-tuple filters in cxgb4, from Vishal Kulkarni.

 6) Various new indirect call avoidance, from Eric Dumazet and Brian
    Vazquez.

 7) Fix BPF verifier failures on 32-bit pointer arithmetic, from
    Yonghong Song.

 8) Support querying and setting hardware address of a port function via
    devlink, use this in mlx5, from Parav Pandit.

 9) Support hw ipsec offload on bonding slaves, from Jarod Wilson.

10) Switch qca8k driver over to phylink, from Jonathan McDowell.

11) In bpftool, show list of processes holding BPF FD references to
    maps, programs, links, and btf objects. From Andrii Nakryiko.

12) Several conversions over to generic power management, from Vaibhav
    Gupta.

13) Add support for SO_KEEPALIVE et al. to bpf_setsockopt(), from Dmitry
    Yakunin.

14) Various https url conversions, from Alexander A. Klimov.

15) Timestamping and PHC support for mscc PHY driver, from Antoine
    Tenart.

16) Support bpf iterating over tcp and udp sockets, from Yonghong Song.

17) Support 5GBASE-T i40e NICs, from Aleksandr Loktionov.

18) Add kTLS RX HW offload support to mlx5e, from Tariq Toukan.

19) Fix the -&gt;ndo_start_xmit() return type to be netdev_tx_t in several
    drivers. From Luc Van Oostenryck.

20) XDP support for xen-netfront, from Denis Kirjanov.

21) Support receive buffer autotuning in MPTCP, from Florian Westphal.

22) Support EF100 chip in sfc driver, from Edward Cree.

23) Add XDP support to mvpp2 driver, from Matteo Croce.

24) Support MPTCP in sock_diag, from Paolo Abeni.

25) Commonize UDP tunnel offloading code by creating udp_tunnel_nic
    infrastructure, from Jakub Kicinski.

26) Several pci_ --&gt; dma_ API conversions, from Christophe JAILLET.

27) Add FLOW_ACTION_POLICE support to mlxsw, from Ido Schimmel.

28) Add SK_LOOKUP bpf program type, from Jakub Sitnicki.

29) Refactor a lot of networking socket option handling code in order to
    avoid set_fs() calls, from Christoph Hellwig.

30) Add rfc4884 support to icmp code, from Willem de Bruijn.

31) Support TBF offload in dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciornei.

32) Support XDP_REDIRECT in qede driver, from Alexander Lobakin.

33) Support PCI relaxed ordering in mlx5 driver, from Aya Levin.

34) Support TCP syncookies in MPTCP, from Flowian Westphal.

35) Fix several tricky cases of PMTU handling wrt. briding, from Stefano
    Brivio.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2056 commits)
  net: thunderx: initialize VF's mailbox mutex before first usage
  usb: hso: remove bogus check for EINPROGRESS
  usb: hso: no complaint about kmalloc failure
  hso: fix bailout in error case of probe
  ip_tunnel_core: Fix build for archs without _HAVE_ARCH_IPV6_CSUM
  selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test
  mptcp: be careful on subflow creation
  selftests: rtnetlink: make kci_test_encap() return sub-test result
  selftests: rtnetlink: correct the final return value for the test
  net: dsa: sja1105: use detected device id instead of DT one on mismatch
  tipc: set ub-&gt;ifindex for local ipv6 address
  ipv6: add ipv6_dev_find()
  net: openvswitch: silence suspicious RCU usage warning
  Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit"
  ptp: only allow phase values lower than 1 period
  farsync: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
  wan: wanxl: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
  hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down
  dpaa2-eth: Fix passing zero to 'PTR_ERR' warning
  net: macb: Properly handle phylink on at91sam9x
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: remove compat_sys_{get,set}sockopt</title>
<updated>2020-07-20T01:16:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-17T06:23:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=55db9c0e853421fa71cac5e6855898601f78a1f5'/>
<id>55db9c0e853421fa71cac5e6855898601f78a1f5</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the -&gt;compat_{get,set}sockopt proto_ops methods are gone
there is no good reason left to keep the compat syscalls separate.

This fixes the odd use of unsigned int for the compat_setsockopt
optlen and the missing sock_use_custom_sol_socket.

It would also easily allow running the eBPF hooks for the compat
syscalls, but such a large change in behavior does not belong into
a consolidation patch like this one.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that the -&gt;compat_{get,set}sockopt proto_ops methods are gone
there is no good reason left to keep the compat syscalls separate.

This fixes the odd use of unsigned int for the compat_setsockopt
optlen and the missing sock_use_custom_sol_socket.

It would also easily allow running the eBPF hooks for the compat
syscalls, but such a large change in behavior does not belong into
a consolidation patch like this one.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: wire-up close_range()</title>
<updated>2020-06-16T22:07:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-24T09:31:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9b4feb630e8e9801603f3cab3a36369e3c1cf88d'/>
<id>9b4feb630e8e9801603f3cab3a36369e3c1cf88d</id>
<content type='text'>
This wires up the close_range() syscall into all arches at once.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry V. Levin &lt;ldv@altlinux.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This wires up the close_range() syscall into all arches at once.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry V. Levin &lt;ldv@altlinux.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: add faccessat2 syscall</title>
<updated>2020-05-14T14:44:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-14T14:44:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c8ffd8bcdd28296a198f237cc595148a8d4adfbe'/>
<id>c8ffd8bcdd28296a198f237cc595148a8d4adfbe</id>
<content type='text'>
POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it.  Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.

Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.

The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR.  Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.

Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it.  Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.

Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.

The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR.  Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.

Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>y2038: hide timeval/timespec/itimerval/itimerspec types</title>
<updated>2020-02-21T19:22:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-21T04:03:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c766d1472c70d25ad475cf56042af1652e792b23'/>
<id>c766d1472c70d25ad475cf56042af1652e792b23</id>
<content type='text'>
There are no in-kernel users remaining, but there may still be users that
include linux/time.h instead of sys/time.h from user space, so leave the
types available to user space while hiding them from kernel space.

Only the __kernel_old_* versions of these types remain now.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200110154232.4104492-4-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are no in-kernel users remaining, but there may still be users that
include linux/time.h instead of sys/time.h from user space, so leave the
types available to user space while hiding them from kernel space.

Only the __kernel_old_* versions of these types remain now.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200110154232.4104492-4-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux</title>
<updated>2020-01-30T03:38:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-30T03:38:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=83fa805bcbfc53ae82eedd65132794ae324798e5'/>
<id>83fa805bcbfc53ae82eedd65132794ae324798e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull thread management updates from Christian Brauner:
 "Sargun Dhillon over the last cycle has worked on the pidfd_getfd()
  syscall.

  This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors of a process
  based on its pidfd. A task needs to have ptrace_may_access()
  permissions with PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (suggested by Oleg and
  Andy) on the target.

  One of the main use-cases is in combination with seccomp's user
  notification feature. As a reminder, seccomp's user notification
  feature was made available in v5.0. It allows a task to retrieve a
  file descriptor for its seccomp filter. The file descriptor is usually
  handed of to a more privileged supervising process. The supervisor can
  then listen for syscall events caught by the seccomp filter of the
  supervisee and perform actions in lieu of the supervisee, usually
  emulating syscalls. pidfd_getfd() is needed to expand its uses.

  There are currently two major users that wait on pidfd_getfd() and one
  future user:

   - Netflix, Sargun said, is working on a service mesh where users
     should be able to connect to a dns-based VIP. When a user connects
     to e.g. 1.2.3.4:80 that runs e.g. service "foo" they will be
     redirected to an envoy process. This service mesh uses seccomp user
     notifications and pidfd to intercept all connect calls and instead
     of connecting them to 1.2.3.4:80 connects them to e.g.
     127.0.0.1:8080.

   - LXD uses the seccomp notifier heavily to intercept and emulate
     mknod() and mount() syscalls for unprivileged containers/processes.
     With pidfd_getfd() more uses-cases e.g. bridging socket connections
     will be possible.

   - The patchset has also seen some interest from the browser corner.
     Right now, Firefox is using a SECCOMP_RET_TRAP sandbox managed by a
     broker process. In the future glibc will start blocking all signals
     during dlopen() rendering this type of sandbox impossible. Hence,
     in the future Firefox will switch to a seccomp-user-nofication
     based sandbox which also makes use of file descriptor retrieval.
     The thread for this can be found at
     https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-12/msg00079.html

  With pidfd_getfd() it is e.g. possible to bridge socket connections
  for the supervisee (binding to a privileged port) and taking actions
  on file descriptors on behalf of the supervisee in general.

  Sargun's first version was using an ioctl on pidfds but various people
  pushed for it to be a proper syscall which he duely implemented as
  well over various review cycles. Selftests are of course included.
  I've also added instructions how to deal with merge conflicts below.

  There's also a small fix coming from the kernel mentee project to
  correctly annotate struct sighand_struct with __rcu to fix various
  sparse warnings. We've received a few more such fixes and even though
  they are mostly trivial I've decided to postpone them until after -rc1
  since they came in rather late and I don't want to risk introducing
  build warnings.

  Finally, there's a new prctl() command PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER which is
  needed to avoid allocation recursions triggerable by storage drivers
  that have userspace parts that run in the IO path (e.g. dm-multipath,
  iscsi, etc). These allocation recursions deadlock the device.

  The new prctl() allows such privileged userspace components to avoid
  allocation recursions by setting the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and
  PF_LESS_THROTTLE flags. The patch carries the necessary acks from the
  relevant maintainers and is routed here as part of prctl()
  thread-management."

* tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
  sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu
  test: Add test for pidfd getfd
  arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall
  pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall
  vfs, fdtable: Add fget_task helper
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull thread management updates from Christian Brauner:
 "Sargun Dhillon over the last cycle has worked on the pidfd_getfd()
  syscall.

  This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors of a process
  based on its pidfd. A task needs to have ptrace_may_access()
  permissions with PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (suggested by Oleg and
  Andy) on the target.

  One of the main use-cases is in combination with seccomp's user
  notification feature. As a reminder, seccomp's user notification
  feature was made available in v5.0. It allows a task to retrieve a
  file descriptor for its seccomp filter. The file descriptor is usually
  handed of to a more privileged supervising process. The supervisor can
  then listen for syscall events caught by the seccomp filter of the
  supervisee and perform actions in lieu of the supervisee, usually
  emulating syscalls. pidfd_getfd() is needed to expand its uses.

  There are currently two major users that wait on pidfd_getfd() and one
  future user:

   - Netflix, Sargun said, is working on a service mesh where users
     should be able to connect to a dns-based VIP. When a user connects
     to e.g. 1.2.3.4:80 that runs e.g. service "foo" they will be
     redirected to an envoy process. This service mesh uses seccomp user
     notifications and pidfd to intercept all connect calls and instead
     of connecting them to 1.2.3.4:80 connects them to e.g.
     127.0.0.1:8080.

   - LXD uses the seccomp notifier heavily to intercept and emulate
     mknod() and mount() syscalls for unprivileged containers/processes.
     With pidfd_getfd() more uses-cases e.g. bridging socket connections
     will be possible.

   - The patchset has also seen some interest from the browser corner.
     Right now, Firefox is using a SECCOMP_RET_TRAP sandbox managed by a
     broker process. In the future glibc will start blocking all signals
     during dlopen() rendering this type of sandbox impossible. Hence,
     in the future Firefox will switch to a seccomp-user-nofication
     based sandbox which also makes use of file descriptor retrieval.
     The thread for this can be found at
     https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-12/msg00079.html

  With pidfd_getfd() it is e.g. possible to bridge socket connections
  for the supervisee (binding to a privileged port) and taking actions
  on file descriptors on behalf of the supervisee in general.

  Sargun's first version was using an ioctl on pidfds but various people
  pushed for it to be a proper syscall which he duely implemented as
  well over various review cycles. Selftests are of course included.
  I've also added instructions how to deal with merge conflicts below.

  There's also a small fix coming from the kernel mentee project to
  correctly annotate struct sighand_struct with __rcu to fix various
  sparse warnings. We've received a few more such fixes and even though
  they are mostly trivial I've decided to postpone them until after -rc1
  since they came in rather late and I don't want to risk introducing
  build warnings.

  Finally, there's a new prctl() command PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER which is
  needed to avoid allocation recursions triggerable by storage drivers
  that have userspace parts that run in the IO path (e.g. dm-multipath,
  iscsi, etc). These allocation recursions deadlock the device.

  The new prctl() allows such privileged userspace components to avoid
  allocation recursions by setting the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and
  PF_LESS_THROTTLE flags. The patch carries the necessary acks from the
  relevant maintainers and is routed here as part of prctl()
  thread-management."

* tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
  sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu
  test: Add test for pidfd getfd
  arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall
  pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall
  vfs, fdtable: Add fget_task helper
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-01-29T19:20:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-29T19:20:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6aee4badd8126f3a2b6d31c5e2db2439d316374f'/>
<id>6aee4badd8126f3a2b6d31c5e2db2439d316374f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
 "This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.

  I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
  zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
  leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
  repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
  review during that... Oh, well.

  Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
  review and public testing, so here it comes"

From Aleksa's description of the series:
 "For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
  incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
  possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
  accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
  flags are present[1].

  This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
  been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
  defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
  kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
  flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
  to being added to openat(2).

  Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
  resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
  breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
  applications.

  This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
  (which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
  was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
  changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
  others I felt were useful.

  In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
  AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
  instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
  syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
  openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
  following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:

  LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:

     Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
     absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
     trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
     also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
     permitted).

  LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:

     Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
     by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
     filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
     reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
     the name.

     It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
     ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
     you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
     will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
     magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.

     In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
     LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.

  LOOKUP_BENEATH:

     Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
     tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
     paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.

     Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
     point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
     to protect against various races that would allow escape using
     "..".

     Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
     can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
     protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
     as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.

  In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:

  LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:

     Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
     all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
     can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
     long as no parent path had a symlink component.

  LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:

     This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
     attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
     scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
     protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
     operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
     chroot(2) is not.

     If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
     generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
     cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.

     The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
     currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
     paths in a potentially malicious container.

     There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
     having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
     CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
     few).

  In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
  libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
  It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
  openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
  thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.

  Future work would include implementing things like
  RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
  programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"

* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
  selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
  open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
  namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
  namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
  namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
  namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
  nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
  namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
 "This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.

  I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
  zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
  leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
  repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
  review during that... Oh, well.

  Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
  review and public testing, so here it comes"

From Aleksa's description of the series:
 "For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
  incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
  possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
  accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
  flags are present[1].

  This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
  been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
  defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
  kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
  flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
  to being added to openat(2).

  Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
  resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
  breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
  applications.

  This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
  (which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
  was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
  changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
  others I felt were useful.

  In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
  AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
  instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
  syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
  openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
  following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:

  LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:

     Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
     absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
     trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
     also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
     permitted).

  LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:

     Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
     by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
     filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
     reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
     the name.

     It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
     ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
     you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
     will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
     magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.

     In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
     LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.

  LOOKUP_BENEATH:

     Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
     tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
     paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.

     Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
     point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
     to protect against various races that would allow escape using
     "..".

     Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
     can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
     protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
     as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.

  In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:

  LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:

     Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
     all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
     can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
     long as no parent path had a symlink component.

  LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:

     This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
     attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
     scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
     protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
     operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
     chroot(2) is not.

     If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
     generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
     cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.

     The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
     currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
     paths in a potentially malicious container.

     There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
     having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
     CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
     few).

  In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
  libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
  It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
  openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
  thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.

  Future work would include implementing things like
  RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
  programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"

* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
  selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
  open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
  namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
  namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
  namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
  namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
  namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
  nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
  namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>open: introduce openat2(2) syscall</title>
<updated>2020-01-18T14:19:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aleksa Sarai</name>
<email>cyphar@cyphar.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-18T12:07:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fddb5d430ad9fa91b49b1d34d0202ffe2fa0e179'/>
<id>fddb5d430ad9fa91b49b1d34d0202ffe2fa0e179</id>
<content type='text'>
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].

This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).

Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.

In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.

Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).

/* Syscall Prototype. */
  /*
   * open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
   * clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
   * sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
   * extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
   * acting as a no-op default.
   */
  struct open_how { /* ... */ };

  int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
              struct open_how *how, size_t size);

/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:

  flags
    Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
    bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
    will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
    allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).

  mode
    The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

    Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

  resolve
    Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
    path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
    moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
    the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).

    RESOLVE_NO_XDEV       =&gt; LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
    RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS   =&gt; LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
    RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS =&gt; LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
    RESOLVE_BENEATH       =&gt; LOOKUP_BENEATH
    RESOLVE_IN_ROOT       =&gt; LOOKUP_IN_ROOT

open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though -&gt;mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.

Note that as a result of the new how-&gt;flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).

After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.

/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.

In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).

/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).

Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.

Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].

This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).

Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.

In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.

Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).

/* Syscall Prototype. */
  /*
   * open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
   * clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
   * sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
   * extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
   * acting as a no-op default.
   */
  struct open_how { /* ... */ };

  int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
              struct open_how *how, size_t size);

/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:

  flags
    Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
    bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
    will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
    allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).

  mode
    The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

    Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

  resolve
    Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
    path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
    moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
    the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).

    RESOLVE_NO_XDEV       =&gt; LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
    RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS   =&gt; LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
    RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS =&gt; LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
    RESOLVE_BENEATH       =&gt; LOOKUP_BENEATH
    RESOLVE_IN_ROOT       =&gt; LOOKUP_IN_ROOT

open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though -&gt;mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.

Note that as a result of the new how-&gt;flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).

After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.

/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.

In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).

/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).

Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.

Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: Reserve asm-generic prot flags 0x10 and 0x20 for arch use</title>
<updated>2020-01-17T12:48:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Martin</name>
<email>Dave.Martin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-11T18:40:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d41938d2cbee926a7de0c1dcff94ca34bf2cab78'/>
<id>d41938d2cbee926a7de0c1dcff94ca34bf2cab78</id>
<content type='text'>
The asm-generic/mman.h definitions are used by a few architectures that
also define arch-specific PROT flags with value 0x10 and 0x20. This
currently applies to sparc and powerpc for 0x10, while arm64 will soon
join with 0x10 and 0x20.

To help future maintainers, document the use of this flag in the
asm-generic header too.

Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: reserve 0x20 as well]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The asm-generic/mman.h definitions are used by a few architectures that
also define arch-specific PROT flags with value 0x10 and 0x20. This
currently applies to sparc and powerpc for 0x10, while arm64 will soon
join with 0x10 and 0x20.

To help future maintainers, document the use of this flag in the
asm-generic header too.

Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: reserve 0x20 as well]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall</title>
<updated>2020-01-13T20:49:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sargun Dhillon</name>
<email>sargun@sargun.me</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-07T17:59:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9a2cef09c801de54feecd912303ace5c27237f12'/>
<id>9a2cef09c801de54feecd912303ace5c27237f12</id>
<content type='text'>
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures.

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures.

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
