<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include, branch v2.6.32.41</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>af_unix: limit recursion level</title>
<updated>2011-05-09T22:55:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-25T04:11:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6019f3837946cd5872ed473cd492d90c49228ee3'/>
<id>6019f3837946cd5872ed473cd492d90c49228ee3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25888e30319f8896fc656fc68643e6a078263060 upstream.

Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.

lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8

This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
recursion limit.

Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
sizes only.

Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.

Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
when socket receive queue is emptied.

Reported-by: Марк Коренберг &lt;socketpair@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Adjust for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 25888e30319f8896fc656fc68643e6a078263060 upstream.

Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.

lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8

This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
recursion limit.

Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
sizes only.

Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.

Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
when socket receive queue is emptied.

Reported-by: Марк Коренберг &lt;socketpair@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Adjust for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mmc: fix all hangs related to mmc/sd card insert/removal during suspend/resume</title>
<updated>2011-05-09T22:55:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Levitsky</name>
<email>maximlevitsky@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-11T01:01:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=28e4bf4a8b80ccae1e42f9ca2d173f1cf5f60abb'/>
<id>28e4bf4a8b80ccae1e42f9ca2d173f1cf5f60abb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4c2ef25fe0b847d2ae818f74758ddb0be1c27d8e upstream.

If you don't use CONFIG_MMC_UNSAFE_RESUME, as soon as you attempt to
suspend, the card will be removed, therefore this patch doesn't change the
behavior of this option.

However the removal will be done by pm notifier, which runs while
userspace is still not frozen and thus can freely use del_gendisk, without
the risk of deadlock which would happen otherwise.

Card detect workqueue is now disabled while userspace is frozen, Therefore
if you do use CONFIG_MMC_UNSAFE_RESUME, and remove the card during
suspend, the removal will be detected as soon as userspace is unfrozen,
again at the moment it is safe to call del_gendisk.

Tested with and without CONFIG_MMC_UNSAFE_RESUME with suspend and hibernate.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: clean up function prototype]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_PM-n linkage, small cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;maximlevitsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Brownell &lt;david-b@pacbell.net&gt;
Cc: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Adjust for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4c2ef25fe0b847d2ae818f74758ddb0be1c27d8e upstream.

If you don't use CONFIG_MMC_UNSAFE_RESUME, as soon as you attempt to
suspend, the card will be removed, therefore this patch doesn't change the
behavior of this option.

However the removal will be done by pm notifier, which runs while
userspace is still not frozen and thus can freely use del_gendisk, without
the risk of deadlock which would happen otherwise.

Card detect workqueue is now disabled while userspace is frozen, Therefore
if you do use CONFIG_MMC_UNSAFE_RESUME, and remove the card during
suspend, the removal will be detected as soon as userspace is unfrozen,
again at the moment it is safe to call del_gendisk.

Tested with and without CONFIG_MMC_UNSAFE_RESUME with suspend and hibernate.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: clean up function prototype]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_PM-n linkage, small cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;maximlevitsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Brownell &lt;david-b@pacbell.net&gt;
Cc: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Adjust for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: Add define for TX headroom reserved by mac80211 itself.</title>
<updated>2011-05-09T22:55:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gertjan van Wingerde</name>
<email>gwingerde@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-10T18:25:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b5f7f94872ef2ed281783017e1a6ac787b8c107'/>
<id>2b5f7f94872ef2ed281783017e1a6ac787b8c107</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d24deb2580823ab0b8425790c6f5d18e2ff749d8 upstream.

Add a definition of the amount of TX headroom reserved by mac80211 itself
for its own purposes. Also add BUILD_BUG_ON to validate the value.
This define can then be used by drivers to request additional TX headroom
in the most efficient manner.

Signed-off-by: Gertjan van Wingerde &lt;gwingerde@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
[bwh: Adjust context for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d24deb2580823ab0b8425790c6f5d18e2ff749d8 upstream.

Add a definition of the amount of TX headroom reserved by mac80211 itself
for its own purposes. Also add BUILD_BUG_ON to validate the value.
This define can then be used by drivers to request additional TX headroom
in the most efficient manner.

Signed-off-by: Gertjan van Wingerde &lt;gwingerde@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
[bwh: Adjust context for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>next_pidmap: fix overflow condition</title>
<updated>2011-04-22T15:44:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-18T17:35:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=67e022f3add1879292986e779b2aaf6ecb93fa58'/>
<id>67e022f3add1879292986e779b2aaf6ecb93fa58</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c78193e9c7bcbf25b8237ad0dec82f805c4ea69b upstream.

next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed
in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc.

Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range
(and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the
helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without
checking the range of its arguments.

So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT.  The fact that we then do "last+1"
doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the
pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow
case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to
overflow).

[ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ]

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@cmpxchg8b.com&gt;
Analyzed-by: Robert Święcki &lt;robert@swiecki.net&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c78193e9c7bcbf25b8237ad0dec82f805c4ea69b upstream.

next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed
in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc.

Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range
(and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the
helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without
checking the range of its arguments.

So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT.  The fact that we then do "last+1"
doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the
pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow
case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to
overflow).

[ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ]

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@cmpxchg8b.com&gt;
Analyzed-by: Robert Święcki &lt;robert@swiecki.net&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: copy-and-paste the fixes into compat_do_execve() paths</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-30T19:56:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c18114efe9ae2bacb125f3273d004e5010d8cf07'/>
<id>c18114efe9ae2bacb125f3273d004e5010d8cf07</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 114279be2120a916e8a04feeb2ac976a10016f2f upstream.

Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible.
That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and
uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later.

compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm-&gt;vma/mm directly and thus has
two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory
is not visible to oom killer.

Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings()
to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0)
as do_execve() does.

Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and
compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly
makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff &lt;jmm@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 114279be2120a916e8a04feeb2ac976a10016f2f upstream.

Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible.
That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and
uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later.

compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm-&gt;vma/mm directly and thus has
two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory
is not visible to oom killer.

Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings()
to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0)
as do_execve() does.

Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and
compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly
makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff &lt;jmm@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: make argv/envp memory visible to oom-killer</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-30T19:55:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d3de146b4e4fcf817cee3831c0396ec8e8e2864e'/>
<id>d3de146b4e4fcf817cee3831c0396ec8e8e2864e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c77f845722158206a7209c45ccddc264d19319c upstream.

Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that
evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT):
http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c

execve()-&gt;copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but
this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent
bprm-&gt;mm and take it into account.

With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES
counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When
do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back.

Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new
page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but
I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct
once exec changes -&gt;mm or fails.

Reported-by: Brad Spengler &lt;spender@grsecurity.net&gt;
Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff &lt;jmm@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3c77f845722158206a7209c45ccddc264d19319c upstream.

Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that
evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT):
http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c

execve()-&gt;copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but
this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent
bprm-&gt;mm and take it into account.

With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES
counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When
do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back.

Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new
page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but
I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct
once exec changes -&gt;mm or fails.

Reported-by: Brad Spengler &lt;spender@grsecurity.net&gt;
Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff &lt;jmm@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASoC: Explicitly say registerless widgets have no register</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Brown</name>
<email>broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-23T20:45:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b418b57336323c208e8770bc2614e02eb3d1b19'/>
<id>2b418b57336323c208e8770bc2614e02eb3d1b19</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0ca03cd7d0fa3bfbd56958136a10f19733c4ce12 upstream.

This stops code that handles widgets generically from attempting to access
registers for these widgets.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com&gt;
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood &lt;lrg@ti.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0ca03cd7d0fa3bfbd56958136a10f19733c4ce12 upstream.

This stops code that handles widgets generically from attempting to access
registers for these widgets.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com&gt;
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood &lt;lrg@ti.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ses: Avoid kernel panic when lun 0 is not mapped</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Krishnasamy, Somasundaram</name>
<email>Somasundaram.Krishnasamy@lsi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-28T23:13:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=40001773632081282f51a4cf582e0bb7fee7c225'/>
<id>40001773632081282f51a4cf582e0bb7fee7c225</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d1e12de804f9d8ad114786ca7c2ce593cba79891 upstream.

During device discovery, scsi mid layer sends INQUIRY command to LUN
0. If the LUN 0 is not mapped to host, it creates a temporary
scsi_device with LUN id 0 and sends REPORT_LUNS command to it. After
the REPORT_LUNS succeeds, it walks through the LUN table and adds each
LUN found to sysfs. At the end of REPORT_LUNS lun table scan, it will
delete the temporary scsi_device of LUN 0.

When scsi devices are added to sysfs, it calls add_dev function of all
the registered class interfaces. If ses driver has been registered,
ses_intf_add() of ses module will be called. This function calls
scsi_device_enclosure() to check the inquiry data for EncServ
bit. Since inquiry was not allocated for temporary LUN 0 scsi_device,
it will cause NULL pointer exception.

To fix the problem, sdev-&gt;inquiry is checked for NULL before reading it.

Signed-off-by: Somasundaram Krishnasamy &lt;Somasundaram.Krishnasamy@lsi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger &lt;babu.moger@lsi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d1e12de804f9d8ad114786ca7c2ce593cba79891 upstream.

During device discovery, scsi mid layer sends INQUIRY command to LUN
0. If the LUN 0 is not mapped to host, it creates a temporary
scsi_device with LUN id 0 and sends REPORT_LUNS command to it. After
the REPORT_LUNS succeeds, it walks through the LUN table and adds each
LUN found to sysfs. At the end of REPORT_LUNS lun table scan, it will
delete the temporary scsi_device of LUN 0.

When scsi devices are added to sysfs, it calls add_dev function of all
the registered class interfaces. If ses driver has been registered,
ses_intf_add() of ses module will be called. This function calls
scsi_device_enclosure() to check the inquiry data for EncServ
bit. Since inquiry was not allocated for temporary LUN 0 scsi_device,
it will cause NULL pointer exception.

To fix the problem, sdev-&gt;inquiry is checked for NULL before reading it.

Signed-off-by: Somasundaram Krishnasamy &lt;Somasundaram.Krishnasamy@lsi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger &lt;babu.moger@lsi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug</title>
<updated>2011-03-23T20:16:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>srostedt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-11T02:26:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4db6055ac0d0bfe40daec0448b4d2824c991ad07'/>
<id>4db6055ac0d0bfe40daec0448b4d2824c991ad07</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 868baf07b1a259f5f3803c1dc2777b6c358f83cf upstream.

When the fuction graph tracer starts, it needs to make a special
stack for each task to save the real return values of the tasks.
All running tasks have this stack created, as well as any new
tasks.

On CPU hot plug, the new idle task will allocate a stack as well
when init_idle() is called. The problem is that cpu hotplug does
not create a new idle_task. Instead it uses the idle task that
existed when the cpu went down.

ftrace_graph_init_task() will add a new ret_stack to the task
that is given to it. Because a clone will make the task
have a stack of its parent it does not check if the task's
ret_stack is already NULL or not. When the CPU hotplug code
starts a CPU up again, it will allocate a new stack even
though one already existed for it.

The solution is to treat the idle_task specially. In fact, the
function_graph code already does, just not at init_idle().
Instead of using the ftrace_graph_init_task() for the idle task,
which that function expects the task to be a clone, have a
separate ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(). Also, we will create a
per_cpu ret_stack that is used by the idle task. When we call
ftrace_graph_init_idle_task() it will check if the idle task's
ret_stack is NULL, if it is, then it will assign it the per_cpu
ret_stack.

Reported-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 868baf07b1a259f5f3803c1dc2777b6c358f83cf upstream.

When the fuction graph tracer starts, it needs to make a special
stack for each task to save the real return values of the tasks.
All running tasks have this stack created, as well as any new
tasks.

On CPU hot plug, the new idle task will allocate a stack as well
when init_idle() is called. The problem is that cpu hotplug does
not create a new idle_task. Instead it uses the idle task that
existed when the cpu went down.

ftrace_graph_init_task() will add a new ret_stack to the task
that is given to it. Because a clone will make the task
have a stack of its parent it does not check if the task's
ret_stack is already NULL or not. When the CPU hotplug code
starts a CPU up again, it will allocate a new stack even
though one already existed for it.

The solution is to treat the idle_task specially. In fact, the
function_graph code already does, just not at init_idle().
Instead of using the ftrace_graph_init_task() for the idle task,
which that function expects the task to be a clone, have a
separate ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(). Also, we will create a
per_cpu ret_stack that is used by the idle task. When we call
ftrace_graph_init_idle_task() it will check if the idle task's
ret_stack is NULL, if it is, then it will assign it the per_cpu
ret_stack.

Reported-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules</title>
<updated>2011-03-14T21:30:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-01T21:33:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af4a02bb1eede764c1db87575462cbe1c023e164'/>
<id>af4a02bb1eede764c1db87575462cbe1c023e164</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b upstream.

Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/.  This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**.  However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.

This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases.  This fixes CVE-2011-1019.

Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".

Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.

    root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
    root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
    CapInh:	0000000000000000
    CapPrm:	fffffff800001000
    CapEff:	fffffff800001000
    CapBnd:	fffffff800001000
    root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
    FATAL: Error inserting xfs
    (/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
    xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
    sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
    sit0      Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
	      NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1

    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    sit                    10457  0
    tunnel4                 2957  1 sit

For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:

    root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
    CapInh:	0000000000000000
    CapPrm:	ffffffffffffffff
    CapEff:	ffffffffffffffff
    CapBnd:	ffffffffffffffff
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
    xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    xfs                   745319  0

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev &lt;mjt@tls.msk.ru&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b upstream.

Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/.  This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**.  However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.

This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases.  This fixes CVE-2011-1019.

Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".

Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.

    root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
    root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
    CapInh:	0000000000000000
    CapPrm:	fffffff800001000
    CapEff:	fffffff800001000
    CapBnd:	fffffff800001000
    root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
    FATAL: Error inserting xfs
    (/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
    xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
    sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
    sit0      Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
	      NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1

    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    sit                    10457  0
    tunnel4                 2957  1 sit

For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:

    root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
    CapInh:	0000000000000000
    CapPrm:	ffffffffffffffff
    CapEff:	ffffffffffffffff
    CapBnd:	ffffffffffffffff
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
    xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    xfs                   745319  0

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev &lt;mjt@tls.msk.ru&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
